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Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind 
literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into 
the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are 
compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended 
Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of 
the enablers of mental states. 
 
What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive 
versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived 
content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot 
settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has 
stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make.  
 
Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-
derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. 
Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it 
can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with 
regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely 
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The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) has received a great deal of attention 
since Clark and Chalmers ignited the debate with the publication of ‗The 
Extended Mind‘ in 1998, triggering a large volume of work from both 
critics and sympathisers (e.g. Rupert 2004; Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2005, 
2008; Brook 2006, Sterelny 2004, Shapiro 2008, Clark  2001, 2003, 
2007, 2008, 2009, Rowlands 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2009; Menary 
2006, 2007;  Hurley 1998, 2000, Wheeler 2005) and at least three 
dedicated conferences.
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 This seminal paper can currently be found in 
readers for undergraduate philosophy courses (see Lycan & Prinz (eds.) 
Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, 3
rd
 edition), illustrating that EMT 
has, in the relatively short time since its inception, established itself in the 
philosophical firmament. Its initial success notwithstanding, I argue that 
we must re-think the claims and commitments of EMT as currently 
formulated if a genuinely interesting argument for the extension of mind 
is to be developed.  
 
I offer much needed analysis and clarification of the claims of EMT as 
presented by Clark and Chalmers. Doing so will reveal its core claims to 
be problematic because it accepts too much from traditional views of 
mind that it challenges on the issue of internalism. This is not just a 
descriptive analysis of the field. The debate has stagnated recently and 
my original analysis reveals that acceptance, by both sides, of the 
representationalist view of mind and, in particular, of non-derived content 
as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental means there seems to 
be no decisive moves left to make. 
                                               
1 The Extended Mind: The Very Idea, The University of Hertfordshire 29th June – 1st 
July 2001, The Extended Mind II: Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the 
head, The University of Hertfordshire 10th -12th July 2006, and The Extended Mind 
Thesis in Theory and Applications, ZiF Bielefeld, Germany 23rd -25th November 2009. 
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The core claim to be defended in this work, then, is that when properly 
understood EMT does not yield a decisive argument for extension of the 
defining aspects of the mental. At best—although those aspects of mental 
states that are definitive of mentality do not extend—it is possible that the 
functional aspects of non-biologically basic mental states sometimes 
extend, in certain special cases. The principal conclusion of this thesis is 
that an interesting version of EMT has yet to be formulated: my aim is to 
set the stage for and motivate that development, and to say something 
about what it would require. 
 
In order to establish the core thesis, I begin in chapter one with an 
explication of EMT as originally formulated by Clark and Chalmers and 
also examine more recent adjustments to this formulation by Clark. I 
suggest that Clark‘s exact position can be hard to pin down and argue that 
this is symptomatic of a tension in his work between what is advertised, 
which is nothing less that the literal extension of the mind into the world, 
and what the arguments can conclusively demonstrate, which is a more 
modest, and more easily established claim concerning the extension of 
the enablers of certain mental states. I also draw attention to the key 
distinction between cognitive processes and mental states. Clark and 
Chalmers point out that the extension of cognitive processes may not be 
sufficient to secure EMT proper since the extension of mind requires 
moving beyond mere processing. Thus, EMT requires the extension of 
mental states into the world. 
 
Chapters two and three continue the expository work of the first chapter, 
focusing on the work of Mark Rowlands and Susan Hurley. Both authors 
are commonly taken to advocate a version of EMT but if this requires the 
extension of mental states then we can question whether or not they argue 
for a genuine EMT, since their focus is on the extension of cognitive 
processes and the vehicles of the unity of consciousness, respectively.  
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Chapter four describes some responses and objections that have been 
levelled at EMT in the literature and demonstrates that what is taken to be 
at stake in this debate, on both sides, is nothing less than the literal 
extension of the mental or the cognitive into the environment. I argue that 
each of the objections considered reduce to one key issue: constitution 
versus enabling. In order to settle questions concerning the location of the 
constituents of mental states as distinct from the mere enablers of mental 
states, we require an independently motivated mark of the mental. Clark 
argues that he can accept a proposal by Adams and Aizawa for non-
derived content being the mark of the mental and maintain his argument 
for the extension of mind into the world so long as the extended aspects 
of mental states maintain a special relationship with internal non-derived 
contents. 
 
In order to assess the possibility for success of this strategy I return in 
chapter five to re-examine the fundamental functionalist account of 
mental states and their properties that is presupposed by EMT in order to 
clarify precisely the nature of its claims. If functionalism alone were 
enough for developing an understanding of the mind then perhaps a broad 
functionalism of the sort espoused by Jackson and Pettit (1988) could 
yield an interesting (non-trivial) version of EMT. However, many hold 
that functionalism alone is not sufficient for understanding the mind. 
Consequently, it is thought to require supplementation with a 
representational theory of mind and, moreover, that it is the 
representational content of mental states that is definitive of mentality. 
But if the representational contents that individuate mental states are both 
definitive of mentality and internal then in what sense can the mental 
state be said to extend? 
 
This analysis will reveal that, because of its exclusive focus on processes 
that support or enable mental states (e.g. belief-forming mechanisms) 
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proponents of EMT only give decisive arguments for a weaker thesis 
about the extended ‗machinery‘ of the mind – not of mind itself, or of the 
mental. Understood in this way, EMT converts to EMMT (The Extended 
Machinery of Mind Thesis) and poses no interesting threat to internalism 
regarding mental states. 
 
The investigation will expose that participants in the standard debates 
about EMT have been talking at cross purposes – i.e. that they have not 
clearly articulated the true implications of the proposal of EMT as set 
forth by Clark and Chalmers. Despite the enormous attention that Clark 
and Chalmers‘ proposals have attracted in recent years, if EMT is 
understood as EMMT it becomes clear that the thesis is of limited interest 
and that EMT has been falsely advertised.  
 
Without arguments to secure the extension of the defining aspects of 
mental states into the world the only other possible move for defenders of 
EMT to make would be to argue that although not all aspects of mind 
extend and not even those that are definitive of mentality, it is at least 
possible that the functional aspects of non-biologically basic mental 
states sometimes extend, in certain special cases. But even if such a claim 
could be upheld it too undercuts the value and potential interest of EMT. 
 
In the light of this analysis Chapter six considers the possibility of what 
an interesting version of EMT might look like and what it would require. 
I illustrate how Clark‘s unwillingness to engage the issue of the mark of 
the mental and propose an alternative to the representational view of 
mind stymies his capacity to develop a truly challenging version of EMT. 
But new theories of cognition are developing which deny that mental 
representations are the basis of mentality (see enactivism; Noë, Di Paolo, 
Thompson, O‘Regan, Hutto) and suggest the possibility of a different, 
content-free ‗mark of the mental‘. If these approaches can be made to 
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work then an interesting version of EMT would be possible. I conclude 
with a brief summing up of the principal argument and lay out some 


































The primary purpose of this chapter is exposition—I explore and explain 
EMT as defended by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. I do this by 
considering arguments for thinking that playing Tetris is a case of 
extended cognition and for the attribution of extended beliefs to an 
Alzheimer‘s sufferer who uses a notebook as an ‗external memory‘. In 
the process I also highlight a major worry that will form the backbone of 
my thesis: there is a tension between how EMT is advertised and what 
can conclusively be argued for. As advertised, EMT is about the 
extension of mind into the world. But in this chapter I will demonstrate 
that Clark and Chalmers do not give us enough to secure this claim. All 
that is conclusively demonstrated is the extension of cognition-enabling 
and belief-forming mechanisms. The arguments for EMT presented by 
Clark and Chalmers are too weak, since they do not secure the extension 
of mental states into the world. 
 
EMT vs. Content Externalism 
 
EMT, in its various different incarnations is presented as introducing a 
form of externalism that is distinct from the more familiar Content 
Externalism of Putnam and Burge, and Clark and Chalmers introduce 
‗The Extended Mind‘ (1998) by drawing attention to this distinction: 
 
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question 
invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and 
skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others 
are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words 
"just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning 
carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a 
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third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an 
active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in 




It is not entirely clear what Clark and Chalmers mean by the term 
‗driving‘ here. Indeed, it seems an odd choice of word if their view is that 
the environment can constitute part of the cognitive process (see below) 
and not merely be an add-on to, or enabler of, cognition. This sort of 
expression is key in highlighting the tension inherent in the claims of 
EMT.  
 
But we can put these worries to one side for the moment and consider 
how EMT is presented as furthering the externalist agenda by challenging 
internalism in new and possibly more interesting ways when compared 
with Content Externalism. Roughly, the EM theorist argues not merely 
for the partial external individuation of mental state contents but the 
partial external constitution of mental states and cognitive processes. 
Clark and Chalmers argue that where content externalism invokes passive 
and distal external features that are situated at the end of a long causal 
chain to individuate and attribute mental content, their radical new 
externalism recruits active and proximal external features that are 
required for the production of behaviour. Because of the passive and 
distal nature of the external resources availed of by content externalism, 
they are not thought to play a causal or explanatory role in the here-and-
now generation of action:  
 
In counterfactual cases where internal structure is held constant but 
external features are changed, behaviour looks just the same; so internal 
structure seems to be doing the crucial work. (Ibid: 9) 
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So, for example, if I and my twin-earth doppelganger are both thinking 
that water is wet then any resulting actions will be physically 
indistinguishable in spite of the fact that he is surrounded by XYZ and I 
am surrounded by H2O. 
 
Clark and Chalmers claim that their variety of EMT can be contrasted 
with content externalism because the external features cited in their 
version of externalism:  
 
[P]lay an ineliminable role – if we retain internal structure but change
 the external features, behaviour may change completely. The external
 features here are just as causally relevant as typical internal features of
 the brain. (Ibid.) 
 
In this way Clark and Chalmers‘ EMT is argued to be an active 
externalism—rather than a passive externalism of the content externalist 
variety—because of the essential role that the external features play in the 
generation of action. In the next section I begin to consider Clark and 
Chalmers‘ arguments for this new form of externalism with an 
exploration of the distinction between epistemic and pragmatic actions. 
 
Epistemic vs. Pragmatic Actions 
 
A key component of Clark and Chalmers‘ argument for the extension of 
cognitive processes and mental states is the distinction between epistemic 
and pragmatic actions; a distinction originally introduced by David 
Kirsch and Paul Maglio (1994). Kirsh and Maglio define pragmatic 
actions as actions that are performed in order to bring one physically 
closer to a goal. Such actions bring about some change in the 
environment that is desirable for its own sake. Clark and Chalmers cite 
the case of putting cement in a hole in a dam as an example because a 
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situation where the dam is intact is preferable to one where it is leaking 
and filling the hole with cement brings one physically closer to the goal 
of having an intact dam. Likewise, my removing the top from a bottle of 
water when I am thirsty is an example of a pragmatic action because the 
state of affairs in which I can drink the water from the bottle is one that is 
desirable to me. 
 
Epistemic actions are defined by Kirsch and Maglio as being: ―physical 
actions that make mental computation easier, faster, or more reliable‖ 
(Ibid: 514). Consequently, epistemic actions are not seen merely as the 
end products of cognition. They are actions that alter the world because 
some physical change in the environment, which is brought about by the 
action, ―aids and augments‖ (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8) cognition in 
some way. Consider as an example of an epistemic action the process of 
using a pen and paper to work out a long multiplication sum, such as 
finding the product of 786 and 345. In a simple case of mathematical 
reasoning, where the completion of a mathematical operation such as ‗6 × 
6‘ is required, most of us can just ‗see‘ the answer (Rumelhart et al. 1986 
suggest that this is evidence of some kind of pattern-completion 
mechanism that we possess). However, for the majority of us the solution 
to questions of longer multiplication does not come so easily. For 
example, very few of us could just ‗see‘ the answer to 786 × 345. 
―Instead, we avail ourselves of an external formalism that reduces the 
bigger task to an iterated series of familiar steps‖ (Rowlands 1995a: 19). 
That is, we write down the numbers on a piece of paper and go through a 
series of pattern completion operations: ‗5 × 6‘, ‗5 × 8‘ etc., storing the 
intermediate results according to the long multiplication algorithm. In 
such a case the task is transformed from being one of finding the product 
of 786 and 345 to being the task of finding the product of 5 and 6, the 
product of 5 and 8 and so on. Without this strategy our ability to find the 
product of the two numbers is severely limited, thus the strategy is one 
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that aids and augments our long multiplication abilities. So, if I am 
presented with what in this case ostensibly seems like a cognitive task 
and I choose to complete this task not by means of mental arithmetic 
alone but with the help of a pen and paper then, according to Kirsch and 
Maglio (and also Clark and Chalmers), my doing so is an epistemic 
action because it aids and augments my ability to complete the cognitive 
task in question. 
 
Kirsch and Maglio‘s objective is to unseat the predominant view that all 
actions are pragmatic actions. ―On this view, cognition is logically prior: 
cognition is necessary for intelligent action, but action is never necessary 
for intelligent cognition‖ (Kirsch & Maglio 1994: 526). They hold such a 
view to be wrong, arguing that not all actions have the sole purpose of 
bringing one physically closer to a goal. It is their contention that some 
actions are performed in order to make a problem-solving or cognitive 
task easier, even though they might demonstrably bring one physically 
further away from the stated goal. The specifics of their argument consist 
in presenting evidence of these epistemic actions from studies of subjects 
playing Tetris to show that certain cognitive and perceptual problems are 
solved more quickly, more easily, and with less error by acting in the 
world than by relying solely on computations performed within the head. 
 
It is important to note that although Clark and Chalmers make much of 
Kirsch and Maglio‘s distinction between epistemic and pragmatic 
actions, they do move beyond the arguments proposed by Kirsch and 
Maglio in one very important respect. Kirsch and Maglio state that 
epistemic actions:  
 
[A]re best understood as actions that use the world to improve 
cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to 
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implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to 
simplify the problem-solving task. (Ibid: 513) 
 
They go on to more precisely clarify epistemic actions as being actions 
with the function of improving cognition by: 
 
1. reducing the memory involved in mental computation, i.e., space 
complexity; 
2. reducing the number of steps involved in mental computation, i.e., time 
complexity; 
3. reducing the probability of error of mental computation, i.e., 
unreliability. (Ibid.: 514) 
  
This is the limit of Kirsch and Maglio‘s claims for epistemic actions: 
epistemic actions aid and improve performance on certain cognitive 
tasks. They do not make the stronger claim that epistemic actions are 
partially constitutive of cognition. This is where the critical difference 
between their proposal and EMT lies. Clark and Chalmers declare that 
epistemic actions demand a spread of epistemic credit. Returning to the 
long multiplication example considered above Clark and Chalmers hold 
that the use of the pen and paper to complete the cognitive task can be 
seen as more than a mere add-on or aid to cognition; the use of the pen 
and paper is part of the cognitive process itself because a portion of the 
cognitive load is outsourced into the environment. If the use of the pen 
and paper is essential to the completion of the cognitive task then, they 
argue, there is no reason to deny that it forms part of the cognitive 
process. Thus, for Clark and Chalmers, epistemic actions such as these 
demand a spread of epistemic credit across the internal pattern 
completion processes and the action performed involving pen and paper. 
This is another way of expressing the core claim of EMT that we saw in 
the first section of this chapter: that in certain cases external features play 
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an ineliminable role in the completion of cognitive tasks. So, if we 
consider a counterfactual situation where internal structure is retained in 
the form of the pattern completion mechanisms constitutive of my limited 
multiplication abilities but the external features—in this case my 
recruitment of pen and paper—are changed then my capacity to 
successfully complete the cognitive task in question is compromised. 
 
To further demonstrate their claim that epistemic actions demand a 
spread of epistemic credit, Clark and Chalmers cite the example of the 
computer game Tetris, first explored by Kirsch and Maglio in their 1994 
paper, and it is to Clark and Chalmers‘ thought-experiment developed 
from this research that I turn now. 
 
But before continuing we should be aware here of the distinction between 
the claim that an epistemic actions can form a constituent part of a 
cognitive processes, and the claim that external features are causally 
relevant. Clark, in particular, wavers between the stronger constitutive 
claim and the weaker causal relevance claim. Only the stronger 





For the uninitiated, Tetris involves the manipulation of two-dimensional 
shapes, or ‗zoids‘, on a computer screen which must be rotated so as to fit 
together to form lines across the screen. The rotation of the blocks on 
screen is performed at the push of a button. Points are scored when a full 
horizontal line is completed, this line then disappears. Failure to complete 
a horizontal line quickly enough will result in an accumulation of falling 
zoids that cause the game to end once they reach the top of the screen. 
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Clark and Chalmers ask us to consider three apparently different ways of 
playing Tetris: 
 
1. The player, sitting before a computer screen, must picture and then 
rotate the zoids mentally (i.e. without use of the game‘s controls) in 
order to determine their fit and align them with the available ‗sockets‘. 
2. The player, instead of mentally rotating the zoids, adopts the standard 
strategy of physically rotating the image on the screen by pressing a 
button. This strategy has the benefit of taking less time than the strategy 
outlined in case 1.
2
 
3. The player has a neural implant that performs the necessary rotation of 
the ‗zoids‘ at the same speed as the computer in the second case. 
 
In the third case the agent has a choice regarding which internal resource 
to invoke. He can choose to make use of the implant or use ‗good old 
fashioned mental rotation‘. The choice exists because each resource 
demands different brain processes and also places different demands on 
attention, but as a matter of fact he chooses to utilise the neural implant. 
Now although each case is clearly different Clark and Chalmers want to 
argue that each case is also, importantly, on a par with regard to cognitive 
status. Our intuitions may tell us that in case 1 the rotation of the zoids is 
performed mentally, whereas case 2 looks, at first pass, like a simple case 
of non-mental rotation. But case 3 may be harder to classify; our 
intuitions do not seem to be as clear cut in this case. The computational 
operations involved in case 3 are the same as those in case 2, yet the 
computation takes place within the head, just like the (neural) 
computational operation in case 1. To help guide our intuitions Clark 
(forthcoming) introduces a fourth case: 
 
                                               
2 Kirsch and Maglio (1994) calculate that the physical rotation of a shape through 90 
degrees takes about 100 milliseconds, plus about 200 milliseconds to select the button. 
To achieve the same result by mental rotation takes about 1000 milliseconds. 
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4. A Martian whose natural cognitive equipment includes the kind of 
technology that can fast-rotate the shapes in the same way that the 
player in case 3, with the aid of a neural implant, can. 
 
In this fourth example our intuitions are clear and we have no hesitation 
in classifying the case as one of genuine mental rotation according to 
Clark.
3
 He claims, therefore, that case 4 is on a par with case 1. But the 
computational operations that are involved in case 4 are the same as those 
involved in case 3. So, says Clark, case 3 is also on a par with case 1 and 
should be considered as an example of cognitive processing that happens 
to involve non-neural hardware. To refute this claim the provision of a 
principled difference between the cases is required. Clark states that if no 
principled difference can be supplied then case 3, involving the neural 
implant, is on a par with case 4 and is also, then, on a par with case 1. 
Furthermore, he continues, since case 2 displays the same kind of 
computational structure as case 3 it seems that case 2 is also on a par with 
case 1. The only difference between cases 2 and 3 is that the 
computational structure is distributed across agent and computer in case 2 
instead of internalised within the agent, as in case 3.  
 
Clark and Chalmers argue that if case 3 is on a par with case 1 and the 
rotation of the shapes, which is carried out by means of the neural 
implant, counts as a cognitive process, then there does not seem to be any 
principled reason for denying that the rotation of the shapes in case 2 
counts as a cognitive process, or as part of a cognitive process. As 
already stated; the computational structure is the same in case 2 and case 
3 and although the computational structure is internalized in case 3, 
nothing else of relevance seems different according to Clark and 
Chalmers. If, they claim, the manipulation of these shapes was carried out 
                                               
3 We should beware of the dangers of appealing to intuition. As will become clear in the 
fourth chapter it is not intuition that will settle the debate in cases like this but the 
provision of an independently motivated mark of the cognitive or mark of the mental.  
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in the head we would have no problem in describing the situation as 
cognitive processing; to deny that doing so physically on a computer 
screen is a cognitive process, simply because it occurs outside the head, is 
to beg the question. One cannot point to the skin and skull boundary as a 
means of justification for the exclusion of this process as part of the 
cognitive process because that is precisely the question at issue.  
 
Clark and Chalmers go on to make the point that it is not just the 
presence, in these cases, of advanced external computing resources that 
raises the issue of the possibility of the extension of cognition into the 
world.  Rather, it is, they claim, a general tendency of human cognizers 
to: ―lean heavily on environmental supports.‖ (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 
8). The example considered earlier of the use of pen and paper to 
complete a long-multiplication task is a good example of just such a 
tendency. There are, suggest Clark and Chalmers, many other examples 
of this tendency in action and what is common in each case is that: ―[T]he 
individual brain performs some operations, while others are delegated to 
manipulations of external media‖ (Ibid.).  
 
As highlighted in the previous section Clark and Chalmers (and Clark in 
subsequent writings) are making a stronger claim than that made by Kirsh 
and Maglio. In their consideration of how experts play Tetris Kirsch and 
Maglio arrive at the following conclusion: 
 
We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by
 players of this video-game are best understood as actions that use the
 world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a
 plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in
 order to simplify the problem solving task. (1994: 513). 
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Clark and Chalmers‘ conclusions as based on their Tetris thought 
experiment are different from those arrived at by Kirsch and Maglio. 
Kirsch and Maglio consider the epistemic actions revealed in their studies 
as improving the cognitive capacities of a subject by simplifying the 
problem solving task. And, although they make reference to there being 
―a tighter coupling of action and cognition‖ (Ibid: 518) than has 
traditionally been thought, they nowhere make reference to these actions 
constituting part of the cognitive process. They maintain that the 
traditional failure to recognise this potential for an intimate coupling 
between action and cognition is a mistake and that we need to: 
 
[R]ecognize that often the point of an action is to put one in a better
 position to compute more effectively: to more quickly identify the
 current situation; to more quickly retrieve relevant information; to more
 effectively compute one's goal. (Ibid: 526) 
 
In this manner Kirsch and Maglio consistently refer to epistemic actions 
performed in the playing of Tetris as merely simplifying the task facing 
the player or as improving the player‘s cognitive capacities, thus retaining 
the cognitive processing within the head. 
 
We have found that in a video-game as fast paced and reactive as Tetris,
 the actions of players are often best understood as serving an epistemic
 function: the best way to interpret the actions is not as moves intended
 to improve board position, but rather as moves that simplify the
 player's problem-solving task. (Ibid: 514, emphasis mine) 
 
[S]uch epistemic procedures…are not pragmatic procedures; they are
 procedures that direct the agent to exploit its environment to make the
 most of its limited cognitive resources. (Ibid: 518, emphasis mine). 
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It seems that there are two different ways of interpreting the results of the 
Tetris experiments and Clark and Chalmers are keen to push for the 
stronger constitutive claim by looking for a spread of epistemic credit 
across internal processes and external actions. They argue for this, as we 
have seen, by making claims of parity between the different possible 
strategies adoptable by a player of Tetris. This claim for parity between 
purely internal processes and hybrid processes that straddle the internal 
and the external is dubbed the ‗Parity Principle‘ and this forms the focus 
of the next section. 
 
The Parity Principle 
 
The term ‗Parity Principle‘ is introduced by Clark in Supersizing the 
Mind (2008b), but the original formulation of the principle is given in 
‗The Extended Mind‘. 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world 
is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't 
(all) in the head! (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8) 
 
According to the Parity Principle if a process that is conducted in the 
external environment contributes to the completion of a cognitive task in 
a way that were it to go on in the head we would deem it part of the 
cognitive process, then the process conducted in the external environment 
should also be seen as part of the cognitive process. Thus, the Parity 
Principle states that the location of a process is incidental, or even 
irrelevant, to its potential status as a cognitive process. Processes 
conducted in the environment should be given equal consideration as 
potential cognitive processes, or parts thereof, as processes conducted 
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within the skin and skull. It is not the location of the process which 
determines its status as cognitive or non-cognitive. It sounds, then, as if 
the Parity Principle, upon which Clark and Chalmers‘ active externalism 
depends, evokes a version of functionalism. This is something that is 
recognised by Chalmers in his foreword to Clark‘s Supersizing the Mind 
(2008b). Rejecting the idea that EMT requires functionalism about all 
mental states Chalmers, nonetheless, concedes that EMT does require a 
weaker, more attenuated version of functionalism: 
 
All one needs is the very weak functionalism captured in the Parity 
Principle: roughly, if a state plays the same causal role in the cognitive 
network as a mental state, then there is a presumption of mentality, one 
that can only be defeated by displaying a relevant difference between 
the two (and not merely the brute difference between inner and outer). 
(Clark 2008b: xv) 
 
Moreover, if a process that is conducted in the external environment 
makes an essential—or as they put it, ineliminable—contribution to the 
completion of a cognitive task then that process, say Clark and Chalmers, 
should be seen as a constitutive part of the cognitive process. And unless 
some relevant difference is provided then nothing other than a pre-
existing internalist bias would be a reason for rejecting this claim. 
 
Returning once more to look at the Tetris thought experiment we see that 
Clark and Chalmers‘ claim is that if the processes described in case 2—
the standard Tetris strategy explored by Kirsch and Maglio—were to go 
on in the head then we would consider these processes as cognitive. But 
case 3, involving the neural implant, just is, they claim, an instance of the 
processes described in case 2 going on in the head.
4
 If case 3 can be 
considered an instance of genuine cognitive processing, then, Clark and 
                                               
4 See Coleman, forthcoming, for some good reasons why we should reject this claim. 
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Chalmers argue case 2 must also be considered to be a cognitive process 
on grounds of parity. Which is to say that if we can accept that the 
cognitive is not necessarily limited by the neural then it should not matter 
whether the non-neural element is located within the head or not. If this is 
correct then the process described in case 2, combining internal 
processing and action in the world, is a hybrid cognitive process that 
straddles the internal and the external, thereby extending beyond the 
boundaries of skin and skull and into the world.  
 
A further example offered in support of these claims goes as follows: 
 
One can explain my choice of words in Scrabble, for example, as the 
outcome of an extended cognitive process involving the rearrangement 
of tiles on my tray. Of course, one could always try to explain my action 
in terms of internal processes and a long series of "inputs" and 
"actions", but this explanation would be needlessly complex. If an 
isomorphic process were going on in the head, we would feel no urge to 
characterize it in this cumbersome way. In a very real sense, the re-
arrangement of tiles on the tray is not part of action; it is part of thought. 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998: 9-10). 
 
Given their claims here regarding the isomorphism between internal and 
extended processes, one could, perhaps, be forgiven for thinking that the 
Parity Principle makes a prima facie claim for similarity (rather than 
parity) between internal processes and certain combinations of internal 
and external processes. But Rowlands (2009a) warns against reading the 
parity principle in this way, since to do so expresses a crude and mistaken 
view of EMT. It is futile to object, on this view, that internal processes 
are demonstrably different from the external ones simply in virtue of the 
fact that internal processes involve complicated neural happenings 
whereas the environmental processes do not since the parity expressed in 
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the Parity Principle is pitched at a level of abstraction above that of brute 
similarity in processing. The claim was never that the coupling of internal 
and external processes constitutes an externalisation of what is already in 
the head. Rather, the claim is that were such a process to go on in the 
head then it would be cognitive. 
 
Nonetheless, given the possibility that a mistaken similarity-based 
interpretation of the Parity Principle affords for making the sort of 
objection sketched above, some proponents of EMT have argued that 
relying on the Parity Principle is a mistake. Richard Menary (2006), for 
example suggests that the Parity Principle, as currently framed, is flawed 
and should be dropped by advocates of EMT. It is flawed because it 
emphasises equivalence between internal and external processes, whereas 
Menary argues that it is pertinent to emphasise the differences. 
 
Menary prefers the term ‗Cognitive Integrationist‘ over ‗Extended Mind 
Theorist‘ since he sees the task as being one of integrating disparate 
internal and external processes into an extended cognitive system. 
Menary claims that the integration of internal and external elements of 
cognitive processing makes more sense when we drop the Parity 
Principle and understand arguments in favour of EMT as integrating 
apparently disparate processes into a cognitive whole for the purpose of 
completing certain cognitive tasks. In this case the external processes that 
constitute part of the extended cognitive process may be quite different 
from the internal processes with which they are coupled. Indeed it is in 
these differences that the capacity to aid and augment cognition lies 
according to Menary. He claims that it is important to the integration of 
internal and external processing that external manipulations do something 
different from brain processes. These differences are important because 
they can help to transform our abilities to complete cognitive tasks and 
 21 
can, consequently, potentially improve our abilities to complete them.
5
 
Thus, for Tetris gamers the very fact that the processes required to rotate 
the zoids on-screen differ from those required to do so mentally means 
that the task can be achieved more quickly and with a greater degree of 
success.  
 
It is precisely because of the difference between internal and external 
processes that an organism can complete certain novel cognitive tasks 
(see Menary 2006 & Sutton 2006). Integration of the external 
manipulation of information-bearing structures with internal processing 
expands an organism‘s cognitive capacity. Thus, the differences between 
internal and external processing are more important than any similarities 
we may invoke, according to the integrationist perspective. We can view 
cognitive processes as being hybrid; that is, composed of both internal 
and external processing components because of the fact that the 
external/extended processes can do things that the internal processes 
cannot, or do not, do. Therefore, Menary emphasises that external 
structures and processes possess very different properties from internal 
ones:  
 
In the head, there are connectionist vehicles and processes over them. 
There isn‘t anything in the environment that looks like connectionist 
vehicles and processes over them. There are symbols, such as diagrams 
and linguistically structured vehicles and their manipulation is different 
from the manipulation of connectionist vehicles. (Menary 2006: 342). 
 
And Mark Rowlands agrees: 
 
External structures and processes possess quite different properties from 
internal ones; and it is precisely this difference that affords the cognitive 
                                               
5 This is also expressed by Rowlands in his ‗Transformation Thesis‘ 1998: 330. 
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agent the opportunity to accomplish certain tasks that it could not, or 
might not, be able to accomplish purely by way of internal cognitive 
processes. Without these differences, the external processes would be 
otiose. (Rowlands 2009a: 3-4). 
 
The enhanced possibilities for manipulation and exploitation that are 
afforded cognitive agents because, for example, of the stability of 
external structures, are argued not to be available for internal processing 
alone. Thus, the enhanced possibilities provided by the resources of the 
external environment and the potential for acting on them underwrite the 
ability of the cognitive agent to accomplish novel cognitive tasks; 
cognitive tasks that the agent would not otherwise have been able to 
complete given the use of internal processes alone. 
 
According to the cognitive integrationist case 1 and case 2 of Clark and 
Chalmers‘ Tetris thought experiment can both be considered as cognitive 
processes. This is not, however, because case 1 is similar to case 2 but 
because the player in case 2—in conjunction with the manipulation of the 
external information-bearing structures of the game‘s hardware—
constitutes an integrated cognitive system, a possibility which is afforded 
the player precisely because the external information-bearing structures 
differ from the internal provisions. 
 
So the integrationist perspective rejects the use of the Parity Principle as a 
means for arguing for the extension of cognition into the environment 
and seeks to focus, instead, on the differences between internal and 
external resources. But such a move cannot be quite right. The 
integrationists are correct to emphasise the differences between internal 
and extended putative cognitive processes and in this regard, the 
integrationist perspective provides a means of countering many of the 
objections levelled at EMT that take the Parity Principle to be introducing 
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a brute similarity-based criterion for judging whether or not an external 
process counts as part of a genuine cognitive process. But there must, 
still, be something that both sets of processes have in common, otherwise 




The mistaken similarity-based reading of the Parity Principle states that if 
an external process is enough like an internal cognitive process then there 
is no reason to deny the external process cognitive status as part of a 
larger, extended cognitive process. But such a reading of the Parity 
Principle looks to have been misguided from the start. A similarity-based 
criterion was not what Clark had in mind when the Parity Principle was 
introduced:  
 
[F]ar from requiring any deep similarity between inner and outer 
processes, the parity claim was specifically meant to undermine any 
tendency to think that the shape of the (present day, human) inner 
processes sets some bar … on what ought to count as part of a 
genuinely cognitive process. The parity probe was thus meant to act as a 
kind of veil of metabolic ignorance, inviting us to ask what our attitude 
would be if currently external means of storage and transformation 
were, contrary to the presumed facts, found in biology‘. (Clark, 
forthcoming) 
 
Clark stresses, then, that the Parity Principle does not make any claims 
about identity at the level of processing at all. And this is reinforced by 
what was said originally in ‗The Extended Mind‘, particularly with 
regard to language. 
 
Without language, we might be much more akin to discrete Cartesian 
'inner' minds, in which high-level cognition relies largely on internal 
resources. But the advent of language has allowed us to spread this 
                                               
6 This issue will surface again in discussion of the Mark of the Cognitive in chapter 4. 
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burden into the world. Language, thus construed, is not a mirror of our 
inner states but a complement to them. It serves as a tool whose role is 
to extend cognition in ways that on-board devices cannot. Indeed, it 
may be that the intellectual explosion in recent evolutionary time is due 
as much to this linguistically-enabled extension of cognition as to any 
independent development in our inner cognitive resources. (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998: 18) 
 
Interpretations which take it that the Parity Principle holds that external 
processes must be similar to internal processes in order to count as 
cognitive are mistaken. The Parity Principle is not the mere postulation of 
similarity between internal and extended processes. However, clearly 
there must be identity at some level between case 1 and case 2 in the 
Tetris thought experiment as both are said to be cases of genuine 
cognitive processing. Thus, Clark and Chalmers pitch the Parity Principle 
at a level of abstraction higher than that of what implements the process. 
Rather, the parity that can exist between internal and extended processes 
is parity of the sort mentioned in David Chalmers‘ quote above, which is 
to say that two processes are analogous according to the Parity Principle 
if they fulfil the same causal role within a cognitive system. This does not 
entail that the two cases must be the same, there can and perhaps must be 
genuine differences between the two cases but these differences do not 
matter. 
 
Or, rather, these genuine differences do matter, as the integrationist 
perspective correctly points out, but not as a basis for denying cognitive 
status to extended systems. Menary seems to echo Clark‘s sentiments 
here; he suggests that objectors have attacked a flawed version of the 
Parity Principle: 
 
[I]t has become something of an albatross around Clark‘s neck. 
Internalists have seized upon the parity principle, attacking a flawed 
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comparative version which, schematically, can be stated as: if an 
external process/vehicle X plays a similar role to an internal 
process/vehicle Y (where Y is cognitive), then X is cognitive. (Menary 
2006: 333, emphasis mine) 
 
So, it seems that the Parity Principle, despite the initial protestations of 
the integrationists, can be salvaged but only so long as the differences 
predicted and required by the integrationist perspective are appreciated. 
We will examine in later chapters some possible further problems with 
the Parity Principle but for now I move on, armed with an understanding 
of the Parity Principle informed by the integrationist perspective to 
consider how Clark and Chalmers develop their argument based on the 
Parity Principle with regard to cognitive processes and I do so by 




So that we can better appreciate Clark and Chalmers‘ argument in favour 
of the extension of cognitive processes into the world, they offer us the 
comparison of Otto and Inga. Otto has Alzheimer‘s disease and 
consequently his biological memory is not as reliable as it used to be. 
Otto carries a notebook with him wherever he goes and when he learns 
some new information he writes it in the notebook. Whenever he needs to 
access some old information, he looks it up in the notebook. Now, 
suppose that Otto hears about an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art 
and he has a desire to see it; he looks in his notebook, which tells him 
that the Museum is located on 53
rd
 Street, and off he goes. The question 
here is whether or not Otto‘s use of the notebook counts as an example of 
a genuine cognitive process, specifically, one of remembering.
7
 
                                               
7 In the original treatment Clark and Chalmers ask us to consider the case of Otto for the 
purpose of presenting an argument in favour of the extension of mental states into the 
world, specifically beliefs. In the meantime, the example of Otto has been appropriated 
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Inga, unlike Otto, does not have Alzheimer‘s disease and her biological 
memory is in fine working order. Nevertheless, say Clark and Chalmers, 
if we compare the cases of Otto and Inga, we will find that the cases are 
analogous, as per the Parity Principle. For Otto the notebook plays the 
same role that ordinary biological memory plays for Inga: Otto has come 
to rely on his notebook in the same way that Inga relies on her biological 
memory. For Otto, the notebook is a constant just as Inga‘s memory is a 
constant for her. Although there are various immediately apparent 
differences between the two cases Clark and Chalmers argue that these 
are merely shallow differences and to focus on them is to miss the bigger 
picture. In order to deny cognitive status to Otto‘s use of the notebook an 
opponent needs to show that Otto‘s case is different from Inga‘s in some 
important and relevant respect.  
 
Once more, as emphasised by Chalmers (see Clark 2008b: xv), the 
relevant difference cannot simply be that for Inga the information is 
stored in the head whereas for Otto the information is stored in the 
notebook. But perhaps it could be argued that Inga has more reliable 
access to her memories than Otto has? Someone could potentially steal 
Otto‘s memory store (notebook) after all; something which would prove 
considerably more difficult in Inga‘s case. Clark and Chalmers agree that 
reliability and constancy are relevant here. In order for Otto‘s notebook 
to count as part of the cognitive process of remembering it needs to be 
constantly reliably available to him. And in this case it is. Otto always 
carries the notebook with him and when asked a question he will not 
answer that he does not know until after he has consulted it. Otto‘s case 
would not count as a case of genuine remembering if he were merely 
                                                                                                                   
for arguments both in favour of and against the extension of cognitive processing. A 
discussion of the possibility of the extension of mental states follows later. 
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accessing information from a guide-book or encyclopaedia as a one-off, 
for example. 
 
Thus, Clark and Chalmers argue, Otto‘s notebook is coupled with him so 
as to realise an extended cognitive system precisely because it is a 
constant for him. The information is always reliably available for him 
when needed. Sure, the notebook might get stolen or lost, and Inga‘s 
memory seems, by contrast, to be a lot more secure. But the difference in 
this case is one of degree and not one of kind (Rowlands 2003b). A 
surgeon could remove the relevant part of Inga‘s brain associated with 
her long-term memory, she could fall and damage her brain in hitting her 
head, or a skilled hypnotist could plant apparently veridical, yet false, 
memories in her. It is true that Otto‘s external memory store is not 
perfectly reliable, but neither is Inga‘s internal memory store. So an 
objection on the grounds of reliability is not sufficient to discount Otto‘s 
case. What matters, say Clark and Chalmers, is that: ―the information is 
easily available when the subject needs it, and this constraint is satisfied 
equally in the two cases‖ (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 15). Thus, one 
criterion that must be met by an external, or non-biological, putative 
cognitive resource according to Clark is: 
 
1. That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked. (Clark 
2008b: 79) 
 
An opponent of EMT might press the point and question the difference in 
access that each has to their respective ‗memory stores‘. Otto‘s access to 
his notebook is not constant in the same way that Inga‘s is. That is, it 
comes and goes depending on the situation. He showers without his 
notebook, for example, and cannot read the information contained in it 
when it is dark. Inga, by contrast, it might be claimed, always has her 
memory store with her and thus always has access to it. But this is not 
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strictly true, Inga‘s access to her memory store also comes and goes; 
when she is asleep or when she is intoxicated, for example. Again, the 
difference here is one of degree only and is not sufficient to form an 
objection to discount Otto‘s case as one of genuine belief. 
 
Temporary disconnections do not seem to be decisive, what is crucial is 
that the information is easily available when the subject needs it, and 
this condition is met equally in both cases. (Rowlands 2003b: 181) 
 
Perhaps the relevant difference, instead, is that Inga has better access to 
her memories than Otto does?  
 
Inga‘s ―central‖ processes and her memory probably have a relatively 
high-bandwidth link between them, compared to the low-grade 
connection between Otto and his notebook (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 
15). 
 
Again, Clark and Chalmers argue that this is not a relevant difference. 
They claim that we can construct an analogous case whereby Lucy, a 
friend of Inga, has only a low grade connection between her biological 
memory and central systems. This could be due to Lucy‘s non-standard 
biology, or it could be due to her past misadventures. Either way, what 
counts, again, is that the information that Lucy requires is accessible; 
even if the processing is less than efficient. This applies equally to Otto‘s 
case. A second constraint on a putative non-biological cognitive resource 
offered by Clark then is: 
 
2. That information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required. (Clark 2008b: 79). 
 
A further objection considered by Clark and Chalmers states that Otto‘s 
and Inga‘s respective access to the information stored in memory differs 
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in an important detail. Inga has direct access to her memories, via 
introspection, say; whereas Otto‘s access to his memories comes only by 
way of perception and perceptual access to information in the 
environment has a distinct phenomenology, but it is not clear, say Clark 
and Chalmers, why this should make a difference to the status of Otto‘s 
belief. What Clark and Chalmers are proposing is that Otto and his 
notebook be considered as an extended cognitive system and that within 
this system the flow of information between Otto‘s notebook and his 
brain is not perceptual. It is not perceptual, they claim, because it does 
not involve the impact of something that is outside the system. In this 
way the flow of information between the notebook and the brain is more 
like the flow of information within the brain in normal cases. In Otto‘s 
case there is a distinct perceptual phenomenology that accompanies the 
retrieval of the information from the notebook, which is not there in 
Inga‘s case, but it is not clear, argue Clark and Chalmers, that this counts 
as a relevant difference. 
 
We can, perhaps, imagine a case where a cognitive system has access to 
its memory that has a distinct perceptual phenomenology. Suppose, for 
example, that there exist aliens whose biological routines store bit-
mapped images of printed words. Access to this information, let us 
suppose, is via bit-mapped signals sent to the visual cortex. Would this 
bit-mapped storage form part of the alien‘s cognitive system? Would we 
discount the ‗memories‘ of Arnold Schwarzenegger‘s Terminator as 
genuinely cognitive because they are displayed in his visual field and 
thus have a distinct perceptual phenomenology associated with them? 
 
Tied in with this worry is the concern that normal biological memory, 
like Inga‘s, is automatically endorsed. A third constraint proposed by 
Clark on a putative non-biological resource forming part of a genuinely 
cognitive process, then, is: 
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3. That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike 
the opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed 
about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological 
memory (Ibid: 79). 
 
Taking these three criteria offered by Clark we can see that a book in the 
library would not generally count as an extension to cognition, nor would 
ordinary mobile access to an internet search-engine, such as Google. 
Otto‘s notebook, however, does count as an extension to his cognition. 
Thus, conclude Clark and Chalmers, Otto‘s case gives us an example of a 
genuine extended cognitive system. The argument proceeds from the 
Parity Principle considered earlier.  
 
Certainly, insofar as beliefs and desires are characterized by their 
explanatory roles, Otto's and Inga's cases seem to be on a par: the 
essential causal dynamics of the two cases mirror each other precisely 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998: 13). 
 
The claim is that Otto‘s case is the same as Inga‘s case in all important 
respects and the challenge for the opponent of EMT is to show that this 
parity is defeated by citing some relevant and important difference 
between the cases. Furthermore, the Otto case incorporates the lessons 
regarding the Parity Principle that we learned from the cognitive 
integrationists in the previous section. Given that Otto has Alzheimer‘s 
disease his biological memory lacks the stability or reliability that it used 
to have. A notebook can provide this, thus the difference between the 
internal structures and processes and the external ones are important here. 
To put it crudely, the notebook provides Otto with something that his 
brain cannot. It is for this reason that Otto chooses to place some of the 
cognitive load here. So the differences between the inner and extended 
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processes do matter and are important, as the integrationist perspective 
correctly points out, but not, claim Clark and Chalmers, as a basis for 
denying cognitive status to extended cognitive systems.  
 
Clark and Chalmers contend, then, they have demonstrated that cognitive 
processes can extend beyond the boundaries of the individual by being 
partially constituted by features of the environment. But it is not clear 
that Clark and Chalmers have provided a conclusive case for constitutive 
parts of cognitive processes extending into the world. Their argument 
proceeds by stating that if we accept the Parity Principle then we have no 
good reason to reject Otto‘s notebook as an external memory store.  
 
But an internalist may accept the Parity Principle and reject the argument 
that Otto‘s notebook should count as an extended memory. Just as the 
external location of a process should not automatically deny it cognitive 
status, the internal location of a process should not automatically award it 
cognitive status. Thus, the internalist might argue that if the extended 
process involving Otto‘s notebook were to go on in the head, we would 
still deny it cognitive status. What is required here to settle the issue is a 
definition of what a cognitive process is; a mark of the cognitive.
8
 
Without it the internalist can argue that an equally valid interpretation of 
the case is that Otto‘s notebook transforms the nature of the cognitive 
task facing Otto while the genuinely cognitive processing is internal. The 
EM theorists, says the internalist, have given us no good reason to see the 
external processes as anything other than aids to cognition and the 
genuinely cognitive as remaining skull-bound. 
 
However, we can put these worries to one side for the moment since 
Clark and Chalmers seek to move beyond these arguments for the 
                                               
8 This is key issue for EM theorists. I demonstrate why in more detail in chapter 4. 
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extension of cognitive process to argue that mental states can also be 
partially constituted by features of the environment. This move is key, 
since as will become clear, EMT proper requires the extension of mental 
states; the extension of cognitive processes alone is not sufficient to 
secure EMT. With that in mind it is to these arguments for the extension 
of mental states that I now turn and this requires further analysis of the 




Having offered their arguments in favour of the extension of cognitive 
processes into the environment, Clark and Chalmers take their 
externalism a stage further. They speculate that someone might object 
that more than mere processing is required for mentality and so, 
regardless of whether or not cognitive processes are partially constituted 
by environmental factors, the mind remains firmly rooted within the 




So far we have spoken largely about "cognitive processing", and argued 
for its extension into the environment. Some might think that the 
conclusion has been bought too cheaply. Perhaps some processing takes 
place in the environment, but what of mind?  Everything we have said 
so far is compatible with the view that truly mental states - experiences, 
beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on - are all determined by states of the 
brain. Perhaps what is truly mental is internal, after all? (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998: 12) 
 
Clark and Chalmers want to challenge this claim that mental states are 
necessarily internal. They propose that mental states, in addition to 
                                               
9 Unfortunately, Clark and Chalmers don‘t tell us what the something more than 
processing that constitutes mental states might be. The issue here is the mark of the 
mental will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
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cognitive processes, can extend into the environment and their argument 
for this focuses on beliefs: they argue that beliefs can literally extend into 
the world. 
 
While some mental states, such as experiences, may be determined 
internally, there are other cases in which external factors make a 
significant contribution. In particular, we will argue that beliefs can be 
constituted partly by features of the environment, when those features 
play the right sort of role in driving cognitive processes. If so, the mind 
extends into the world. (Ibid: 12, emphasis mine) 
  
In support of the claim that beliefs extend into the world we are asked to 
compare Otto‘s case with that of Inga, as above. Inga hears about an 
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and has a desire to see it. She 
thinks for a moment before recalling that the Museum of Modern Art is 
on 53
rd
 Street and heading off. Why does Inga go to 53
rd
 Street?  Because 
she has a desire to see a particular exhibition in the Museum of Modern 
Art and she believes that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street. 
Inga‘s case is best described in terms of personal level mental states and 
contents. 
 
Now, consider the status of Inga‘s belief. Did Inga acquire a new belief, 
the belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street, having 
consulted her memory? Did Inga re-acquire that belief, having held it 
previously, after consulting her memory? Or, did Inga believe that the 
Museum of Modern Art was located on 53
rd
 Street before she consulted 
her memory? It seems that the latter answer is the correct one. Inga, from 
when she first learned the location of the Museum of Modern Art, held 
the belief that it was on 53
rd
 Street. This belief became occurrent when 
she accessed her memory store but she doesn‘t stop believing that the 
Museum is on 53
rd
 Street when the belief is no longer an occurrent one. It 
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is not necessary that a particular piece of information be constantly 




Next, we compare Inga‘s case with that of Otto. Suppose Otto hears 
about the same exhibition in the Museum of Modern Art and he too has a 
desire to see it. He looks in his notebook, which tells him that the 
Museum is located on 53
rd
 Street, and off he goes. Why does Otto go to 
53
rd
 Street? Clark and Chalmers claim that we can apply the same 
reasoning to Otto‘s case as we do to Inga‘s. Otto has a desire to see a 
particular exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and believes that it is 
located on 53
rd
 Street. We can also apply the same questions regarding 
the status of Otto‘s belief as we did to Inga‘s belief. Does Otto acquire a 
new belief, the belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street, 
having consulted his notebook? Does Otto re-acquire that belief, having 
held it previously, after consulting his notebook? Clark suspects that all 
of these options will prove to be the wrong ones, highlighting the 
functional role that the notebook plays in Otto‘s everyday life. 
 
[I]f we follow Otto around for a while, we will see how unnatural this 
way of speaking is. Otto is constantly using his notebook as a matter of 
course. It is central to his actions in all sorts of contexts, in the same 
way that an ordinary memory is central in an ordinary life. (Ibid: 13) 
 
Alternatively, however, we could say that Otto‘s case is best described by 
stating that the beliefs that are properly attributed to Otto are ones such as 
‗Otto believes that the location of the museum of modern art is written in 
                                               
10 Since Clark and Chalmer‘s argument for the extension of mental states focuses on 
dispositional beliefs a lot hangs on how we understand the status of dispositional beliefs. 
Some may argue that Inga does not continue to believe that the Museum is on 53rd street 
when the belief is no longer occurrent, and that dispositional beliefs are beliefs that we 
are disposed to have, i.e. to form, counterfactually, under such and such conditions. 
Alternatively one might simply reject the idea that dispositional or standing beliefs are 
part of the mind (e.g. Gertler 2007). 
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the notebook‘. This strategy is one that Clark calls the two-step objection, 
and it goes like this: 
 
[A]ll Otto actually believes (in advance) is that the address is in the 
notebook. That‘s the belief (step 1) that leads to the looking (step 2) that 
then leads to the (new) belief about the actual street address. (Clark, 
forthcoming). 
 
Clark‘s response to this objection is to question why we don‘t apply the 
same reasoning to Inga‘s case. That is, why don‘t we say that all Inga 
actually believes in advance is that the information she requires is stored 
in memory. This is the belief (step 1) that leads to the retrieval (step 2) 
that then leads to the new belief about the actual street address. The 
reason that we don‘t apply this 2-step strategy in the case of Inga is that it 
seems to add, in the words of Clark; ―spurious complexity‖ (Ibid.). The 
best (or at least the standard) way of describing Inga‘s case is by saying 
that Inga wants or desires to go to the Museum of Modern Art and 
believes that the Museum is located on 53
rd
 Street. To employ the two-
step strategy to describe Inga‘s case seems unnecessary because she 
doesn‘t rely on beliefs about her memory to guide her everyday actions—
the use of her memory is generally automatic and transparent. Clark 
claims that the same can be said for Otto: 
 
Otto is so accustomed to using the book that he accesses it 
automatically when bio-memory fails. Calls to the notebook are as 
deeply and subpersonally integrated into his problem-solving routines 
as calls to external rotation for the expert Tetris players. The notebook 
has become transparent equipment for Otto, just as biological memory 
is for Inga. And in each case, doesn‘t it add needless and 
psychologically unreal complexity to introduce additional beliefs about 
the book or biological memory into the explanatory equations? (Clark 
2008b: 80, emphasis mine). 
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So, in Inga‘s case we don‘t employ the 2-step strategy because it 
needlessly complicates the matter. And it does so because Inga‘s access 
to her memory is automatic and transparent; her access is subpersonal, it 
is not something that she need have conscious control over. Similarly 
then, it is claimed that Otto‘s access is automatic and transparent. 
Because he has grown to rely on the notebook his access to it has ‗gone 
subpersonal‘ and thus the 2-step strategy is to add one step too many to 
our explanation of his behaviour and associated mental states. 
 
If Otto‘s access was not subpersonalised in this way then presumably it 
would be correct to invoke the 2-step strategy as his access would not 
then be automatic and transparent. Consider, for example, that I ask 
someone for the location of the Museum of Modern Art and write the 
address down in a notebook. Later, I look the information up in the 
notebook when I decide to go to an exhibition at the museum; in such a 
case I would best be described as believing that the location of the 
Museum of Modern Art is written in my notebook, not that the Museum 
of Modern Art is located on 53
rd
 street, or that I know the location of the 
Museum of Modern Art. I must make a conscious decision to look in the 
notebook in order to retrieve the information that I require—my access to 
the notebook is not automatic and transparent in the same way that Otto‘s 
is. However, if I choose to employ this strategy over the long term then as 
I begin to use the notebook more and more, the idea is that my access to 
the notebook may become automatic and transparent and at this stage the 
2-step strategy would no longer be the correct strategy to employ in 
describing my actions and attributing mental states. My access to the 
notebook becomes fluid and immediate. The notebook and my accessing 
of the notebook are said to become part of the subpersonal architecture of 
my personal level contents. This is also the case for Otto, but because of 
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his condition he has to rely on the notebook, consequently, adaptation 




This kind of case has parallels with the commissurotomy and callosal 
agenesis cases considered by Susan Hurley (1998b), which we will 
examine in more detail in chapter three. A commissurotomy is a 
procedure whereby the corpus callosum—connective tissue linking the 
left and right hemispheres of the brain—is severed, often with the 
purpose of reducing or eliminating seizures. Callosal agenesis on the 
other hand is a congenital condition where an individual is born without 
the corpus callosum; these individuals are often referred to as acallosals. 
Commissurotomy patients are faced with the challenge of integrating 
information between the two hemispheres of the brain as the normal 
method of information integration has been removed. These cases are 
interesting to Hurley because of the relevance they have to questions 
about the unity of consciousness and, in particular, for inducing, under 
experimental conditions, what Hurley calls partial unity.  
 
Partial unity may be described as falling midway on a scale between a 
normally functioning human being with a single conscious perspective 
and an individual exhibiting dissociative identity disorder, which is to say 
that a partially unified individual does not exhibit distinct dissociated 
personalities but that inconsistencies in conscious content in separate 
brain hemispheres can be induced under experimental conditions. The 
problem of information integration between hemispheres does not really 
arise for an acallosal as she will always, of necessity, have employed 
external methods of information integration—such as using cross-cuing 
                                               
11 If subpersonal, automatic and transparent access is a requirement then it is not clear 
that the Otto plus notebook example is the best choice for promoting EMT. Is it really 
plausible to suppose that Otto uses his notebook without consciously thinking about it? 
And, in any case, is there any reason to suppose that one cannot quite consciously try to 
access normal biological memory? 
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and access movements—between the two hemispheres and is, 
consequently not best described as being partially unified. In this case the 
external means of integration is a pre-condition of the unity of 
consciousness. Newly operated commissurotomy patients are, on the 
other hand, initially best described as disunified, or partially unified if 
they employ external methods of integration. However, as these 
commissurotomy patients continue to practice this external means of 
integration, the action becomes automatic and transparent. It goes 
subpersonal. When this happens we should no longer attribute disunity to 
the commissurotomy patient. So it would be inappropriate to call 
commissurotomy patients disunified at the personal level given a number 
of years of making use of access movements and cross-cuing to realise 
unity. In these cases, with internal methods of integration no longer 
possible, external methods of integration are a pre-condition for unity at 
the personal level.  
 
Clark and Chalmers presumably consider Otto‘s case similar because 
internal methods of memory storage are no longer possible for him, at 
least not with any degree of reliability. Thus the external storage he now 
employs becomes a pre-condition for the successful formation of new 
beliefs and if his access to the notebook is automatic and transparent the 




So Clark and Chalmers argue that with regard to Otto, even before he 
looks up the location in his notebook, the attribution of the belief that the 
Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street makes the most sense. It is not 
                                               
12 Once again, in comparison with a commissurotomy patient who subpersonally 
integrates information between the two hemispheres of the brain, it may not seem 
plausible that Otto could use his notebook to retrieve information without it being under 
some measure of conscious control. As we will see in chapter 5 though, the argument in 
support of Otto‘s belief extending seems to rest more on the functional role that the 
notebook plays for Otto rather the nature of his access to it. It may be the case that the 
automatic and transparent access requirement is introduced purely to deal with the two-
step objection. 
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necessary for a particular piece of information to be constantly present 
before consciousness in order for it to be a belief. So, as in Inga‘s case, 
Otto‘s belief becomes an occurrent one when he accesses his memory 
store, the notebook. 
 
If Otto‘s case warrants the attribution of the belief that the Museum of 
Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street even before he looks in his notebook then, 
Clark and Chalmers claim, Otto‘s belief extends into the world. Otto‘s 
belief extends into the world because the memory, on which this belief 
depends, extends into the world as it is located in Otto‘s notebook. Clark 
and Chalmers claim that analogously to Hilary Putnam‘s Twin-Earth 
thought experiment we can construct a Twin-Otto thought experiment 
which supports this conclusion that beliefs can and do extend beyond the 
brain. Imagine that on Twin-Earth there is a Twin-Otto who is exactly 
like Otto in every respect except for the fact that instead of writing in his 
notebook that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street, he mistakenly 




Today, Twin Otto is a physical duplicate of Otto from the skin in, but 
his notebook differs.
13
 Consequently, Twin Otto is best characterized as 
believing that the museum is on 51
st
 Street, where Otto believes it is on 
53
rd
. In these cases, a belief is simply not in the head. (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998: 14) 
 
Here, the difference between Content Externalism and Active 
Externalism emphasised by Clark and Chalmers becomes manifest. A 
Twin-Otto with the belief that water (xyz) is wet will behave no 
differently from Otto who believes that water (H20) is wet, whereas 
                                               
13 In making this claim Clark and Chalmers may be committing the error of assuming 
the possibility of general duplication: that internal states can, in general, be duplicated in 
counterfactually altered environments. In chapter 3 we will examine whether or not the 
duplication required for their thought experiment to work can be achieved as easily as 
they hope. 
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Twin-Otto in the above case will go to 51
st
 street and Otto will go to 53
rd
 
street. Otto‘s notebook is, it seems, an active and proximal external 
feature that is causally relevant in the production of behaviour. The 
notebook for Otto (and for Twin-Otto) plays an ineliminable role in the 
production of behaviour and in the formation and subsequent attribution 
of mental states—without it we could not attribute certain beliefs and 
memories to Otto. So, given his use of the notebook, Clark and Chalmers 
argue that Otto is best described as believing that the Museum of Modern 
Art is on 53
rd
 Street. But there‘s no doubt that Otto comes to believe this 
at some point. The real question is whether or not Otto believes that the 
Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street before he looks in his notebook. 
Clark and Chalmers take themselves to have demonstrated that Otto 
knows where the Museum of Modern Art is before he looks it up—just as 
Inga does before she brings it to mind—in which case the notebook 
constitutes part of the belief state and Otto‘s belief extends. 
 
But, once again it is not clear that Clark and Chalmers have done enough 
to secure this conclusion. It is possible to accept the parity principle and 
still reject the claim that Otto knows the location of the Museum before 
he looks in his notebook. If Otto‘s looking in his notebook does not count 
as a genuine case of remembering, regardless of its location, then the 
notebook will not constitute part of Otto‘s belief state.  
 
It seems that all that Clark and Chalmers have conclusively demonstrated 
is that the notebook has a key role to play in the formation of Otto‘s 
belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street, rather than the 
stronger claim that it is a constitutive part of his belief state. The 
difference between these two claims is the difference between EMT and 
EMMT: the Extended Machinery of Mind Hypothesis. I can agree that 
Otto believes that MOMA is located on 53
rd
 street, and I can hold that 
this is true because of his notebook, without adhering to the claim that 
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Otto‘s belief extends into the world. The notebook forms part of the 
mechanism that enables Otto to believe that MOMA is located on 53
rd
 
street, but it is not a constitutive part of his belief. We will examine 
exactly why this should be so in chapter 4 but, for now, I just want to 
highlight the tension that exists, particularly in Clark‘s writings, between 
the claims made for EMT and the arguments themselves, which make a 
good claim for EMMT but do not decisively prove the stronger claim. 
This is the difference between mechanisms that enable cognition and 
mental states and mechanisms that constitute cognition and mental states. 
In the next section I proceed to highlight where this tension is evident in 
Clark‘s Active Externalism. 
 
Constitution vs. Enabling 
 
Analysis of Clark and Chalmers‘ ‗The Extended Mind‘ has revealed that 
they frequently make claims for the partial external constitution of mental 
states and cognitive processes – for their extension into the environment. 
For example: 
 
Once we recognize the crucial role of the environment in constraining 
the evolution and development of cognition, we see that extended 
cognition is a core cognitive process, not an add-on extra. (Ibid: 12) 
  
In particular, we will argue that beliefs can be constituted partly by 
features of the environment, when those features play the right sort of 
role in driving cognitive processes. If so, the mind extends into the 
world.‖ (Ibid.) 
 
Thus, in seeing cognition as extended one is not merely making a 
terminological decision; it makes a significant difference to the 
methodology of scientific investigation. (Ibid: 10) 
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Another example may be language, which appears to be a central means 
by which cognitive processes are extended into the world. (Ibid: 11) 
 
In these cases, a belief is simply not in the head. (Ibid: 14, all emphases 
mine) 
 
Such a view is also evident in the Parity Principle, the claim on which 
their argument for EMT is based: 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world 
is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't 
(all) in the head! (Ibid: 8, emphasis mine) 
 
But we also questioned whether these conclusions about the partial 
external constitution of mental states and cognitive processes are 
warranted. In his subsequent writings Clark has tended, for the most part, 
to steer clear of the sorts of expressions whereby he talks of the extension 
of cognition, cognitive processes, or mental states into the world. Instead, 
we get references to the extension of the material vehicles of mind, or to 
the machinery of mind or cognition. Dubbing his version of EMT as 
EXTENDED in his latest book, Clark characterises it as follows: ―The 
physical mechanisms of mind, EXTENDED suggests, are simply not all 
in the head‖ (Clark 2008b: 85). 
 
But, frequently running alongside these expressions about the extension 
of the machinery of mind are bolder claims about the extension of 
cognition and mind itself: 
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The local mechanisms of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head. 
Cognition leaks out into the body and world. (Clark 2008b: xxviii, 
emphasis mine) 
 
Such body- and world-involving cycles are best understood, or so I shall 
argue, as quite literally extending the machinery of mind out into the 
world—as building extended cognitive circuits that are themselves the 
minimal material bases for important aspects of human thought and 
reason. Such cycles supersize the mind. (Clark, 2008b xxvi, emphasis 
mine). 
 
And, in discussing the famous exchange between the physicist Richard 
Feynman and the Historian Charles Weiner about whether Feynman‘s 
notes constituted his work or merely a record of his work Clark remarks:  
 
…I would like to…suggest that Feynman was actually thinking on the 
paper. The loop through pen and paper is part of the physical machinery 
responsible for the shape and flow of his thoughts and ideas that we 
take, nonetheless, to be distinctively those of Richard Feynman. It 
reliably and robustly provides a functionality which, were it provided by 
goings-on in the head alone, we would have no hesitation in designating 
as part of the cognitive circuitry. (Ibid: xxv) 
 
Within these lines we can distinguish two views. The first of these is 
EMT; the view that Feynman was thinking on the paper, the view that 
Otto‘s belief extends into the world in the form of his notebook, the view 
that pushing buttons to rotate blocks on a computer screen is partially 
constitutive of a cognitive processes. The second view is EMMT; the 
view that the machinery of mind extends into the world. This is a sort of 
enabling-externalism which views Otto‘s notebook as a belief-forming 
mechanism without which Otto would not be able to form the belief that 
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the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street but which doesn‘t imply that 
he has the belief before consulting his notebook. 
 
As discussed earlier, such a view is the one that Kirsch and Maglio seem 
to take with regard to their examination of epistemic actions in relation to 
playing Tetris, which is to say that without the use of epistemic actions 
players would find it a lot harder to complete the rotation and alignment 
of the zoids with such speed. We also examined how Clark and Chalmers 
seek to go further than Kirsch and Maglio in arguing that epistemic 
actions demand a spread of epistemic credit, claiming that the action in 
question is partially constitutive of a cognitive process and not merely an 
enabler or facilitator of a cognitive process. Thus, it is EMT rather than 
EMMT that Clark and Chalmers try to defend in ‗The Extended Mind‘. 
However, alongside their claims for EMT in this paper are expressions of 
a position that is more akin to EMMT: 
 
Moreover, it may be that the biological brain has in fact evolved and 
matured in ways which factor in the reliable presence of a manipulable 
external environment. It certainly seems that evolution has favoured on- 
board capacities which are especially geared to parasitizing the local 
environment so as to reduce memory load, and even to transform the 
nature of the computational problems themselves. (Clark & Chalmers 
1998: 11, emphasis mine) 
 
It is not just the presence of advanced external computing resources 
which raises the issue, but rather the general tendency of human 
reasoners to lean heavily on environmental supports. (Ibid:  8, emphasis 
mine) 
 
Thus there seems to be a tension in the original paper. The tension is 
between EMT as advertised—which is as nothing less than an argument 
for the extension of mind into world—and the reality, which is that 
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arguments for EMT secure only EMMT, a thesis about the physical 
mechanisms that enable cognition and the formation of mental states.  
 
The answer, we claimed, was that mental states, including states of 
believing, could be grounded in physical traces that remained firmly 
outside the head. (Clark, forthcoming, emphasis mine) 
 
That will suffice to highlight that this tension, between Active 
Externalism as a version of EMT and as a version of EMMT exists. In 
chapters four and five a more detailed examination of the distinction 
between EMT and EMMT will be provided along with a demonstration 
of how EMT as originally formulated by Clark and Chalmers, collapses 
into EMMT. Next, however, I continue the expository work by 
examining the work of Mark Rowlands and Susan Hurley, who are taken 






















In this chapter I continue the expository work on EMT started in chapter 
one, with the focus switching to Mark Rowlands. Rowlands‘ version of 
EMT was initially labelled Environmentalism and he later comes, in 
Externalism (2003b), to endorse a variety of Vehicle Externalism. I 
examine both theses in order to show that —as with Clark and Chalmers‘ 
Active Externalism— Rowlands‘ work fails to provide conclusive 
support for an interesting variant of EMT. Crucially, Rowlands claims 
that an argument can be made for the extension of cognitive processes 
only if cognitive processes are specified non-intentionally. But this means 
that there is no reason to see the extension of cognitive processes as 
concerning the extension of the mental rather than the extension of the 
enablers of mental states. 
 
EMT vs. Content Externalism 
 
Like Clark and Chalmers, Rowlands distinguishes his version of EMT 
from content externalism. He claims that EMT is more radical and 
broader in scope than content externalism and distinguishes these 
externalist positions by contrasting each with internalism. Here I examine 
how Rowlands makes this distinction in order to clarify his claims with 
regard to his version of EMT and I begin with a brief explication of how 
he characterises internalism. 
 
[Internalism] is both widespread and tenacious, not only as an explicit 
doctrine but, more significantly, in the clandestine influence it has on 
explicit doctrines of mind. The philosophical thesis from which the 
view is born is spelled out by Descartes, and its association with him is 
sufficiently robust for it to be called the Cartesian conception. 
(Rowlands 1999: 3) 
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This Cartesian conception, says Rowlands, sees mind as substance; as an 
object that thinks and which, due to its capacity for thought, must be 
fundamentally different from other objects, which are incapable of 
thought. This feature of the Cartesian view of mind has been accused of 
promoting the myth of the ghost in the machine (Ryle 1949). Importantly, 
although there has been a revolt against Cartesian views of the ontology 
of mind, most have limited their rejection of Cartesian thinking to a 
rejection of its dualist assumptions; i.e. a rejection of the ‗ghostly‘ 
element of the myth. A key part of Descartes‘ theory that is not generally 
challenged (as is seen by the commitments of modern day Cartesian 
materialists) is the idea that the mind is somehow in the machine
14
 It is 
this aspect of Cartesianism—internalism—has become ingrained in much 
contemporary thinking about the mind. Consequently, though there are 
very few remaining dualists today, the majority of materialists still cling 
to this facet of Cartesianism and are internalists (Rowlands 1999: 4). 
 
Rowlands claims that this Cartesian internalism has yielded three broad 
strands comprising internalist ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
commitments (2003b). My focus is on the ontological and 
epistemological commitments. According to Rowlands, the ontological 
commitments of internalism comprise two theses: one concerning the 
location of mental phenomena and the other concerning possession 
conditions for mental phenomena by subjects. 
 
The Location Claim: any mental phenomenon is spatially located inside 
the boundaries of the subject, S, that has or undergoes it. 
 
                                               
14 There are two reasons for this. Many still think that contents cause behaviour and also 
that causes must be local – hence they must be in the head/body. It is this causalist 
commitment that really sponsors modern day internalism. 
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The Possession Claim: the possession of any mental phenomenon by a 
subject S does not depend on any feature that is external to the 
boundaries of S. (Ibid: 13) 
 
As Rowlands makes clear, the principal distinction between EMT and 
content externalism is that content externalism only challenges the 
Possession Claim, whereas EMT challenges both the Location and 
Possession Claims. It is for this reason that Rowlands holds EMT to be 
more radical than content externalism.  
 
Rowlands also sees EMT as being broader in scope than content 
externalism. He argues that content externalism is fairly restricted in what 
it applies to, specifically, mental states for which semantic content plays 
a role in determining the type of mental state they are: ―states that possess 
semantic content essentially‖ (Ibid.: 134). For this reason he argues that 
content externalism does not apply to cognitive processes or cognitive 
architectures, nor does it apply to sensations or perceptions unless 
phenomenal content can be reduced to semantic content (see Rowlands 
2003b: 125-134). Although this is true we need not concern ourselves 
with the scope of content externalism since we are more concerned with 
understanding EMT, and in this regard the relationship of content 
externalism with the Location Claim is what matters.  
 
The Location Claim, as concerned with the location of mental 
phenomena, applies most naturally to mental particulars, where mental 
particulars are defined as: ―concrete, non-repeatable, event-, state- and 
process-tokens‖ (Ibid: 13) such as Inga‘s conscious entertainment at time 
t of the belief that the museum of Modern Art is Located on 53
rd
 street. 
EMT is said to be more radical than content externalism because it 
challenges this Location Claim, whereas a rejection of the Possession 
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Claim in the form of content externalism is perfectly compatible with an 
endorsement of the Location Claim according to Rowlands. 
 
The Possession Claim is about how, in general, mental phenomena are 
individuated and, as such, it applies most naturally to mental properties, 
where mental properties are defined as: ―abstract, multiply-exemplifiable, 
event-, state- and process-types‖ (Ibid.). According to the Possession 
Claim mental properties are non-relational in the important sense that the 
possession conditions for having a mental property do not depend on 
anything external to subjects. However, what counts as external to a 
subject depends on how you define a subject. A typical position for a 
Cartesian materialist to adopt is to identify the subject with the brain or 
body (see Rowlands 2003b: 20-25). On this view of a subject, the 
Possession Claim has it that the possession of a mental state by a subject 
will not depend on anything that is external to the brain or body; it is 
determined solely by the physical state of the body or brain (Ibid: 16). 
 
There is an initial difficulty in apprehending such a claim, however, as it 
seems to be obvious that the mental life of a subject can be dependent on 
factors that are external to the body. For example, the death of loved one 
causes me to be sad, and when Inga hears from a friend of a particular 
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art she is prompted to recall the 
location of the Museum. It seems that there is a causal relation between 
my mental properties (internal to me on this view) and environmental 
factors (external to me). Rowlands says that the Possession Claim need 
not and does not deny that this can be the case because the Possession 
Claim is a claim about the individuation of mental properties rather than a 
claim about the causation of mental properties. 
 
For example, Inga believes that she is walking to the Museum of Modern 
Art. This could be because she is actually walking to the Museum of 
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Modern Art or it could be because she is the victim of a Matrix-style 
computer-generated simulation. According to the Possession Claim, Inga 
has the same belief in each case because her internal physical states are 
identical in each case—external factors are irrelevant to her having that 
particular belief or beliefs in general. It is consistent with the Possession 
Claim that external factors can and do have a causal influence on Inga‘s 
mental states but this influence can only be instrumental, which is to say 
that external factors can influence mental states only to the extent that 
they can bring about certain internal physical states. 
 
And it is the presence of these internal states, however these states get 
to be caused, that determines which mental properties a subject 
possesses or exemplifies. (Ibid: 17) 
 
So, a full causal story of how Inga comes to acquire her belief in each 
case will involve external items but these external items have no bearing 
on the possibility of individuating Inga‘s belief, they are incidental to 
Inga‘s believing that p. On this view, Inga‘s possession, or instantiation, 
of the belief that she is walking to the Museum of Modern Art depends 
only on features that are internal to her. 
 
Rowlands argues that content externalism challenges the internalist 
Possession Claim but not the Location Claim. The content externalist 
challenge to the Possession Claim seeks to establish that certain types of 
mental states are individuation-dependent on environmental factors but, 
says Rowlands, establishing this does not entail that a mental state must 
be externally located. Thus, even if true, content externalism, by itself is 
not a threat to the Location Claim 
 
Even in the case of propositional attitudes…the arguments for content 
externalism show only that such attitudes are externally individuated, 
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not that they are externally located. That is, while the arguments for 
content externalism entail rejection of the Possession Claim that is 
partially definitive of internalism, these arguments, by themselves, are 
not sufficient to entail rejection of the Location Claim.‖ (Ibid: 135). 
 
To see why the individuation dependence of a mental state on 
environmental factors does not entail the external location of that mental 
state Rowlands invites us to consider the following analogy he takes from 
McGinn. According to McGinn the property of being a planet looks to be 
an externally individuated property because:  
 
(i) specification of which planet something is requires reference to the 
star that it orbits; 
(ii) one cannot know which planet something is unless one knows 
which star it orbits 
(iii) it is not possible for something to be a planet unless it orbits a star; 
(iv) one could not master the concept of a planet unless one had also 
mastered the concept of a star (and the concept of an orbit). (Ibid: 
136) 
 
If this is correct and the property of being a planet is individuation 
dependent, at least in part, on external factors then the question is 
whether or not this has any entailment with regard to location.  Clearly in 
this case there are implications for location built into to the property of 
being a particular planet since it requires being a body that orbits a 
particular star. But Rowlands‘ point seems to be that the individuation 
dependence of the planet on the star does not carry entailments with 
regard to the metaphysical extent of the planet, i.e. the constitutive parts 
of the planet do not extend:  
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[E]ven though the property of being a planet is externally individuated, 
this does not mean that an instance of this property – an individual 
planet is located, even partly, where its star and orbit are located.  (Ibid.) 
 
We can question whether or not this is the best analogy for Rowlands to 
make his point. But we can allow the conclusion for the purposes of 
argument. In general, his claim is that the fact that the property of being x 
is individuated by the property of being y does not entail that x is located 
where y is. 
 
In a similar vein, it would seem that mental properties – for example, 
the property of being propositional attitude P – can be individuation 
dependent on environmental objects and properties, and so can be 
externally individuated, without instances of that property – individual 
propositional attitudes of this type – being located, even in part, where 
those environmental objects and properties are located. The arguments 
for content externalism, that is, seem to establish only that mental 
properties are externally individuated. They do not establish that 
individual propositional attitudes – instances of those properties – are 
externally located. (Ibid: 136-137) 
 
If this is correct then perhaps it was misleading of Putnam to say 
―meaning just ain‘t in the head‖. But more importantly for our purposes if 
the above is correct then arguments for content externalism challenge the 
Possession Claim without challenging the Location Claim. What 
allegedly makes EMT interesting is that it seeks to go further than content 
externalism by challenging the Location Claim. According to Rowlands, 
some mental phenomena are at least partially located outside of the body 
of the subject of those mental phenomena.  
 
We looked briefly in chapter one at how Clark and Chalmers saw their 
version of EMT, Active Externalism, as differing from content 
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externalism. They characterised content externalism as recruiting passive 
and distal external features situated at the end of a long causal chain that 
was not relevant in the here-and-now production of behaviour. By 
contrast, they saw their Active Externalism as playing an ineliminable 
role in the production of behaviour and Clark later comments that it is 
―more like an environmentally extended case of narrow content than a 
case of broad content‖ (Clark, forthcoming). 
 
We can use this distinction between narrow and broad content to help us 
better appreciate what exactly is at issue for EMT theorists such as Clark 
and Rowlands. Broad content is necessarily fixed, in part, by 
environmental factors. It is the content attributed to Inga and Twin-Inga 
in virtue of which we can type-distinguish their respective thoughts that 
water (H20) is wet and that water (XYZ) is wet. However, since Inga and 
Twin-Inga are physically identical there is a sense in which they can be 
said to be in the same mental state. Certainly, their behaviour will be 
physically indistinguishable. On these grounds it has been argued that 
there must be a narrow mental state that causes such behaviour and that if 
it causes rational, intelligent behaviour then it must be a contentful 
mental state. Such mental states must have narrow content. Narrow 
content, if it exists, is the kind of content that supervenes solely on the 
subject‘s internal physical states, the kind of physical states that are 
causally relevant in the production of behaviour. According to Fodor, an 
original defender of this idea, broad content is a function of narrow 
content as relativized to environmental context, thus the latter kind of 
content can vary for physically identical twins like Inga and Twin-Inga 
when they inhabit different environments. 
 
Accordingly, causally efficacious yet contentful physical states remain 
internal and a common strategy for internalists is to accept the arguments 
of the content externalist but seek to limit their force by insisting that 
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broad content is not the only kind of content. It is exactly this internalist 
move that EMT theorists want to challenge. Proponents of EMT such as 
Rowlands seek to undermine this picture of narrow mental states by 
arguing that physical states that are causally efficacious in the here-and-
now production of behaviour are not necessarily located within the body 
of the subject but can extend into the world. 
 
But, as we will see later on, because EMT accepts too much of this 
internalist picture that it seeks to challenge, the reduction of EM-style 
arguments for the partial external constitution of mental states to 
arguments for the extension of internal mental states with external 
enablers is always a live possibility: arguments for EMT can be 
converted into arguments for EMMT. 
  
To see the intended target of the EM theorist clearly it is useful to 
consider Rowlands‘ distinction between the task of psychotectonics and 
the task of psychosemantics. Psychotectonics is essentially an 
engineering question: ‗how can one build a mind?‘ (Rowlands 1999: 2). 
Psychosemantics, by contrast, seeks to give an account of mental 
representations qua representations—as states that have content or 
possess semantic properties. The content externalist arguments that we 
looked at above attempt to address the questions of psychosemantics, 
arguing that a person cannot be in possession of a certain type of mental 
property, or cannot be in a certain type of mental state, unless they stand 
in the appropriate relation to some object or property in the environment. 
Because of this such arguments are unconcerned with the project of 
psychotectonics and thus are ineffective against the internalist Location 
Claim. Rowlands‘ Environmentalism and Vehicle Externalism are, by 
contrast, psychotectonic projects. He is explicit about this: 
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[L]et me make it clear that the environmentalist position to be defended 
in this book claims that cognitive processes are not just externally 
individuated, they are also, and perhaps much more importantly, 
externally located. (Ibid: 32) 
 
Vehicle externalism entails rejection not only of the internalist 
Possession Claim, but also of the Location Claim. Many mental 
phenomena, if vehicle externalism is true, are not merely individuation 
dependent on what is going on in the environments of their subjects, but 
they are also, in part, located in those environments. (Rowlands 2003b: 
182) 
 
What we need to consider as we examine Rowlands‘ arguments in 
support of these claims is whether they entitle him to conclusions of this 
sort or whether, like Clark and Chalmers, a reading of his version of 
EMT only entitles him to make claims about the extension of cognition-
enabling and belief-forming mechanisms. I begin this examination by 
looking at Rowlands‘ arguments for the extension of cognitive processes 
into the world. 
 
The Ontological Claim 
 
In The Body in Mind (1999) Rowlands defends his Environmentalism, 
which he expresses as a conjunction of two claims: 
 
The Ontological Claim: Cognitive processes are not located exclusively 
inside the skin of cognizing organisms. 
 
The Epistemological Claim: It is not possible to understand the nature of 
cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside 
the skin of cognizing organisms. (Ibid: 22) 
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Rowlands says that the Epistemological claim is a corollary of the 
Ontological claim—if cognitive processes are not located exclusively 
within the skin of the cognizing organism (The Ontological Claim) then 
one cannot understand these processes by focusing exclusively on what 
goes on within this boundary (The Epistemological Claim). Thus, for 
Rowlands, a defence of Environmentalism consists primarily in a defence 
of the Ontological Claim; if the Ontological Claim can be established 
then the Epistemological Claim follows according to Rowlands. Thus, 
my focus is on this Ontological Claim. Now, it is important to note that 
Rowlands does not argue that all cognitive processes extend into the 
environment in the manner suggested by the phrasing of the Ontological 
Claim. Rather, the claim is that certain cognitive processes do extend, 
while others may be exclusively internal processes (see also Clark 
2008b). Furthermore, Rowlands is not claiming that the cognitive 
processes that do extend into the environment are completely external. 
Rather, the claim is that these cognitive processes are hybrid entities, 
straddling both internal and external processes.  
 
The Ontological Claim may well present a direct challenge to an 
internalist location claim made about cognitive process. But the 
Ontological Claim challenges the Location Claim specified above in 
terms of mental phenomena only if a cognitive process counts as a 
genuine mental phenomenon. Later, we will see that Rowlands‘ 
requirement that cognitive processes be specified non-intentionally opens 
the door for opponents to reject cognitive processes as genuinely mental 
phenomena.   
 
But regardless of the possible failure of the Ontological Claim to 
challenge the Location Claim, there is a possible obstacle to progress 
regarding an argument for the extension of cognition that is commented 
on by Rowlands and, as we will see in chapters four and five, it is no 
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small obstacle. It is, in fact, one of the primary hurdles in the path of the 
proponent of EMT and is one that I flagged in the last chapter. It is the 
lack of any clear definition of what a cognitive process actually is. This 
also holds with regard to mental states. And if EMT proper requires the 
extension of mental states then a mark of the mental is required if the 
EMT project is to succeed.
15
 Rowlands concedes that there is much 
uncertainty surrounding the concept of a cognitive process and that, 
consequently, a clear definition of ‗cognitive process‘ that is agreeable to 
all is hard to come by (1999). Nevertheless, he argues that clarifying the 
notion of a cognitive task is central to explaining the concept of a 
cognitive process and that we can approach a definition of a cognitive 
process via the definition of a cognitive task (Rowlands 2003b: 161). 
Thus, Rowlands defines a cognitive process as follows: 
 
A process P is a cognitive process if and only if (i) P is essential to the 
accomplishing of a cognitive task T, and (ii) P involves operations on 
information bearing structures, where information carried by such 
structures is relevant to task T. (Rowlands 1999: 103) 
 
But what is a cognitive task? Rowlands states that a cognitive task is 
defined partly by way of ostension. That is, we define a cognitive task by 
pointing to particular examples of cognitive tasks: the task of perceiving 
the surrounding environment, the task of committing information to, and 
retrieving it from, memory, or the task of reasoning, for example. So if, 
for example, I am faced with the task of recalling the location of the 
museum of modern art and initiate some process that involves operations 
on information-bearing structures that are essential to the completion of 
this task, then this process is a cognitive process according to Rowlands. 
He argues that in certain cases these cognitive processes that allow us to 
                                               
15 Rowlands is one of the few EM theorists to take up this challenge. He provides his 
version of a well-thought out mark of the cognitive in a 2009 paper. We will examine 
this in a later chapter. 
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accomplish cognitive tasks are made up of internal operations along with 
the manipulation of certain environmental structures. 
 
The Manipulation Thesis 
 
Rowlands‘ arguments for the extension of cognitive processes into the 
environment are defended in The Body in Mind by appeal to his 
manipulation thesis, where manipulation is understood in what he calls a 
broad sense, which is to say that manipulation does not necessarily mean 
manual interaction with the environment. Furthermore, manipulation in 
this case need not be intrusive—it need not change the environment. 
What Rowlands‘ broad conception of manipulation, properly understood, 
encompasses is any form of bodily interaction with the environment that 
makes use of the environment in order to accomplish a particular task 
(Ibid: 23). A prime example of this broad sense of manipulation is that of 
a sponge making use of the ambient currents by opening and closing 
certain flagella to maximize the flow of water through it. The interaction 
in this case is not intrusive, says Rowlands, no aspect of the environment 
need be changed but the sponge is making use of the environment to 
accomplish a particular task—the task of maintaining the flow of water 
through the sponge in order to feed (Ibid.).
16
 Applied to cognition, the 
manipulation thesis yields the central claim of Rowlands‘ 
Environmentalism; that certain cognitive processes include the 
manipulation, as just described, of environmental structures. 
 
But it is not just any manipulation, so understood, of environmental 
structures that helps constitute cognitive processing on Rowlands‘ view. 
It is essential to his account that the environmental structures being 
manipulated are information-bearing. In the case of the sponge 
                                               
16 We can question, perhaps, whether the flow of water is changed, perhaps in its speed 
or direction, because it flows through the sponge but the point is not a crucial one. 
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manipulating the ambient currents in its environment, no information-
bearing structures are being manipulated, thus, even if the sponge‘s task 
could be described as cognitive, the manipulation of the ambient currents 
could not be described as part of a cognitive process because it does not 




Cognitive processes, on this account, must involve the manipulation of 
information-bearing structures for the purpose of the completion of a 
certain cognitive task. And if these information-bearing structures should 
happen to be located beyond the boundaries of skin and skull then the 
cognitive process also extends beyond the boundaries of skin and skull. 
So, if a process that is essential to the completion of a certain cognitive 
task involves the manipulation of some external (environmental) 
information-bearing structure then this process is cognitive and extends 
into the environment. 
 
We can run this argument from the perspective of the Parity Principle 
endorsed by Clark that we examined in chapter one. If a cognitive 
process is a process that facilitates the completion of a particular 
cognitive task and if this process proceeds by way of processing certain 
information that is relevant to the completion of the task then it should 
not matter where this process is carried out in so far as its cognitive status 
is concerned. What matters is that the putative cognitive process fulfils 
the criteria laid out by Rowlands above—which is to say that the process 
                                               
17 We can see how Rowlands‘ manipulation thesis as applied to cognitive processes 
differs from Clark and Chalmers‘ use of epistemic actions. Whereas epistemic actions, 
as defined by Kirsch and Maglio and employed by Clark and Chalmers, make some 
change to the environment that aids and augments cognition, the manipulation thesis 
does not hold that every instance of manipulation yields a change to the environment. 
We could see, perhaps, epistemic actions as special cases of manipulation as defined by 
the manipulation thesis. On this view all epistemic actions exemplify the manipulation 
thesis as applied to cognitive processes but not all cases of the manipulation of 
information-bearing structures performed for the completion of a cognitive task are 
epistemic actions. 
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is essential to the completion of a cognitive task and involves processing 
on information-bearing structures. 
 
Rowlands‘ Environmentalism as noted briefly in chapter one, endorses 
the correct reading of the Parity Principle in that it anticipates the 
arguments of the cognitive integrationist and emphasises the differences 
that exist between the external portion of extended cognitive processes 
and their internal portion. The parity that Rowlands sees as existing 
between the purely internal cognitive process and the extended cognitive 
process exists on the level at which cognitive status is awarded, not on 
the level of what implements the processing. Rowlands recognises that 
there are important differences that exist between purely internal and 
extended aspects of cognitive process and, much like the cognitive 
integrationist, Rowlands argues that these differences are required if the 
external portion of extended cognitive processes are to be in any way 
useful in assisting the completion of specific cognitive tasks.  
 
To see why this should be the case I will examine some arguments from 
the evolutionary perspective that Rowlands develops in support of 
Environmentalism. The first element of the evolutionary argument that I 
want to consider is Rowlands‘ Barking Dog Principle. 
 
The Barking Dog & Evolutionary Support for EMT 
 
The Barking Dog Principle: If it is necessary for an organism to 
be able to perform a given adaptive task T, then it is differentially 
selectively disadvantageous for that organism to develop internal 
mechanisms sufficient for the performance of T when it is 
possible for the organism to perform T by way of a combination 
of internal mechanisms and manipulation of the external 
environment. (Ibid: 80) 
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In order to demonstrate why such a principle should hold, Rowlands 
invites us to consider the concept of evolutionary cost. Any evolutionary 
development requires an investment of resources. Each organism has a 
finite amount of resources, such that an investment of resources—in the 
development of wings, for example—will mean fewer resources to invest 
in other areas, such as reproduction. Every evolutionary adaptation costs 
something and costs typically multiply. A larger brain, for example, 
means a larger head, which means more weight at the front of the body, 
which means developing a longer tail to balance this extra weight and so 
on. So, at every stage of evolutionary development there is a balancing of 
costs and benefits.  
 
Rowlands‘ Barking Dog Principle appreciates the evolutionary cost 
involved with adopting particular evolutionary strategies and 
recommends the adoption of the manipulate-the-environment strategy 
because it can be purchased at less evolutionary cost. Why do all of the 
work if you can get someone, or something to do some of that work for 
you? Or, if you have a dog then you do not have to bark yourself (Ibid: 
80). 
 
Andy Clark also recognizes this principle, albeit by another name. He 
claims that if evolution can economize by exploiting the structure of the 
physical environment in order to aid an animal‘s processing then it is 
very likely to do so. He calls this the 007 principle: 
 
The 007 Principle: In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor 
process information in costly ways when they can use the structure of 
the environment and their operations upon it as a convenient stand-in 
for the information-processing operations concerned. That is, know only 
as much as you need to know to get the job done. (Clark 1989: 64) 
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So it makes good evolutionary sense, according to Clark and Rowlands, 
to delegate certain tasks, or at least a significant portion of certain tasks, 
to the external environment where possible.
18
 The reason that this 
strategy of delegating certain tasks to external environment makes sense 
according to Rowlands is that it enables an organism to maximize 
differential fitness. He illustrates this quite nicely in discussion of the 
evolutionary strategy adopted by the beaver. Beavers build dams because 
a dam results in the creation of a miniature lake, which means the beaver 
can travel greater distances by water, thus making the task of reaching 
and transporting food much safer. The building of dams is, in this way, 
advantageous to the beaver so it became part of the beaver‘s evolutionary 
strategy. However, the beaver could have evolved in other ways. Imagine 
that in the past the beaver‘s ancestors began evolving in two distinct 
ways. One way involved adapting the dam-building strategy and the other 
strategy concentrated on making the beaver stronger, quicker, more 
intelligent etc. 
 
The tasks that the beaver‘s ancestor had to accomplish were the location 
and transportation of food and the evasion of predators. The conjunction 
of these two tasks, Rowlands calls ‗T‘. Now, let us suppose that S(o) is 
the strategy adopted by the dam-building or ordinary beaver and S(s) is 
the strategy adopted by the other, super-beaver. If both the ordinary 
beaver and super-beaver are equally competent in performing T then it 
follows that the benefits for the ordinary beaver through adopting S(o) 
are equal to the benefits for the super-beaver through adopting S(s). This 
does not entail, however, that the differential fitness of each beaver is the 
same. This would only be the case if the cost of adopting S(o) was the 
                                               
18 It should be noted at this point—in anticipation of what is to follow in later chapters—
that even if it makes evolutionary sense for an organism to delegate cognitive tasks to 
the environment this does not necessarily entail that the processing taking place in the 
environment is cognitive processing. The only thing that matters in this case is whether 
or not this processing exemplifies the mark of the cognitive. 
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same as the cost of adopting S(s) and this is said not to be the case. 
Rowlands claims that S(s) is bought at a greater cost than S(o). The 
implementational cost of S(o) comprises the genetic resources needed for 
development and maintenance of the large flat powerful teeth and tail and 
the muscle that surrounds each. In the case of S(s) the implementational 
costs seem greater. The super-beaver must develop more powerful 
muscles for dragging its food over long overland journeys so its limbs 
and torso must become bigger. It will have to become quicker to escape 
predators, which entails longer limbs. It might have to become more 
intelligent and will also have to improve its senses so as to detect and 
avoid predators, which would require encephalization, which leads to a 
larger head, which means more weight at the front of the body, which 
must be balanced at the rear, and so on. 
 
The disparity in performance cost between the two strategies is even 
greater. Although the ordinary beaver has the large initial cost of building 
the dam it seems small compared to the daily overland journeys with risk 
of predation that the super-beaver must make. So, both the 
implementational and performance costs of S(o) are less than S(s). With 
respect to task T (finding food and evading predators) the differential 
fitness of the ordinary beaver would be greater than that of the super-
beaver. Thus, from the point of view of evolutionary fitness it seems to 
be differentially selectively advantageous to accomplish a particular task 
by developing the capacity to manipulate the environment instead of 
accomplishing that same task by developing additional, improved, or 
enlarged internal mechanisms or structures (Rowlands 1999: 79). 
 
This leads us to another principle that Rowlands highlights and which 
also evidences his support of the Cognitive Integrationist position. In the 
case of the beaver consider, once more, the task, T, that faces him. The 
beaver must locate and transport food while evading predators. Now, the 
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internal mechanisms that the beaver has, in fact, evolved to accomplish 
this task are not at all obvious given the nature of the task. This insight 
yields the Principle of the non-obvious character of evolved internal 
mechanisms. Rowlands states it as follows: 
 
NOC: For the performance of a given task T, and for any internal 
mechanism M which has evolved in organism O and which, when 
combined with suitable environmental manipulation on the part of O, 
allows O to perform T, the nature of M is not always obvious on the 
basis of T. (Ibid: 81). 
 
According to Rowlands, this principle applies equally to internal 
mechanisms that have evolved in conjunction with the manipulation of 
environmental structures for the purposes of completing specific 
cognitive tasks. These internal mechanisms or structures will by no 
means be obvious given the nature of the cognitive task to be completed. 
The reason that these internal mechanisms or structures are not obvious 
on the basis of the task to be completed is precisely because they have 
been developed in conjunction with a strategy of the manipulation of 
environmental structures. Once you examine the bigger picture, 
incorporating the integrated internal and external portions of the extended 
process, the integrated mechanism, as a whole will become more obvious 
given the nature of the cognitive task. It is only upon consideration of the 
beaver‘s manipulation of the structures in his environment that his 
evolutionary strategy of the development of powerful jaws, large teeth 
and a large flat tail along with the associated musculature makes sense.  
 
Furthermore, it makes sense only when the extended process, mechanism, 
or strategy as a whole is considered, precisely because the internal 
portion of the process, mechanism, or strategy is insufficient for the 
completion of the task in question. It is insufficient, on its own, for the 
 65 
completion of the task because it requires something different, something 
extra, to complete the task. This is exactly what the cognitive 
integrationist is getting at when he talks about the integration of distinct 
internal and external processes. The precise reason that the external 
portion of the process is integrated with the internal process to create one 
extended process is because on its own the internal portion of the process 
is insufficient for, or incapable of, completion of the task. In this way 
Rowlands‘ Environmentalism, and his evolutionary arguments in support 
of Environmentalism, endorses the insights of the integrationist 
perspective. 
 
Rowlands may well be correct in arguing that it is a biological tendency 
for organisms to offload significant portions of tasks onto the 
environment where possible. He may be correct in arguing that doing so 
makes good evolutionary sense from the perspective of the differential 
fitness of the organism. He may be correct that this holds true with regard 
to cognitive tasks as well as more mundane tasks that do not involve 
cognition. He may be correct in arguing that offloading portions of 
cognitive tasks onto the environment transforms the nature of the internal 
processing that needs to be carried out in order to complete the cognitive 
task in question. And he may be correct in arguing that, in cases where a 
portion of the cognitive task is offloaded onto the environment, the 
manipulation of the information-bearing structure in question is essential 
to the completion of the cognitive task. None of this, however, entails 
that cognitive processes extend into the environment. What is required 
for such a conclusion is that the extended hybrid process, comprising 
internal and external processing, displays the mark of the cognitive, 
whatever that turns out to be. 
 
What Rowlands has given us is a good supporting argument for why we 
might expect organisms to adopt the ‗manipulate the environment‘ 
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strategy with regard to cognitive processing. What he needs next, is an 
argument to show that adopting this strategy entails the extension of 




Before I examine Rowlands‘ arguments for the extension of cognitive 
processes I want to give a reminder of his definition of a cognitive 
process, which is key in this section:  
 
A process P is a cognitive process if and only if (i) P is essential to the 
accomplishing of a cognitive task T, and (ii) P involves operations on 
information bearing structures, where information carried by such 
structures is relevant to task T. (Ibid: 103). 
 
In The Body in Mind Rowlands examines perception, memory, reasoning 
and language acquisition, arguing that Environmentalist accounts can be 
given in each case that endorse the Ontological Claim. From these 





1. The amount of internal information processing that an organism 
needs to perform in order to accomplish a cognitive task is inversely 
proportional to the amount of relevant information that is available 
to that organism in the environment. 
                                               
19 There are actually four general claims made by Rowlands in The Body in Mind 
regarding cognitive processes. However, one claim—that we cannot begin to understand 
the internal information-processing task facing an organism for the completion of a 
cognitive task unless we understand what relevant information is contained in the 
organism‘s environment—relates to the Epistemological Claim rather than the 
Ontological Claim, which is not of concern here. And another is simply the claim that in 
certain cases manipulating external structures is a form of information processing. 
Rowlands admits that he does not require this claim in order to run his argument so I 
propose to ignore it here. 
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2. An organism can process information relevant to the completion of 
a cognitive task through acting upon, and thus effecting 
transformations in, information-bearing structures in the environ-
ment. 
 
If we allow these two claims to pass unchallenged (which I propose to do 
here for the sake of argument) and if the definition of a cognitive process 
proposed by Rowlands above is correct, then cognition extends into the 
world. I now examine these general claims applied to specific cognitive 
processes, beginning with perception. 
 
In making his case for the extension of the cognitive process of visual 
perception into the world Rowlands examines, first of all, a typical 
internalist account of perception (in the style of David Marr) in order to 
contrast with his own. Such an account, he claims, is typically organised 
around the following sort of framework:  
 
1. Perception begins with stimulation by light energy impinging on it. 
2. This results in a retinal image, characterised in terms of intensity 
values distributed over a large array of locations. 
3. Retinal images carry relatively little information, certainly not 
enough to add up to genuine perception. 
4. In order for perception to occur, the information contained in the 
retinal image has to be supplemented and embellished (i.e. 
processed) by various information processing operations. 
5. These information-processing operations occur inside the skin of 
the perceiving organism. (Rowlands 2003b: 169-170). 
 
So, this sort of framework is characterised by the positing of a retinal 
image carrying insufficient information. Given the paucity of information 
contained in the retinal image, it must be processed by a number of 
internal operations in order for visual perception to be possible. So, 
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according to Rowlands, the retinal image is always the starting point for 
analysis of visual perception according to this internalist framework and 
because the retinal image is inside the skin of the cognizing organism, the 
processing that is carried out on the retinal image is also seen as 
occurring inside the organism‘s skin. So, on this view visual perception is 
naturally construed as a purely internal process. Rowlands turns to the 
work of J.J. Gibson for an alternative to this internalist account.  
 
For Gibson, the starting point for theorising about visual perception is not 
the retinal image but the optic array. The optic array is the structure of 
light that surrounds an observer yielding information about the 
environment, information which changes as the observer moves because 
the movement alters the structure of the optic array. Thus, the optic array 
is, says Rowlands, an external information-bearing structure. Given the 
existence of the optic array, Rowlands makes the following claim which 
is a specific application of the more general Claim 1 above: 
 
The amount of internal information processing which an organism 
needs to perform in order to accomplish visual perception task T is 
inversely proportional to the amount of relevant information that is 
available to that organism in the optic array. (Rowlands 1999: 108) 
 
This claim follows once we allow that the optic array exists, which, 
Rowlands states, is not controversial. What this claim makes explicit, 
says Rowlands, is that perception is essentially bound up with action. The 
perceiving organism moves in order to change the structure of the optic 
array that surrounds it and thereby acquires the information contained 
within. This yields the following claim, which is a specific application of 
the more general Claim 2 above: 
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An organism can process information relevant to visual perception task 
T through acting upon, and thus effecting transformations in, the optic 
array. (Ibid: 116) 
 
If this is correct then at least some of the information processing that is 
essential to the completion of the cognitive task of visual perception lies 
outside of the boundaries of skin and skull. Rowlands says that if the 
manipulation of the external optic array is a process that is essential to the 
completion of the cognitive task of visual perception and if the definition 
of a cognitive process above is correct then at least some of the 
processing involved in visual perception is external, which is the message 
of the Ontological Claim. Thus, the Ontological Claim can be defended 
with respect the cognitive task of visual perception according to 
Rowlands. 
 
A similar result follows if we look at Rowlands‘ arguments for the 
extension of memory. We all use external cues to aid memory. I have a 
diary, for example, where I write down everything that I need to do in the 
course of the day because I don‘t trust myself to remember ‗on my own.‘ 
Examples of this type of memory aid abound: the knot in the hanky, the 
shopping list, asking somebody else to remind you of something, or using 
a ‗wearable remembrance agent‘20, are all possible ways of using external 
cues that trigger the process of remembering. The standard reading of 
such a situation is that I see the knot in the hanky, which triggers 
something within my brain that causes me to remember whatever it is that 
I wanted to remember. The remembering is typically seen as a purely 
internal process and the memory aid as external to the real magic of 
memory. Memory cues or memory aids are seen as just precisely that: 
something to kick-start the real process of remembering. This is not 
                                               
20 Apparently it exists, called a ―Private Eye‖ and made by Reflection Technology. For 
discussion see: Clark 2003: 46.  
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necessarily the correct way of looking at things according to Rowlands. 
He claims, at least with regard to the memory systems possessed by 
modern literate adult human beings, that there is no sound theoretical 
reason for imposing such a dichotomy between internal memory 
processes and external ‗aids‘ to those processes (Ibid: 121). 
 
Rowlands begins by considering episodic memory, which is memory of 
specific episodes in the life of the subject. Although modern literate 
adults do possess an episodic memory system, it does not seem to operate 
with anything like efficiency or accuracy of people of preliterate cultures 
(Luria & Vygotsky 1992). Similarly, children rely much more heavily on 
episodic memory than adults (up to a certain point in their development). 
If the episodic memory of preliterate cultures and children is superior to 
that of modern, literate adults, then it seems legitimate to wonder if the 
memory in general of preliterates and children could be said to be 
superior to that of modern, literate adults. Rowlands argues that this is an 
incorrect way of looking at the situation, stating that the difference here is 
not one of degrees of superiority but, rather, one of strategy. Modern 
literate adults simply employ a different memory storage strategy; they 
employ semantic memory, which is, roughly, memory of facts—
remembering that something is the case. Modern literate humans do 
possess episodic memory systems but this has been superseded by 
semantic memory says Rowlands (1999). He claims that this difference in 
memory strategy exists despite the lack of any relevant biological 
difference between preliterate people and modern literate humans, or 
between children and adults, at least none that could explain the switch in 
storage strategy from episodic to semantic. 
 
Rowlands says that the explanation of the development of this alternative 
strategy lies in a change in the functional hardware involved in memory 
storage and retrieval. But he argues that this change in hardware does not 
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have a biological explanation in the human brain. Instead, Rowlands 
argues that the development that made this alternative strategy possible 
was a fundamental change in the environment in which the modern brain 
is situated; the development of external means of representation (Ibid.). 
 
Given the availability of an external means of representation how would 
we imagine a memory storage and retrieval strategy to develop? 
Rowlands considers the use of a system of knots for communication 
called kvinus (Rowlands 1999: 134-137; 2003b: 178-177). Kvinus were 
used in Peru to record chronicles, to transmit instructions to remote 
provinces, and to record information about the state of the army among 
other things. A kvinu officer was appointed whose task was the tying and 
interpreting of the knots such that the system became standard and could 
be used to record all major matters of the state. Rowlands compares the 
strategy of the Peruvian kvinu officer with the strategy of the preliterate 
African envoy, both charged with the task of transporting a message. The 
African envoy (who cannot make use of external means of 
representation) will need to remember the content of the message word 
for word, in the correct order. However, the Peruvian kvinu officer need 
not remember either the content or order of the message, all he needs to 
remember is the code that will allow him to extract the information that is 
contained in the knots. So the African envoy will need to employ his 
episodic memory each time that he needs to remember a new message. 
By contrast, the Peruvian kvinu officer need only employ his episodic 
memory once in learning the code. So, given the availability of an 
external means of representation in the form of the kvinus, we can say 
that the more information that is carried and processed externally, the less 
information needs to be carried and processed internally. Thus, we get a 
specific application of the more general Claim 1 offered above:  
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The amount of internal information processing that an organism needs 
to perform in order to accomplish memory task T is inversely 
proportional to the amount of relevant information that is available to 
the organism in the physical structures around it. (Rowlands 1999: 122) 
 
Now although the kvinu officer must employ some internal processing in 
order to remember the code that allows him to translate the knots, the 
remainder of the information is carried by the knots themselves and by 
using or processing this information the kvinu officer is able to complete 
his particular memory task. So, the kvinu knots are structures that carry 
information, that is, they are information-bearing structures which the 
kvinu officer must manipulate. Furthermore, the manipulation of these 
information-bearing structures is essential to the completion of the 
cognitive task of retrieving, or remembering, the message. Thus, we get a 
specific application to memory of the more general Claim 2 above: 
 
An organism can process information relevant to memory task T 
through the manipulation of physical structures in its environment. 
(Ibid.)  
 
If Rowlands‘ definition of a cognitive process is correct then the Kvinu 
officer‘s use of the system of knots to relay messages forms part of a 
cognitive process. In this case the information-bearing structure to be 
manipulated happens to be located beyond the boundary of skin and skull 
and so, says Rowlands, the cognitive process in this case also extends 
beyond this boundary. Thus, the cognitive process of remembering can 
extend into the environment in accordance with the Ontological Claim. 
 
Rowlands also considers the possibility of the extension of reasoning via 
consideration of a classic example of mathematical reasoning that we 
examined briefly in chapter one, which by extension, he claims, provides 
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a template for the operation of formal reasoning in general. There is no 
need to rehearse the long-multiplication example that we examined in 
chapter one. Rowlands claims that the numbers written down on the piece 
of paper constitute an information-bearing structure and these structures 
are manipulated for the process of completing the long multiplication 
task, which is a specific application of the more general Claim 2 above. 
Furthermore, without adopting this strategy the possibility of completing 
the task diminishes drastically unless one is particularly adept at mental 
arithmetic. So, the amount of internal processing that a subject must 
perform in order to complete the task is inversely proportional to the 
amount of relevant information in the subject‘s environment, which is a 
specific application of the general Claim 1 above. Thus, if Rowlands‘ 
definition of a cognitive process is correct, then reasoning can extend into 
the environment by being partially constituted by these external 
information-bearing structures, which provides further endorsement of 
the Ontological Claim. 
 
We can, says Rowlands, apply these arguments to spatial as well as 
formal reasoning tasks such as the long multiplication example 
considered above. Consider how difficult the completion of a jigsaw 
would be if it was forbidden to pick up the pieces and physically rotate 
them. Much like the Tetris example considered in chapter one, in this 
case the external rotation of the pieces does work that would, otherwise, 
have to be carried out internally. That is, one would have to form a 
mental image of the piece and mentally rotate it in order to determine its 
best fit. The fact that we can physically rotate the pieces removes the 
need for performing these difficult mental imagery tasks. Thus, once 
more, the amount of internal processing that is required for the 
completion of the reasoning task is inversely proportional to the amount 
of relevant information contained in the environment. And, furthermore, 
the manipulation of pieces in the manner just described constitutes the 
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manipulation of external information-bearing structures for the 
completion of the spatial reasoning task—completing the jigsaw. So, 
again if Rowlands‘ definition of a cognitive process is correct then the 
process just described counts as cognitive and provides further 
endorsement of the Ontological Claim. 
 
In later work, Rowlands attempts to broaden the scope of his version of 
EMT and does so by endorsing a form of vehicle externalism—a variety 
of EMT that we will consider in detail the next chapter. Here, I will 
examine how Rowlands uses vehicle externalism to argue for the 




In Externalism (2003b) Rowlands puts a slightly different spin on his 
version of EMT, arguing for a form of vehicle externalism. The 
vehicle/content distinction is essentially a distinction between content or 
meaning and what has or carries that content. The typical manner of 
characterising vehicles is by exemplifying this distinction in simple 
sentences. So, for example, in the case of the sentence ‗water is wet‘ we 
can distinguish the content of the sentence, what is expressed by that 
sentence—the proposition that water is wet—from the sentence itself—
the order of symbols and spaces of the written sentence or the phonetic 
sound of the spoken sentence. This syntactic-phonetic sentence form is 
the vehicle and it carries the content that water is wet. 
 
The distinction is also thought to apply to mental contents, which is to 
say that in the case of particular mental states, such as the thought that 
water is wet, we can distinguish the content of the mental state from the 
vehicle that has or carries that content. In this case vehicles are the 
physical processes and mechanisms, such as neurophysiological 
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processes, that are the causally explanatory events or processes of 
particular mental content tokens. The vehicles of mental content occupy a 
differentially token-explanatory role with regard to the mental contents 
rather than a type-explanatory role. That is, the mechanisms and 
processes described can explain particular instances of mental state 
tokens, they explain the occurrence of a particular belief that p at time t, 
but do not explain why mental states of this type obtain at all. 
 
This way of using the term ‗vehicle‘ is, as demonstrated, quite tightly 
linked with the notion of semantic content. But Rowlands argues that 
there is another way of using the term vehicle that ‗bears no direct or 
essential connection to content‘ (Rowlands 2006: 31). Instead we can 
characterise a vehicle, says Rowlands, in terms of the distinction between 
a state and a process. 
 
 The above conception of a vehicle sees it primarily as a state—one that
 has a token-explanatory role in accounting for why a token content, and
 thus why a token mental state, should obtain. But there is another sense
 of vehicle that applies to mental processes rather than mental states.
 And its most natural application is to a subclass of mental processes:
 cognitive processes. (Ibid.) 
 
Rowlands argues that just as the vehicles of mental content are the 
subpersonal states that explain particular content tokens, the vehicles of 
cognition are the subpersonal mechanisms on which particular cognitive 
processes run. He says that we can refer to these vehicles of cognition as 
cognitive architecture.  
 
 [C]ognitive processes are implemented in certain subpersonal
 mechanisms possessed by the cognizing organism. We can refer to these
 as the cognitive architecture of the organism. In this sense, the vehicles
 of cognition consist in cognitive architecture: the subpersonal
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 mechanisms that allow cognitive processes to be run. However, by
 extension the notion of a vehicle can also be extended to the
 processes themselves—as long as we are clear that these are identified
 non- intentionally. (Ibid: 32, emphasis mine). 
 
In talking about the vehicles of mental content we can distinguish 
between the content and the vehicle as bearer of that content. But the 
question arises as to whether it is legitimate to make a similar distinction 
in talking about the vehicles of cognition. That is, can we make a 
distinction between cognition itself and the vehicle of cognition? 
Rowlands thinks that we can but he believes that the extension of the 
vehicles of cognition means that cognition extends, provided that we 
identify the cognitive process non-intentionally. 
 
This admission seems detrimental to the prospects of a genuine EMT. If 
cognitive processes must be specified non-intentionally then, if 
intentionality is crucial for mentality, we have no compelling reason to 
see the extension of cognitive processes as concerning an extension of the 
mental in any interesting sense.
21
 If this is correct then the best that can 
be decisively concluded from these arguments is the extension of the 
belief-forming mechanism, the enablers of mental states.  
 
Rowlands does not himself argue for the extension of mental states into 
the world but in Externalism (2003b) he reports on Clark and Chalmers‘ 
argument for the extension of ‗cognitive states‘. It is not immediately 
clear why Rowlands chooses to specify Otto‘s belief as a cognitive state 
rather than a mental state. But later we learn that he sees cognitive states 
as being the ―products‖ of cognitive processes (Ibid: 182). So, on 
Rowlands‘ account, Otto‘s believing that the Museum of Modern Art is 
                                               





 Street is a cognitive state that is the result of an extended 
cognitive process involving the manipulation of the notebook. In this 
case, even if we accept that this constitutes an example of a genuinely 
extended cognitive process the option is still there to reject the claim that 
the mental (or cognitive) state extends. And if the extension of mental 
states is required for the extension of mind, the extension of cognitive 
processes that are specified non-intentionally will not entail a genuine 
EMT.  
 
Constitution vs. Enabling 
 
There are problems with using the notion of a vehicle in the manner just 
described in reference to cognitive processes. As mentioned, the notion of 
a vehicle is very tightly bound up with the notion of semantic content and 
it is not clear that it can be appropriated to be synonymous with 
‗cognitive architecture‘ as Rowlands does. Furthermore, it is not clear 
that the extension of cognitive architecture necessarily entails the 
extension of cognition as argued by Rowlands. One of the more 
important corollaries of endorsing the vehicle/content distinction is the 
warning to be careful not to conflate the properties of vehicles with the 
properties represented in the contents of mental states (see Hurley 
1998b). Thus, it is a mistake to assume that the properties of the vehicle 
of content will project onto the content itself, and vice versa. For 
example, it is, quite obviously, a mistake to assume that the vehicle that 
carries the content ‗green‘ must itself be green. 
 
Something similar may hold with regard to the locational properties of 
cognitive architectures and cognition. If so, the extension of the vehicles 
of cognition, cognitive architecture, will not entail the extension of 
cognition. Instead, the extension of the vehicles of cognition may best be 
described as extending the enabling mechanisms of cognition. In the next 
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chapter, we will delve deeper into issues surrounding the use of vehicles 
by the EMT theorist in consideration of the work of Susan Hurley. 
 
However, even apart from the problems Rowlands faces over his use of 
vehicles there are problems with his account of the extension of cognitive 
processes as described earlier. Rowlands‘ arguments for evolutionary 
support for the manipulate-the-environment strategy may well be correct. 
However, the success of these arguments demonstrates, at best, that it 
makes good evolutionary sense to make use of external information-
bearing structures in order to aid in the completion of cognitive tasks. In 
order to demonstrate that cognitive processes extend Rowlands needs to 
demonstrate not only that adopting this strategy is relevant or essential to 
the completion of the cognitive task in question, but that the manipulation 
of the external information-bearing structure constitutes cognitive 
processing. 
 
So, although Rowlands‘ suggests that his arguments in The Body in Mind 
entail the extension of cognitive processes into the environment, it is not 
conclusively demonstrated that he is entitled to this conclusion. One 
could take Rowlands‘ arguments as providing a good case for certain 
information-bearing structures in the environment enabling the 
completion of certain cognitive tasks without partially constituting the 
cognitive process in question. Indeed, Rowlands notes that his arguments 
in The Body in Mind should be viewed as providing an alternative picture 
to the one provided by Internalism, however, and not as conclusively 
refuting it, and thus it is not a decisive argument against internalism. It 
seems, then, equally valid is to view processes that involve the 




But an opponent of EMT can accept the extension of cognitive processes 
in the manner argued for by Rowlands and yet maintain that mental states 
remain internal. If cognitive processes are specified non-intentionally 
then it is not clear that their extension into the world concerns an 
extension of the mental in any interesting sense. Thus, we can question 
the extent to which Rowlands actually argues for EMT since his focus is 
on extending cognitive processes that must be specified non-intentionally 
rather than extending the intentionally specified mental states that would 
entail a genuine EMT. In the next chapter I examine the work of Susan 



























Here, the exposition of EMT concludes with Susan Hurley, who is taken 
to be one of its most meticulous exponents. However, I will argue that if 
the extension of mental states is required for a genuine EMT then it is not 
clear that Hurley advocates an EMT of the same kind as Clark and 
Chalmers. Hurley‘s vehicle externalism is the thesis that the vehicles of 
mental content can extend beyond the boundaries of skin and skull and 
into the world. I examine the arguments that Hurley offers in favour of 
just such a conclusion and, as with my treatments of the work of Clark 
and Rowlands, consider whether these arguments actually yield a 
conclusion of EMMT—the extension of the machinery of mind—rather 
than a conclusion of EMT. I begin, however, as in the preceding chapters, 
with an examination of how Hurley characterises her vehicle externalism 
by distinguishing it from content externalism. 
 
EMT vs. Content Externalism 
 
In ‗Varieties of Externalism‘ (forthcoming) Hurley offers a taxonomy of 
externalist positions that yields four varieties. She categorises these 
varieties, first of all, according to the type of explanation offered by each 
externalist position; distinguishing ‗what‘-explanations from ‗how‘-
explanations. Hurley describes ‗what‘-explanations in the philosophy of 
mind as accounting for why a mental state has content of a certain type; 





                                               
22 Hurley‘s is not arguing that ‗what‘-explanations account for mental state types, i.e. 
why a mental state is a belief rather than a desire. The type distinction applies to the 
contents of mental states rather than their attitudinal aspects.  
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For example, they explain why an intention is an intention to look inside 
the box on the left, rather than to look inside a different box, or to do 
something else entirely. Or why an experience is one of how something 
looks rather than of how it feels or sounds, or is an experience of red 
rather than of green. (Ibid.) 
 
‗How‘-explanations in philosophy of mind explain the occurrence of 
particular tokens of mental states, such as the belief, at time t that p, by 
accounting for the processes or mechanisms that enable this particular 
mental state. 
 
They explain, e.g., what processes or mechanisms enable a given 
intention to look inside the box on the left, or a given visual experience 
of a certain surface as blue. (Ibid.) 
 
Hurley argues that we can look at the distinction between content 
externalism and her version of EMT (vehicle externalism) in terms of the 
distinction between ‗what‘-explanations and ‗how‘-explanations. On this 
account a ‗what‘-explanation is an externalist ‗what‘-explanation if it 
invokes external features in accounting for why a mental state has a 
particular content type, e.g. the content that water (H20) is wet rather than 
the content that water (XYZ) is wet, for example. Similarly, a ‗how‘-
explanation is an externalist ‗how‘-explanation, like vehicle externalism, 
if it invokes external features in explaining the tokening of a particular 
mental state, such as the belief by Otto, at time t, that the Museum of 




The second category of distinction that Hurley employs in her taxonomy 
of externalist positions is between different explananda—what is to be 
accounted for by the externalist explanation. Here again there are two 
possibilities according to Hurley: mental content and phenomenal quality. 
A ‗what‘-explanation that seeks to give an account, for example, of why a 
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particular belief is a belief that water (H20) is wet by appealing to 
external factors is, by Hurley‘s taxonomy, a ‗what‘-content externalist 
position: the content externalism of Putnam and Burge. A position that 
seeks to explain phenomenal quality type, e.g. why a particular 
experience is of red rather than green, by appealing to external factors is a 
‗what‘-quality externalist position. 
 
Similarly, an externalism that offers explanations of particular tokenings 
of semantically contentful mental states by appealing to external factors 
(‗how‘-content externalism), can be distinguished from what Hurley says 
seems a more radical position: offering explanations of particular 
tokenings of phenomenal quality by appealing to external factors (‗how‘-
quality externalism). 
 
Thus, on Hurley‘s taxonomy her vehicle externalism (which she sees as 
being of a kind with the positions endorsed by Clark and Chalmers and 
Rowlands) is a ‗how‘-content externalist position. Before moving on to 
consider how Hurley argues for her vehicle externalism it is important to 
note that in ‗Varieties of Externalism‘ (forthcoming) Hurley distinguishes 
different types of externalism as offering explanations of different mental 
phenomena. For example, ‗what‘-content Externalism explains 
intentional content type, ‗what‘-quality externalism explains phenomenal 
quality type, ‗how‘-content externalism explains intentional content 
tokens, and ‗how‘-quality externalism explains phenomenal quality 
tokens. But, as we have briefly touched on in the previous chapters, the 
fact that appeal to external factors may offer the best explanation of the 
occurrence of a particular content token does not necessarily mean that 
the content token itself is partially externally constituted or located. It 
may just be that external factors play an ineliminable role in enabling that 
particular content token. 
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Hurley‘s position in this regard is not immediately clear. As we saw 
above she sees vehicle externalism as being of a kind with the EMT 
advocated by Clark and Chalmers. But in ‗Varieties of Externalism‘ 
(forthcoming) she interchanges ‗vehicle externalism‘ with ‗enabling 
externalism‘; suggesting that she may endorse EMMT rather than an 
EMT. What needs to be established, then, in looking at Hurley‘s work, is 
what her take on vehicles is. Are vehicles constitutive of mental states or 




Hurley argues that the vehicles of mental content are events or processes 
that are described at the subpersonal level as opposed to the personal 
level (1998b). The personal level, according to Hurley, is the folk 
psychological level of explanation that we use every day to understand 
the behaviour of others, by attributing beliefs, desires, and intentions to 
them and by thinking of them as acting for reasons. Inga goes to the 
museum of Modern Art; why does she do this? We can understand her 
actions by attributing certain beliefs and desires to her. Inga has a desire 
to see a particular exhibition; she believes that this exhibition is at the 
Museum of Modern Art, that the Museum is located on 53
rd
 street, and 
she forms an intention to go there. Hurley says that these attributions of 
propositional attitudes are made at the personal level.  
 
The subpersonal level of explanation yields causal explanations of these 
personal level content tokens in neurophysiological or computational 
terms, describing processes, mechanisms, and the functions of theses 
mechanisms. The contents of mental states, which we attribute at the 
personal level, are said by Hurley to be carried by these processes, which 
is why Hurley calls them vehicles of content (Ibid: 3). 
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On Hurley‘s conception these vehicles of mental content occupy a token-
explanatory rather than a type-explanatory role. That is, these 
mechanisms and processes described at the subpersonal level can explain 
particular instances of mental-state tokens, ―particular thoughts on 
particular occasions‖ (Ibid: 19), such as the belief that p at time t. 
 
However, although a vehicle can explain the obtaining of a particular 
content token such as the belief that p at time t, it will not explain why 
mental states of this content type (that p) obtain in general. Vehicles of 
content, in other words, don‘t tell us why the token mental states carried 
by the vehicles have the contents that they do. And the properties of 
vehicles of content, thus conceived, do not fix the contents carried by the 
vehicles. So, for Hurley, the vehicles of content do not include ―all the 
entities back through time needed to explain why mental states or 
episodes of a given type or with a given type of content exist at all‖ (Ibid: 
28).  
 
For example, in an account of which content is carried by a particular 
vehicle, type-explanatory processes, such as evolution, are often appealed 
to and we saw in chapters one and two how contextual factors can be 
appealed to in taxonomising mental state types. However, as Hurley 
explains:  
 
[V]ehicles of content do not include all this context. Vehicles explain 
the obtaining of particular mental states and processes, even if the 
contents of the mental states in question are determined by further type-
explanatory factors. (Ibid: 28). 
 
Consequently, says Hurley, we can think of vehicles differentially, which 
is to say that a vehicle is what is left over when you subtract what is 
needed to explain the existence of some mental state type from what is 
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needed to give a full explanation of the obtaining of a particular instance 
of this mental state type. So, in a full explanation of the obtaining of a 
particular instance of a mental state type, evolutionary, normative and 
contextual content-fixing factors may be appealed to but an appeal to 
what pattern of neurons fired may also be required. 
 
To better see Hurley‘s point consider the following sentence token 
written in ink on paper: the cat is on the mat. A full explanation of the 
obtaining of this particular instance of that content type will perhaps 
require an appeal to the historical processes underlying the evolution of 
language and writing among other things, along with an appeal to the 
actual sentence token itself; the particular markings of ink on paper. If 
vehicles do the differentially token-explanatory work then the vehicle in 
this case is what is left over when you subtract what is needed to explain 
the existence of the content type: that the cat is on the mat from what is 
needed to give a full explanation of the obtaining of a particular instance 
of this content type. In this case, we are left with the ink markings on 
paper, which is the vehicle that carries the content. 
 
Initial considerations suggest, then, that Hurley sees vehicles as 
occupying an enabling role with regard to mental contents rather than a 
constitutive role. This is something that will be teased out more fully in 
the course of the chapter but for now, armed with this definition of a 
vehicle we can proceed to investigate how Hurley argues for the 
extension of these vehicles into the environment. And we begin with her 








The Unity of Consciousness 
 
Hurley‘s Vehicle Externalism emerges from her project of providing an 
intelligible account of the unity of consciousness. She criticises 
traditional approaches to the problem because of their failure to give an 
adequate account what constitutes unity. In attempting to provide such an 
account she challenges the assumptions of these traditional approaches 
and illustrates how, in certain cases, the extension of vehicles into the 
world may be necessary to account for the unity of consciousness at a 
time. 
 
Unity of consciousness is said to hold when distinct conscious states are 
co-conscious. So when consciousness that p at t and consciousness that q 
at t combine in one centre of consciousness to give consciousness at t that 
p and q, then the states are said to be co-conscious, or unified within one 
consciousness. Obviously then, it is not sufficient for co-consciousness 
that two experiences occur simultaneously. For example, if Inga is talking 
with Otto at time t, then we can say that Inga has an experience of 
perceiving Otto‘s face at time t and Otto has an experience of hearing 
Inga‘s voice at time t. Clearly, these experiences occur simultaneously 
but they are not co-conscious as they occur in separate centres of 
consciousness. The question for Hurley is; how do we account for the 
difference between this case and a case where two states or experiences 
are co-conscious—how do we give a constitutive account of the co-
consciousness at a time of two or more mental states? 
 
Hurley‘s (1998b) approach consists of examinations of some empirical 
results achieved in experiments conducted with so-called split-brain 
patients (that we encountered briefly in chapter one) and also considers 
some hypothetical cases. ‗Split-brain‘ patients fall into two categories: a 
commissurotomy patient is one who has the bundle of fibres that connect 
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the two hemispheres of the cortical brain—called the corpus callosum—
severed (which is a recognised treatment for epileptic seizures); 
occasionally the corpus callosum is congenitally absent, this is referred to 
as callosal agenesis and those subject to this condition are sometimes 
referred to as acallosals. Under experimental conditions, when a 
commissurotomy patient or an acallosal fixes his gaze, information from 
the left visual field reaches the right hemisphere of the brain only and 
information from the right visual field reaches the left hemisphere of the 
brain only.  
 
For example, the savant Kim Peek, on whom the film Rain Man is based, 
is an acallosal and can read two pages of a book simultaneously—one 
with each eye—doing so with near perfect information retention. So, 
given the absence of the corpus callosum in a patient, an experimenter 
can send differing information to each hemisphere by displaying different 
stimuli in the left and right visual fields. Thus, under laboratory 
conditions, the experimenter can induce inconsistencies of content, or 
disunity, in the commissurotomy patient or acallosal. 
 
For example, suppose the experimenter simultaneously projects a single 
point of red light to the patient‘s right visual field and a single point of 
green light to the patient‘s left visual field. Suppose also that when asked 
what he sees while fixating the patient responds using the right hand 
(controlled by the left hemisphere) that he sees just one point of light that 
is wholly red and simultaneously responds using the left hand (controlled 
by the right hemisphere) that he sees just one point of light that is wholly 
green. In such a case the experimenter will have induced a normative 
incoherence in the mental content of the patient—it does not make sense 
for there to be an experience of just one point of light, at one time, that is 
both completely red and completely green. 
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Normative constraints such as these are redundant when we consider the 
separateness of Otto‘s consciousness from Inga‘s consciousness at a time 
because the separateness of their consciousnesses already seems to be 
over-determined by other factors like their bodily separateness. If Otto is 
thinking that p at t and Inga is thinking that not-p at t, then we do not 
need to appeal to a constraint of normative coherence to distinguish the 
two separate centres of consciousness because we can simply appeal to 
their bodily separateness. So constraints of normative coherence are 
redundant when considering cases of disunity between two separate 
bodies.  
 
Norms do have a role to play, however, in cases of possible disunity 
harboured within one body. This kind of situation can arise in cases of 
multiple personality and in cases of commissurotomy. Consider two 
mental states a and b: mental state a has the content that p and mental 
state b has the content that q. Furthermore, that q entails that not-p. It is 
impossible then (in general) for mental state a and mental state b to be 
co-conscious because a person cannot be thinking both that p and that 
not-p at the same time. Likewise, if a person responds, under 
experimental conditions, using the right hand, that he sees just one point 
of light that is wholly red and simultaneously responds using the left hand 
that he sees just one point of light that is wholly green, then we can 
deduce that consciousness is not unified in this case. We cannot, given 
constraints of normative coherence, attribute two such inconsistent 
contents to one consciousness, so we segregate the contents or recognise 
disunity. That is, the patient in the hypothetical experiment just 
considered has manifested disunity of consciousness. 
 
Hurley emphasises she is not claiming that this normative constraint, 
which forbids inconsistent or incoherent contents in one consciousness at 
a time, applies universally or indefeasibly. She admits that there may be 
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cases where it does make sense to attribute inconsistent contents to one 
consciousness at a time. Her point is simply that a constraint of normative 
coherence and consistency does apply in many cases. And she states that 
the role of such a constraint is demonstrated by the way in which disunity 
is attributed in neuropsychological cases such as the commissurotomy 
case considered above. 
 
So norms of coherence can account for separateness in cases such as the 
commissurotomy one considered above but they can also help us in 
making sense of duplicate states of consciousness. Suppose that while our 
hypothetical experiment is being conducted there is music playing. In this 
case both left and right hemispheres will be conscious of the music. 
Nevertheless, it will still remain the case that the right hemisphere is 
conscious of a green light and not a red light and the left hemisphere is 
conscious of a red light and not a green light. It is difficult to make sense 
of such a situation. One way explored by Hurley is to posit two separate 
centres of consciousness in which conscious content, in this case 
consciousness of the music, can be duplicated. 
 
 
  red light   green light  




Duplication of content in separate centres of consciousness 
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Here, consciousness of the music is duplicated in each centre of 
consciousness—each hemisphere. When the experiment ends and the 
inconsistency that had been induced also ends, the duplication of 
conscious contents in each hemisphere may continue. However, norms 
can only account for the duplication of contents in this way in cases of 
normative inconsistency. Norms cannot account for separateness where 
there are no normative inconsistencies or incoherence between contents. 
Consequently, normative constraints cannot account for the possibility of 
the global duplication of contents over time. To put it another way, norms 
cannot account for the wholesale duplication of contents of one 
consciousness simultaneously in another consciousness. Thus, a 
constitutive account of the unity of consciousness at a time requires, 
according to Hurley, moving beyond the rules of normative coherence. 
 
The Vehicle/Content Distinction 
 
So far we have seen that although normative constraints do play a role in 
a constitutive account of the unity of consciousness for Hurley, normative 
coherence is not sufficient for unity as there can be normative coherence 
between contents realised in two distinct consciousnesses and, 
furthermore, normative coherence cannot account for the possibility of 
the global duplication of contents.
23
 We need, then, a complement to 
these normative considerations. The obvious place to look for this, says 
Hurley, is at the subpersonal level of the vehicles of content. 
 
Hurley says that the internalist position that vehicle externalists claim to 
challenge holds that the vehicles of content are exclusively brain 
                                               
23 There are more problems with attempting to rely on normative coherence to offer a 
constitutive account of unity: an account based purely on normative coherence lacks the 
resources to distinguish cases of partial unity from cases of duplication and also trying 
to account for unity in this way can give norms too much power over time as we may 
need to project isolated incidences of normative incoherence through time and postulate 
two separate centres of consciousness in an otherwise normal subject. 
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structures and processes. If this internalist position were true then Hurley 
claims that one would expect the neurophysiological structure of the 
brain to be reflected in the personal level structure of consciousness. That 
is, disunity of brain structure should manifest itself in disunity at the 
personal level, the level of consciousness. This would explain why 
commissurotomy patients, such as the patient considered in our 
hypothetical experiment, manifest disunity of consciousness; because 
there is disunity of brain structure given that the connection between the 
two hemispheres of the brain has been severed. But relying on 
neuroanatomical isomorphism in this way to account for the unity of 
consciousness at a time has problems in certain cases, according to 
Hurley. 
 
In ordinary cases the corpus callosum is present and intact and 
consciousness is unified, suggesting, possibly, that neurophysiological 
isomorphism may be a good candidate for the necessary subpersonal 
element for a complete account of the unity of consciousness. However, 
the corpus callosum is also present and intact in multiple personality 
patients yet consciousness is not unified. In multiple personality cases 
there seem to be separate centres of consciousness and there may be 
duplicate conscious states at a given time. Thus, Hurley says that 
neuroanatomical structure does not reflect the structure of consciousness 
here. In cases of commissurotomy, where the corpus callosum has been 
severed, responses that manifest disunity can be elicited from the patient, 
as in our hypothetical experiment. However, displays of disunity in the 
commissurotomy patient are extremely rare outside of artificial, 
experimental conditions such as these. When the commissurotomised 
subject is observed under normal conditions he/she is usually 
perceptually and socially competent and indistinguishable from ordinary 
cases. So, in cases of commissurotomy we have a clear anatomical, 
subpersonal basis for attributing disunity at the personal level but this 
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disunity, in the form of normative incoherence at the personal level, can 
be very difficult to induce and rarely manifests itself outside of 
experimental conditions.  
 
Furthermore, the inability to integrate visual information, for example, 
between one hemisphere and another is ―biologically trivial‖ (Kinsbourne 
1974: 253). This is because slight changes in orientation can enable the 
patient to distribute the same information to both hemispheres. Such 
changes in orientation are called access movements and are reliable 
methods of information integration even where alternative methods such 
as cross-cuing fail. Cross-cuing is deliberate communication between 
hemispheres by means of an alternative, usually external, pathway. A 
smile can function as a method of cross cuing as it crosses the vertical 
axis of the face and thus relays proprioceptive information to both 
hemispheres. 
 
In cases of callosal agenesis the corpus callosum is congenitally absent, 
yet it is extremely difficult, even under experimental conditions to elicit 
responses that are normatively incoherent and, thus, indicative of 
disunity. Despite the fact that callosal agenesis patients are anatomically 
similar to commissurotomy patients they pass almost all of the tests that 
commissurotomy patients fail. This illustrates, says Hurley, that unity of 
anatomical structure is not necessary for unity of consciousness. One 
could argue that there are other neurological structures, such as 
subcortical and ipsilateral structures, that could transfer information 
between the hemispheres. But these structures are also present in 
commissurotomy patients—the presence of these structures is not 
necessarily what makes the difference says Hurley. 
 
It does not seem correct to attribute disunity to a callosal agenesis patient 
who does not manifest disunity under testing. If the patient displays unity 
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under testing then it is surely a mistake to attribute disunity on the basis 
of the absent corpus callosum alone (Hurley 1998b). Unity of 
consciousness is a personal level phenomenon and the anatomical 
distinction that we can draw between unified and disunified brain 
structures is actually independent of the intuitive distinctions that we 
draw between normal cases and non-normal cases such as multiple 
personality, commissurotomy and callosal agenesis. The intuitive 
distinctions that we draw between unified and disunified consciousnesses 
are based on norms applied to actions. If these intuitive distinctions are 
independent of brain structure then the actions to which the norms are 
applied, and on the basis of which we make our intuitive distinctions, 
cannot be regarded as necessarily providing evidence for underlying 
brain structure. Unity at the subpersonal level in anatomical brain 
structure can yield disunity at the personal level, whereas unity in 
consciousness at the personal level can manifest despite disunity at the 
subpersonal level in anatomical brain structure. The lesson to be learned 
here, according to Hurley, is that it is a mistake to assume that properties 
of the subpersonal level of neuroanatomical structure project onto the 
personal level of contents and consciousness, or vice versa. 
  
This is a warning to heed the vehicle/content distinction as also noted by 
Dennett (1991), Dennett & Kinsbourne (1992), Millikan (1991) and 
others. For example, nobody thinks that a vehicle that enables particular 
phenomenal content of the type ‗green‘, or ‗green there!‘ must itself be 
green, nor should anyone claim that the syntactic, recombinant (classical) 
structure of thought must be implemented by a classical architecture. In 
computational terms, it is completely uncontroversial that 0s and 1s can 
represent information other than 0s and 1s. In short, it is a mistake to 




Extended Vehicles and the Dynamic Singularity 
 
The above considerations raise the question of how commissurotomy 
patients and acallosals integrate information so as to pass experimental 
tests of unity, despite disunity of neuroanatomical structure. Furthermore, 
how do acallosals integrate information so as to pass the experimental 
tests of unity that commissurotomy patients fail? One way may be 
reliance on ipsilateral and subcortical neural pathways. This is more than 
likely to be the case where acallosals pass tests of unity that rule out the 
use of external mechanisms of integration such as access movements or 
cross-cuing. But if, instead, acallosals employ external mechanisms of 
integration are we justified in attributing disunity? If we are tempted to 
attribute disunity to the acallosal in this case but not in the previous case 
then we must specify the relevant difference. We cannot simply point to 
the fact that unity is achieved in the former case by brain structure 
because, as we have seen, unity of neurophysiological structure is often 
not what matters in non-normal cases. So, Hurley offers a hypothetical 
case for consideration. In a move similar to that made by Clark and 
Chalmers in presenting the Parity Principle, she considers the 
significance of the distinction between internal and external methods of 
integration; firstly for recently operated commissurotomy patients, and 
secondly for callosal agenesis patients. 
 
If a recently operated commissurotomy patient uses an external means of 
integration when access movements are prevented then this may well 
provide evidence for a division in consciousness. But similar dependence 
on cross-cuing by an acallosal will not necessarily provide evidence for a 
division in consciousness. In the case of the acallosal this behaviour will 
be necessary throughout the development of his conscious mental 
capacities. For him there is no structure of consciousness, unified or 
disunified, prior to the use of external mechanisms of integration. The 
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structure of consciousness, in this case, is something that emerges along 
with the external mechanisms of integration. The external mechanisms of 
integration, for this acallosal patient, are temporally and ontologically 
prior to the unity of consciousness that eventually manifests itself at the 
personal level. 
 
Consider, next, two hypothetical acallosal patients. The first displays a 
high degree of integration and coordination between hemispheres that is 
achieved in everyday circumstances by external mechanisms. The 
external mechanisms employed here would suggest communication 
between two separate centres of consciousness along with duplication of 
some contents if the patient were a recently operated commissurotomy 
patient (Hurley 1998b). The second patient displays a high degree of 
integration and coordination between hemispheres achieved in everyday 
circumstances by internal mechanisms such as subcortical and ipsilateral 
pathways. 
 
Hurley claims these acallosal cases display parity; in neither case are the 
mechanisms of integration a means of communication between two 
separate centres of consciousness with resulting duplication of contents. 
This is because in the cases of the acallosals there was no structure of 
consciousness prior to the mechanisms (internal or external) of 
integration. Similarly, it is not correct to say that the corpus callosum is a 
means of communication between two separate centres of consciousness 
with resulting duplication of contents in a normal case. Thus, the same 
claim for parity cannot be made for adult, recently-operated 
commissurotomy patients. 
 
For acallosals, to the extent either internal or external mechanisms of 
integration function reliably; there is no reason not to regard them as 
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part of the vehicles of co-conscious contents and of a unified 
consciousness. (Ibid: 191) 
 
To explain this in more detail Hurley offers an analogy with perceptual 
adaptation to up-down-inverting lenses (see Hurley 1998b: 191). She 
claims that acallosals stand to commissurotomy patients with respect to 
the unity of consciousness as persons who have always worn up-down 
inverting lenses stand to adults who put on inverting spectacles in 
perceptual adaptation experiments with respect to type of conscious 
experience. Persons wearing up-down inverting spectacles are found, 
after a period of time that involves dynamic action in the world, to adapt 
to the wearing of these spectacles such that the world ‗rights itself‘ again 
and normal ‗right side up‘ perceptual experience is restored. But for the 
subject who wears these inverting lenses from birth the situation is 
slightly different. Although similar means of up-down re-routing may be 
used to achieve reliable perception of the environment, these methods, for 
the latter subject, are a pre-condition of correct perception of the world. 
Now, whether the up-down re-routing is achieved via internal or external 
mechanisms in this case is irrelevant according to Hurley. What is 
relevant is that up-down rerouting is achieved and reliable perceptual 
experience is accomplished. Thus, just as it makes no difference here 
how the up-down rerouting is achieved, it makes no difference in 
principle whether the mechanisms of integration for the callosal agenesis 
patient are internal or external says Hurley. 
 
What does matter in cases such as these, says Hurley, is that the 
mechanisms of integration ‗go subpersonal‘. That is, what is essential for 
achieving unity of consciousness by means of these methods is that the 
mechanisms (be they internal or external) should not normally be subject 
to control at the personal level. They can initially be subject to control at 
the personal level for the commissurotomy patient who has recently had 
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his corpus callosum severed. But unity will not be achieved until control 
of these mechanisms goes subpersonal such that unity is achieved 
automatically and information is integrated between the two hemispheres 
without conscious effort. This condition echoes that offered by Clark and 
Chalmers in relation to cases of genuine external memory: Otto‘s case 
was not to count as a genuine case of belief unless his access to the 




Hurley‘s empirical and hypothetical cases demonstrate that 
commissurotomy disrupts an established subpersonal basis for the 
structure of consciousness and it is reasonable to suppose that new 
external links would at first be treated as foreign, rather than as simply re-
establishing prior unity. But the commissurotomy patient could adapt 
over time such that external mechanisms of integration acquire the status 
of a subpersonal basis for the unity of consciousness rather than a means 
of communication between separate consciousnesses. Thus, says Hurley, 
there is no reason in principle why external mechanisms of information 
integration could not contribute to supporting a unified consciousness 
and, in some cases, external mechanisms may be necessary to enable the 
unity of consciousness. 
 
The difference between internal and external mechanisms of integration 
is not the same as the difference between an automatic, subpersonal 
process that underwrites one unified consciousness, and a conscious 
personal-level coordination between two separate consciousnesses. 
Subpersonal processes that underwrite unity are not necessarily internal 
on Hurley‘s account. There is nothing wrong with the idea that an 
external mechanism of integration could be part of the system that 
supports the unity of consciousness. This idea, says Hurley, appeals to a 
                                               
24 But as we noted in chapter one, this didn‘t seem a plausible condition to place on 
Otto‘s access to his notebook.  
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system of causes and effects in the same way that an explanation citing 
purely internal mechanisms of integration would, it‘s just that some of the 
causal routes go external. 
 
Whether the causal mechanisms are wholly internal or partly external 
may be incidental to the unity of consciousness: context and history of 
development may matter more. (Ibid: 193) 
 
So, Hurley concludes that there need not be neuroanatomical unity 
underwriting consciousness. What seems to be critical for unity is the 
functional structure and history of a dynamic causal system, which may 
have external as well as internal elements. Thus, for Hurley, the 
neuroanatomical isomorphism suggestion fails; the unity of 
consciousness at a time does not necessarily reflect an isomorphic unified 
neuroanatomical structure and the structure of consciousness, like the 
contents of consciousness, is as Hurley puts it:  ―easy going; it will take a 
ride wherever it finds one‖ (Ibid.: 194). If so, then an appeal to 
neuroanatomical isomorphism will not provide the subpersonal 
component of an objective account of unity that is needed. But Hurley 
suggests that the notion of a dynamic singularity may be able to succeed 
where neuroanatomical structure fails. 
 
A dynamic singularity is a structural singularity in the field of causal 
flows realised at the subpersonal level of explanation. This singularity is 
characterised through time by a tangle of multiple feedback loops, each 
with varying and distinctive orbits. It is centred on the organism and 
moves through the environment with the organism. But although the 
dynamic singularity is centred on the organism it can extend beyond the 
organism because the causal feedback loops extend beyond the 
boundaries of the organism and into the environment just as in the case of 
the acallosal who uses external mechanisms of integration. The dynamic 
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singularity, unlike the organism, does not itself have any clear, 
unchanging boundaries. 
 
Now, although the realisation of the causal roles that form the structure of 
the dynamic singularity would involve neurophysiological states: ―it 
would not consist in mere neuroanatomical isomorphism: the structure of 
the realizing neurophysiological states need not correspond to the 
structure of consciousness‖ (Ibid: 207). This, in certain cases, may be 
precisely because some of the causal loops of the dynamic singularity go 
external. For example, the hypothetical acallosal patient discussed earlier 
has used external methods of integration since birth and depends on these 
methods for the unified structure of his consciousness. For him, there was 
no structure of consciousness prior to these external mechanisms of 
integration; thus, there is no reason to deny that these external 
mechanisms are part of the vehicles of co-consciousness. 
 
So, Hurley suggests that normative coherence and dynamic singularity 
may be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the unity of 
consciousness at a time. Moreover, the dynamic singularity can extend 
beyond the boundaries of the organism. If this is the case then the 
subpersonal vehicles that realise a unified consciousness can extend into 
the environment.  
 
This does not mean, however, that consciousness extends into the 
environment. Rather, the claim is that these extended vehicles provide the 
structural basis that enables the unity of consciousness at a time. And, 
given that we should be wary, in accordance with the vehicle/content 
distinction, of projecting properties from the vehicles of content onto the 
content itself it would be poor judgment to simply assume that the 





Hurley‘s argument for the extension of vehicles into the world does not 
stop at the necessity of the dynamic singularity in accounting for the 
unity of consciousness. She moves beyond these considerations to 
explore one of the traditional tools of the externalist; Twin Earth thought 
experiments, in order to present further support for her Vehicle 
Externalism. 
 
In chapter one I briefly mentioned an argument presented by Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) that is introduced in order to lend weight to their version 
of EMT and emphasise its distinctness from content externalism. The 
argument went as follows: content externalists frequently rely on Twin 
Earth thought experiments in order to demonstrate that when internal 
factors are held constant mental content type can still change along with 
environmental changes. However, in cases such as these (like the 
water/retaw case) the behaviour of the doppelgängers is identical, 
indicating that content externalism is a passive form of externalism that 
has no consequences for action. Active Externalism, however, employs 
external factors that have an ineliminable role to play in the production of 
behaviour in the here and now as in the case of Otto and Twin Otto: 
 
[W]e can even construct the case of Twin Otto, who is just like Otto 
except that a while ago he mistakenly wrote in his notebook that the 
Museum of Modern Art was on 51st Street. Today, Twin Otto is a 
physical duplicate of Otto from the skin in, but his notebook differs. 
Consequently, Twin Otto is best characterized as believing that the 
museum is on 51st Street, where Otto believes it is on 53rd. In these 
cases, a belief is simply not in the head. (Ibid: 14) 
 
This seems initially like a straightforward extension of the scope of the 
Twin Earth thought experiment to argue for the extension of factors that 
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can affect behaviour in the here and now rather than just passive and 
distal factors that, while affecting content type, make no difference to the 
production of behaviour. But Clark and Chalmers‘ argument here seems 
to rely on the thought that Twin Otto can mistakenly write ‗51st street‘ in 
his notebook and yet remain a physical duplicate of Otto from the skin in. 
That is, if internal factors are held constant while external factors are 
altered, as in the Twin Otto case, so as to yield different behaviour then in 
some cases external factors will have an ineliminable role to play in the 
production of behaviour and mental states may extend into the world. 
 
It is not clear though, how Clark and Chalmers propose that Twin Otto is 
to remain a physical duplicate of Otto from the skin in given that he 
writes ‗51st street‘ in his notebook, rather than ‗53rd street‘. Presumably, 
Twin Otto‘s writing a different number will require different hand 
movements than Otto‘s, which will require a different pattern of neural 
firings, and when consulting his notebook the pattern of light striking 
Twin Otto‘s retina will be different to the pattern of light striking Otto‘s 
retina, thus the signals sent to the brain will differ and the physical 
internal states will differ. 
 
It may well be the case that what is written in the notebook plays an 
ineliminable role in the production of behaviour in each case but since it 
seems that Otto and Twin Otto are not in fact physically identical from 
the skin in, the door is open for those who would argue that the different 
beliefs in each case is constituted solely by internal factors although it 
may be partially explained by external factors. I will return to the Twin 
Otto case periodically in the course of this section as I examine in detail 




Clark and Chalmers‘ mistake here is an example of what Hurley (1998b) 
calls the general duplication assumption, a view that she says is typically 
associated (though not exclusively) with internalism. On the internalist 
view, our internal physical brain states fix the contents of our beliefs and 
experiences, and so mental content depends only instrumentally on the 
external environment. That is, mental content depends on the 
environment only to the extent that it can affect or change the internal 
physical states that fix mental content. Thus, a person‘s mental content, 
on the internalist view, is, in an important sense, autonomous or 
independent of the environment.  
 
So, if mental content is internal and autonomous of the external world 
and if changes in the world affect mental content only instrumentally by 
affecting changes in internal physical states and processes, then the 
duplication of mental content by means of the duplication of internal 
physical states and processes should be possible in radically different 
environments. This internalist position regarding the duplicability of 
mental contents has, as we have seen, received widespread challenge in 
the form of content externalism. However, as Hurley points out, the 
duplicability of internal physical states and processes in radically altered 
environments is often taken to be unproblematic. To believe in the 
possibility of general duplicability is to believe that, in general, internal 
physical states can be duplicated in radically different environments. 
 
Hurley argues that this assumption of general duplicability is widespread; 
it is the default starting point for those wishing to theorise about mind, 
although it is not widely recognised and as a consequence it is not widely 
challenged. This is evident in consideration of Clark and Chalmers‘ Twin 
Otto thought experiment. As we have seen, Clark and Chalmers‘ 
argument only works if Otto and Twin Otto are physically identical from 
the skin in; that is, if Otto‘s internal physical states can be duplicated in 
 103 
an altered environment—one where he mistakenly writes ‗51‘ instead of 
‗53‘. But it is difficult to see how identity of internal physical states can 
be maintained between the doppelgangers given the altered nature of 
Twin-Earth in this case. Nonetheless, Clark and Chalmers take the 
duplication of internal physical states to be unproblematic here. Indeed, 
the success of twin-earth thought experiments depends on the possibility 
of duplicating internal physical states in counterfactual worlds. Content 
Externalists who wish to demonstrate that mental content can alter 
although internal physical brain states remain constant often support their 
arguments by constructing Twin Earth thought experiments, which are 
predicated on the assumption that the duplication of internal physical 
states in altered environments is not problematic. 
 
Hurley argues that assuming that duplication of this sort is in general 
unproblematic is a mistake. She states that challenging the general 
duplication assumption is a matter of scrutinising the presupposition of 
duplicability in specific cases. And this challenge to the general 
duplication assumption leads, ultimately, to the suggestion of externalism 
about the vehicles of content. 
 
Now, although adherence to the assumption of general duplicability is a 
mistake, there are certain cases for which duplicability would seem to 
hold without a problem. Consider the Twin Earth thought experiment 
where Twin Earth has a substance called ‗retaw‘, which has a different 
chemical structure to water. Here, duplicability seems possible without 
too much difficulty. That is, it may be possible to have a Twin Earthling 
on Twin Earth that is a physical duplicate of the Earthling on Earth from 
the skin in.
25
 This duplication of internal physical states would seem to 
                                               
25 We can ignore here, for the purposes of argument, the fact that the human body would 
be made up of 70% water whereas the Twin-Earth body would be made up of 70% 
retaw, ruling physical duplication out in this case.  
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hold despite the radical change to the environment where water is 
replaced with ‗retaw‘. The point here, however, in challenging the 
general duplication assumption is not to try and show that duplication is 
always and everywhere impossible. Rather, the point is to challenge the 
general duplication assumption, to challenge the idea that it is always, in 
every case, possible to radically alter the environment while duplicating 
internal physical states. To challenge the general duplication assumption 
means to challenge the idea that it makes good sense in principle to 
suppose that internal physical states can be duplicated in radically 
different environments—whether duplication holds in particular cases 
should be an empirical matter. 
 
Certainly, duplication may not be problematic in certain uncomplicated 
cases; however, as we saw in the Twin Otto case, as the examples 
increase in complexity and involve action in the world by an agent, 
duplication becomes increasingly difficult. In these problem cases we 
need to consider not just internal operations over inputs that lead to 
outputs but we also need to examine certain functions from output back 
to input. Certain of these functions operate internally such as efferent 
feedback and proprioceptive feedback, whereas others operate externally, 
via the environment of the agent, like visual feedback from movement. 
Hurley warns against a tendency that she observes in philosophy to 
simplify thought experiments so as to gloss over such things as feedback 
relations. She says that in doing this we are in danger of making ‗toy‘ 
agents, who are not true agents at all. We need to consider, instead, real 
agents acting dynamically in their environments. Doing so can make 
problems for duplication. 
 
Thus, once we consider Otto and Twin Otto as dynamic agents acting in 
the world and not as ‗toy‘ examples frozen at a point in time, we see that 
the duplication of their internal physical states becomes at the very least 
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problematic, if not impossible. One option in trying to preserve the 
possibility of duplication is to introduce ‗reversing devices‘ that can 
negate the changes brought about to internal physical states by the 
radically altered environment, thus maintaining the duplicability of 
internal physical states. We will examine possibilities such as this, along 
with Hurley‘s response, in the next two sections. 
 
Colour Inversion and Left-Right Reversal 
 
Hurley begins her argument against the general duplication assumption 
(which leads, she argues, to externalism about the vehicles of content) by 
examining a red/green inversion case in which duplication seems to be 
unproblematic. Everything that is green on Earth is red on Inverted Earth 
and vice versa. Furthermore, the people on inverted Earth call red things 
‗green‘ and green things ‗red‘. Other than this difference, Earth and 
Inverted Earth are twin possible worlds. Now, suppose we have an 
Earthling and a Twin Earthling, who both interact with their worlds in the 
same manner: will their internal physical states be duplicated? It seems 
not, for when the Earthling encounters a green object on Earth his Twin 
Earthling encounters a red object on Inverted Earth. Thus, the light 
striking the retina of the Twin Earthling will be different to the light 
striking the retina of the Earthling, the signals sent to the brain will differ, 
and consequently the physical internal states will differ.  
 
Hurley states that: ―This is where the causal slack between outside world 
and internal physical states is exploited‖ (1998b: 299). We suppose that, 
in principle, a change can be made to the causal pathways that connect 
the outside world to the Twin Earthling‘s internal physical states. This 
change would vindicate the assumption of duplicability in this specific 
case by cancelling out or compensating for the differences that are on 
Inverted Earth as compared with Earth. In this case of a red-green 
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Inverted Earth we may suppose that colour inverting goggles are fitted to 
our Twin Earthling. These goggles, obviously, fall outside of the 
boundary that marks off the internal physical states and processes that are 
to be duplicated from the ‗outside‘ world. If we used colour inverting 
lenses inserted into the retinas of the Twin Earthling instead then it could 
be objected that the lenses are within the boundary of the skin and would 
themselves have to count as part of the internal physical state that is 
supposed to be duplicated between the two possible worlds. As with 
Clark and Chalmers‘ thought experiment, the skin seems to be the 
generally accepted boundary in cases like this, but as we will see it may 
be necessary to retreat further inwards to the boundary around the central 
nervous system (CNS), for example, if duplication of internal physical 
states is to be preserved. Hurley points out that: ―[t]his looks like a 
harmless enough piece of boundary-drawing, but the gerrymandering that 
begins here ultimately turns problematic‖ (Ibid: 300). 
 
With the colour inverting goggles fitted to our Twin Earthling the causal 
pattern that holds on Earth between certain internal physical states and 
green objects in the environment now holds on Inverted Earth for red 
objects and vice versa. That is, perception of a red object on Inverted 
Earth by our Twin Earthling will cause the same internal physical state as 
when our Earthling perceives a green object on Earth. In this case, and 
other simplistic cases, the achievement of duplicability seems to be 
unproblematic, at most it raises technical questions such as how the 
colour inverting lenses would work—it does not raise difficulties in 




                                               
26 However, Hurley points out that the fact that the inversion in this case is symmetrical 
is crucial. Non-symmetrical inversions would be subject to what she calls the search-
and-replace-fallacy and, consequently, duplication may not be possible for non-
symmetrical inversions. Thus, there is a problem for the general duplication assumption 
even before we consider issues relating to action and dynamic feedback. More on this 
point later. 
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But Hurley claims that switching from ‗what‘-system perception cases—
involving colour, details or textures—to considering ‗where‘-system 
perception cases—involving where things are and how fast they are 
moving—makes duplication more difficult. In particular, the action and 
dynamic-feedback that is intimately bound up with ‗where‘-system 
perception makes duplication difficult. She is not claiming that 
duplication is always unproblematic for ‗what‘-system perception and 
never for ‗where‘-system perception but does claim that there is 
something about ‗where‘-system perception that makes duplication 
difficult—‗where‘-system perception involves orientation and 
localization that involves acting in the world more intimately than colour-
perception does. 
 
Hurley asks what would happen if we modelled a left-right reversal case 
on the red/green inversion case we considered earlier but this time taking 
action and dynamic feedback into account. This would introduce real-
world complexities into the example, protecting it from the over-
simplicity charge which could be levelled at other twin earth thought 
experiments. The problem posed by ‗where‘-system perception for the 
possibility of duplication in cases such as this becomes evident in the 
requirement for a reversing device that cancels the left/right inversion. 
Such a device, as in the colour inversion case, must yield the same neural 
input to the Twin Earthling as occurs for the Earthling, and must be 
placed outside of the boundary within which duplication is to be 
preserved. If the device must be placed inside this boundary in order to 
achieve identity of neural input then central states will differ between the 
Earthling and Twin Earthling and duplication will not be achieved. 
 
Experiments carried out by Taylor (1962) with the mathematician 
Seymour Papert concerning the perceptual adaptation of Papert to the 
long-term wearing of left-right reversing goggles provide interesting 
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support for Hurley‘s thought experiment here. Left-right reversing 
goggles cause objects that would normally appear on the right of the 
subject to appear on the left, and vice versa. Papert underwent a program 
of training while wearing the goggles each morning. In the evening the 
goggles would be removed and he would go about his daily activities as 
normal. During one of the training programs Papert experienced, for the 
first time while wearing the left-right reversing goggles, the perception of 
an object in its true position: 
 
But it was a very strange experience, in that he perceived the chair as 
being both on the side where it was in contact with his body and on the 
opposite side. And by this he meant not just that he knew that the chair 
he saw on his left was actually on his right. He had that knowledge from 
the beginning of the experiment. The experience was more like the 
simultaneous perception of an object and its mirror image, although in 
this case the chair on the right was rather ghost-like. (Taylor 1962: 202) 
 
Bear in mind that Papert only wore the goggles during the morning and 
returned to normal vision in the evening. Despite this, he adapted to the 
wearing of the goggles quite quickly and the adaptation was total, that is, 
he was, following training, able to perceive objects as normal, as if he 
was not wearing the reversing goggles. So Papert‘s adaptation to the 
wearing of the goggles was not impeded by the fact that he returned to 
normal perception each afternoon. In fact, Taylor reports that Papert‘s 
adaptation to the wearing of the goggles had been faster than in two 
previous experiments that had been conducted. This was due, according 
to Taylor, to the systematic training that Papert underwent in the third 
experiment. Furthermore, following adaptation, Papert was able to put on 
and remove the goggles without changing the left-right ordering of his 
perceptual field and without his behaviour being disrupted: 
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This was strikingly illustrated when the subject rode a bicycle while wearing 
the spectacles, and took them off and replaced them without changing 
course or wobbling or showing any other signs of disruption. Objects that he 
perceived as being on his left while wearing the spectacles were still on his 
left when he took them off. (Ibid: 204) 
 
In Hurley‘s left/right reversal thought experiment we are given Seymour, 
who is on Earth, and enjoys riding his bike while wearing his (normal—
no reversing lenses included) biking goggles. While on Twin Earth Twin 
Seymour also enjoys riding his bike but in a world that is the mirror 
image of Seymour‘s—a global left-right reversal has taken place. The 
question is: is it possible to duplicate Seymour‘s inner physical states on 
Earth in Twin Seymour on Mirror Earth and, if so, how? If the general 
duplication assumption is correct then duplicating Seymour‘s internal 
physical states in Twin Seymour should not be a problem. 
 
As things stand if Seymour sees a sphere on his left then Twin Seymour 
will be seeing a sphere on his right, thus the light entering the retinas of 
Seymour and Twin-Seymour will be different and the neural signals 
being sent to the brain of each will differ. It follows, then, that the 
internal physical states differ and duplication is not achieved. In order to 
get duplication we need some cancelling or compensating reversing 
devices as we did in the red/green inversion case. Hurley suggests 
left/right reversing goggles such as Papert wore in the real experiments 
considered above. These goggles must, of course, be outside the 
boundary within which we are trying to achieve duplication. Otherwise 
duplication will fail as Twin Seymour‘s goggles must be physically 
different from Seymour‘s in order to perform the necessary reversal. 
 
Hurley says that wearing these goggles could possibly achieve the desired 
duplication—but only on condition that both Seymour and Twin 
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Seymour stand still. When Seymour sees a sphere on his right, Twin 
Seymour will now also see a sphere on his right. So the neural signals to 
each from the eye to the brain would be the same and duplication would 
seem to be preserved. But note again here the tendency towards 
oversimplification in thought experiments. In order to avoid this 
objection we must examine the individuals as functional individuals 
within their environments: ―[A] stationary perceptual system is a 
truncated and denatured one; it's not significant here that you can trick it‖ 
(Hurley 1998b: 304). 
 
Once Seymour and Twin Seymour start to move then duplication is lost. 
Imagine that Twin Seymour has his left-right reversing goggles on and 
both Seymours are seeing a sphere on their right. Duplication will be lost 
as soon as Twin Seymour tries to reach out and point at it, for example. 
True, it will appear to him with the reversing goggles on that he is 
reaching toward the sphere with his right hand say, but in reality he will 
be reaching with his left hand and proprioceptive signals will inform him 
of the discrepancy. Like Papert in the real experiment Twin Seymour 
would, doubtless, learn to adapt and would be able, like Seymour (and 
Papert) to remove and replace his goggles while cycling and continue to 
function normally. But this isn‘t the issue here, what we want to know is 
whether it is possible to duplicate Seymour‘s internal physical states on 
Earth in Twin Seymour in a mirror reversed environment. And, given 
proprioceptive feedback and the fact that we need Seymour to be able to 
engage with and function in the world we are going to need more 
reversing devices than the left-right reversing goggles here. 
 
So, in order to achieve duplication here we would need some sort of 
motor reversal device that would cause Twin Seymour‘s right hand to 
move rightward when Seymour‘s left hand moves leftward, while at the 
same time preserving the internal physical duplication. These differences 
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in which hand is used and in which direction it reaches must be outside 
the boundary within which physical states are to be identical, just as the 
goggles are, otherwise our duplication attempt is already defeated. But 
likewise, the device that causes these changes must also be outside the 
boundary.  Thus, we are faced with a bit of a dilemma: if we don‘t switch 
from one hand to the other (when Twin Seymour is pointing at the sphere 
say) then we won‘t duplicate visual feedback from hand movements but 
if we do switch hands then we won‘t duplicate muscle contractions and 
motor nerve firings (as Twin Seymour will be moving the opposite arm to 
Seymour) but this means, says Hurley, that the boundary within which 
we wish achieve duplication cannot be the skin – if we wish to preserve 
duplication we will have to retreat further inwards to the boundary of the 
CNS. 
 
To summarise, if we are to achieve duplication in this case we are going 
to need at least two things besides the reversing goggles, we will need a 
motor reversal device and we will need a proprioceptive reversal device. 
It is difficult to see, in either case, how we could fulfil the need for these 
reversal devices without altering physical states within the body. This is 
particularly the case for the proprioceptive reversal device. However, if 
we do have to alter physical states within the body in order to fulfil the 
need for the reversing devices then we are changing the internal physical 
states that are supposed to be duplicated, the states that are supposed to 
be held constant cannot, then, be held constant. In this case duplication 
does not seem to be possible. However, if we retreat from the skin as the 
boundary within which we wish to duplicate physical states to the CNS 
then both the motor reversal and proprioceptive reversal devices can be 
moved inside the skin to the boundaries of the CNS, changing the signals 
on the way out. Thus, Twin Seymour‘s motor reversal device would take 
the motor signals that emerge from the CNS and switch them to the 
opposite side—reversing the brain‘s contralateral control. The result of 
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this is that the right hand moves rightward instead of the left hand 
moving leftward. Similarly, the proprioceptive reversal device now takes 
signals coming from the arms, for example, and switches them to the 
opposite side. The result is that the proprioceptive signals coming from 
the right arm now input to the right hemisphere of the brain instead of the 
left and vice versa. Both of these devices, although within the skin, must 
be located outside of the CNS if duplication within the CNS is to be 
achieved. 
 
Even with these reversal devices implanted, however, there is a problem 
when Seymour removes his goggles on earth. If Twin-Seymour does 
likewise on Twin-Earth then duplication will not be preserved as the 
reversing effect of the goggles is removed. This is easily overcome, 
however, by simply moving the goggles inward—surgically inserting 
left-right reversing lenses in Twin Seymour‘s retinas. So, Hurley 
concludes that in this case duplication is possible provided we move the 
boundary inward from to the skin of the subject to the CNS of the subject 
and keep all reversal devices within a safe-zone free from the possibility 
of tampering by the agent. But this safe-zone strategy is not likely to 
work in all cases. 
 
Can we find a case in which the safe zone strategy will not work? 
Programmatically, what would be needed would be a situation in which 
something analogous to putting the reversing goggles off and on is a 
normal activity and so cannot be avoided by the safe zone strategy. 
(Ibid: 314) 
 
So, the tactic employed by Hurley here is to illustrate how the mirror 
reversal case forces us to retreat to the CNS as the boundary within which 
physical states are to be duplicated in order to preserve the possibility of 
duplication. It also suggests to us that the retreat to the CNS in order to 
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preserve the possibility of duplication may not always work. Once we 
introduce real-world complexities into our inverted earth thought 
experiments we may be forced to alter the very internal states that we are 
trying to duplicate. To pursue this line of enquiry we will examine cases 
which challenge the general duplication assumption further. 
 
El Greco Worlds 
 
In discussing the red/green inversion case we focused on ‗what‘-system 
perception and in the mirror reversal example the focus was on location 
and orientation; ‗where‘-system perception. Shape is a ‗what‘-system 
property but shape distortion can have consequences for both ‗what‘ and 
‗where‘ system perception. This sort of shape distortion occurs on what 
Hurley calls El Greco worlds. Worlds that are exactly similar to earth, El 
Greco worlds are twin earths except for one property; a vertical stretch 
has been applied to everything in the direction opposite to the pull of 
gravity. 
 
Hurley‘s subjects for her El Greco thought-experiments are Dom and 
Twin Dom and our duplication boundary is around the CNS, not around 
the whole person. So in this case, because your body is one of the things 
that you perceive, Twin Dom‘s body will also have the vertical stretch 
applied to it, although this stretch will not apply to his CNS. Hurley‘s 
strategy in arguing against general duplication is to consider different 
kinds of activity for Dom on Earth and Twin Dom on Twin Earth, where 
the one-off vertical stretch has been applied. Consideration of certain 
kinds of activities on Earth and Twin Earth will provide cases where the 
assumption of duplicability seems untenable and ultimately leads to 
suggestions for the extension of vehicles beyond the boundaries of the 
CNS and the skin and into the world. 
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Suppose that at t0 Dom is physically identical to Twin Dom and Earth is 
physically identical to El Greco Earth. Now, suppose that at t1 a one-off 
stretch is applied to all physical objects on El Greco Earth, including 
bodies, therefore, the stretch will apply to Twin Dom‘s body. Also, the 
stretch is proportionate; such that at t1 all objects on El Greco Earth, 
including Twin Dom‘s body, are twice as tall as their counterparts on 
Earth. But the stretch does not apply to the CNS, so that Twin Dom‘s 
CNS remains a physical duplicate of Dom‘s CNS at t1. 
 
On this El Greco world the stretch does not entail a simple doubling of 
the size of objects. The stretch applies only in the opposite direction to 
gravity. So, the El Greco Earth counterpart of a square on Earth will be a 
rectangle, and the El Greco Earth counterpart of a sphere on earth will be 
an ellipse. Also, it is important to note that the stretch is a one-off and is 
applied at time t1 only, thus, even when an object‘s orientation relative to 
gravity changes after t1, it will keep its shape. So a rectangle on El Greco 
Earth that is the counterpart of a square on Earth will keep its shape even 
if it is tipped over on its side at t2. And an ellipse on El Greco Earth that 
is the counterpart of a sphere on Earth will remain elliptical even if it is 





















So, given Dom and Twin Dom acting on Earth and El Greco Earth 
respectively is it possible for internal states to be duplicated? Hurley 
argues that they cannot be duplicated unless we tamper with processes 
like memory, in which case we may need to admit that duplication is 
impossible in this case or perhaps try and shift the boundary further 
inwards, which has its own problems. 
 
Consider that at time t1 Dom on Earth is facing three spheres arranged in 
front of him such that the centre of each sphere is horizontally equidistant 
Time: t2 
Earth El Greco Earth 
Time: t1 
Earth El Greco 
Earth 
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from where he stands. On El Greco Earth at t1, then, Twin Dom will be 
facing three ellipses such that the centre of each is horizontally 
equidistant from where he stands (the ellipses are standing on end with 
their major axes perpendicular to the ground). The ellipses on El Greco 
Earth will be twice the height of the spheres on Earth but given that the 
stretch has also been applied to Twin Dom‘s body, the heights of the 
ellipses relative to Twin Dom‘s body are of the same ratio as the heights 
of the spheres on Earth relative to Dom‘s body. If sphere one on Earth is 
at the same height as Dom‘s eyes, then ellipse one on Twin Earth will be 
at the same height as Twin Dom‘s eyes. Likewise, if sphere two is three 
times the height of Dom‘s eyes then ellipse two will be three times the 
height of Twin Dom‘s eyes and so on for sphere three and ellipse three, 
which are both eight times the height of the eyes of the respective viewer. 
 
Next, suppose that on top of each sphere on Earth there is a red dot such 
that the line from Dom‘s eyes to the top of sphere one is horizontal. This 
will also be the case for Twin Dom and ellipse one. That is, the angle of 
the line from Dom‘s eyes to sphere one on Earth is equal to the angle of 
the line from Twin Dom‘s eyes to ellipse one on El Greco Earth. 
However, with regard to spheres two and three and ellipses two and three, 
this will not be the case. In fact, the angle of the line from Twin Dom‘s 
eyes to the red dot will be steeper than the angle of the line from Dom‘s 
eyes to the red dot in each of these cases. Furthermore, the percentage 
difference between the angles in each case will be different. That is, when 
Twin Dom is looking at the red dot on ellipse two there is a roughly 
100% increase in angle compared to when Dom looking at the red dot on 
sphere two; for sphere three and ellipse three the percentage difference is 
roughly 70% (see Hurley 1998b: 316). 
 
If we now suppose that Dom points to each red dot in turn then Twin 
Dom must do the same. Can internal physical states be duplicated in 
 117 
these cases and if so, how? Let‘s look, first of all, at visual perception. 
The angle of incidence of light entering the retina for Dom and Twin 
Dom will clearly differ, resulting in different inputs to the CNS and, 
consequently different internal physical states, thus, initially, duplication 
does not seem to be possible. In order to achieve duplication in this case, 
Hurley suggests that: ―The angle of incidence of light coming into Twin 
Dom‘s eyes needs to be transformed in a way that is a function of the 
twin-relative heights of the red spots‖ (Ibid: 316). The question here is 
whether or not some transformation that is made to visual input, outside 
of the boundary of the CNS can preserve duplication. Hurley is 
pessimistic with regard to this possibility but even if such a 
transformation, that doesn‘t impinge on internal states and processes, is 
possible duplicationists face similar problems in attempting to transform 
motor and proprioceptive inputs and reconcile them with the alterations 
to visual input. And these problems are compounded once Dom performs 
further actions. 
 
Let‘s suppose that at t2 Dom rolls his spheres sideways. Twin Dom will, 
then, roll his ellipses onto their sides such that their orientation is 
changed and their major axes are now parallel rather than perpendicular 
to the ground. If we again suppose that both Dom and Twin Dom are 
pointing at each of the red spots on their spheres and ellipses in turn, then 
we will not want a correction applied to Twin Dom‘s visual input in the 
way that it was applied when the ellipses were standing on end. As the 
girth of the objects did not alter when the one-off vertical stretch was 
applied the red dots will now be at the same height on El Greco Earth as 
they are on Earth. Instead, the stretch that was applied at t1 now makes 
for horizontal distortions with regard to the location of the red dots on El 
Greco Earth relative to Earth and consequently a different kind of 
correction device is required in order to preserve duplication. However, 
we do not want this correction device to apply to all objects on El Greco 
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Earth as there are objects whose orientation since t1 have not changed and 
that are not horizontally distorted. If this specification for the correction 
device is not included then the possibly of duplication in this case will be 
foiled by what Hurley calls ‗the search –and-replace fallacy‘. 
 
There is a search-and-replace function on word processors that enables 
you to locate in your document every instance of the word ‗red‘, for 
example, and then change it to ‗green‘. However, if you subsequently 
decide that the change should not have been made the search-and-replace 
function, as well as changing every instance of ‗green‘ that had been 
‗red‘ back to ‗red‘ again, will now change every instance of ‗green‘ that 
had not previously been ‗red‘ into ‗red‘. It is prudent then to tag pre-
existing instances of ‗green‘ before using this function in case you wish 
the change to be reversed. What Hurley calls the ‗search-and-replace 
fallacy‘ throws up difficulties for the general duplication assumption. If 
we examine a Twin Earth in which all things that are red on Earth are, 
instead, green but in which not all things that are green on Earth are red, 
then the earthly information about the red/green distinction is lost. The 
information about the red/green distinction on Earth is not transformed 
into the information about the green/red distinction on Twin Earth. In this 
case a reversing device would be of no use as the distinction that it would 
need in order to duplicate Earthly internal physical states by cancelling 
out the reversing effects is not available on Twin Earth. In cases such as 
these, where the differences between the twin possible worlds are not 
symmetrical, duplication is problematic: ―Mad scientists in the 
duplication business may be out of work for a wide range of non-
symmetrical environmental differences‖ (Ibid: 302). 
 
In the El Greco Earth case currently under consideration, unless the 
correction device can avoid compensating for objects that have not 
changed their orientations after t1 then duplication will not be possible. 
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Given this, the correction that is applied to Twin Dom at t2 must be 
sensitive to the distinction between objects that have changed their 
orientation after t1 and those that have not, and will have to involve 
memory of some sort. Memory, on the internalist view, involves 
processes that occur within the CNS so, in this case the duplicationist 
could propose retreating further inwards in order to preserve duplication 
of internal physical states that do not involve memory of the objects on El 
Greco Earth that have changed their orientation after t1—this is a strategy 
that sounds like preserving duplication for duplication‘s sake. 
Alternatively, the duplicationist could try to specify a device that can 
carry out the necessary transformations to visual, motor and 
proprioceptive inputs and can compensate for the altered relations 
between them, that is located outside of the CNS but within the skin, and 
that can track the changes in the orientations of objects on El Greco Earth 
that have occurred after t1. Such a device may well be able to duplicate 
Dom‘s internal physical states in Twin Dom, but leads us to consider 
whether or not the spirit of the general duplication assumption is being 
adhered to. 
 
The problem we are faced with is as follows: the General Duplication 
Assumption, as stated by Hurley, is the assumption that the duplication of 
internal physical states is unproblematic; that whatever lies inside the 
boundary of skin and skull should be duplicable in radically altered 
environments. But the duplicability of these states and processes within 
the skin and skull is shown to be problematic in all manner of 
circumstances. This led us to consider possible strategies for preserving 
duplication in these problem cases. The first involved shrinking the 
boundary around which internal physical states are to be duplicated. The 
first move was from the skin to the CNS in order to preserve duplicability 
where normal action by an agent on Earth amounted to tampering with an 
external reversal device on Twin Earth. But shrinking the boundary in 
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this way looks like the beginning of a move that is motivated merely by a 
desire to preserve duplication. What if similar problem issues arise for the 
states and processes of the CNS as in the El Greco World case above? 
Would the duplicationist be tempted to shrink the boundary to the frontal 
lobes, or some other area of the brain, such that duplication is preserved? 
Would it not be better, instead, asks Hurley, to question whether or not 
the possibility of duplication holds in general? 
 
Alternatively, it could be proposed that the boundary around the central 
processes is fixed by whatever processes can be duplicated in each 
particular case. But if this were so, says Hurley, the boundary would be 
relativized and may vary from case to case. Furthermore, in certain cases 
we may find a certain slice of processes that are duplicated but that are 
not involved in any way with the adaptation to the inverse environment. 
Putting a boundary around these processes would not be philosophically 
interesting and would only be motivated by a desire to preserve 
duplication. One could, instead, stipulate that the boundary goes around 
whatever bodily and brain states can be duplicated for any environmental 
inversion. Thus, the boundary postulated by the duplicationist here would 
be around the intersection of the states that can be duplicated in each 
case. But this falls prey to the same objections mentioned above. First of 
all there is no reason to assume that there will be any processes in the 
intersection of the sets of duplicated states. And secondly, even if there 
were, it there wouldn‘t be any reason to regard these processes as 
philosophically interesting. 
 
The second move considered above also seems to be motivated solely by 
a desire to preserve duplication. Instead of retreating inwards in order to 
preserve duplication, the boundary of the CNS is held fast and any 
reversing device required to preserve duplication is positioned outside of 
this boundary. In order to duplicate physical states and processes within 
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the CNS between Dom and Twin Dom what is proposed is a device that 
can compensate for the changes that have occurred on El Greco Earth by 
transforming the inputs from visual perception, motor function and 
propioception along with the relations between them while 
simultaneously tracking the objects on El Greco Earth that have (or have 
not) changed their orientation since t1. All of this processing must occur 
outside of the boundary of the CNS if internal physical states are to be 
duplicated. But when we look at the internal physical states that are 
duplicated in this case what we find is that the duplication of internal 
processes that are not involved in any way with the adaptation to the 
altered environment. So, as with the strategy of retreating further 
inwards, Hurley says that there is no reason to suppose that the duplicated 
internal physical states will be philosophically interesting. At which point 
Hurley poses the question as to whether or not there is any philosophical 
merit to the postulation of a boundary within which the physical states of 
an agent should be duplicable at all. 
 
What is it about the physical processes located within the boundary of 
skin and skull or within the boundary of the CNS that marks them off as 
being duplicable in radically altered environment? On the Internalist view 
of the nature of mind internal physical processes are the central processes 
between perception and action that fix the contents of mental states. Input 
comes to the mind in the form of perception and output comes from the 
mind in the form of action and the processing that occurs in between is 
what the mind does. The mind changes the input: perception, into output: 
action. The states and processes that perform this operation, on this view, 
are contained within the head; these are the ‗central‘ states and processes 
that it should be possible to duplicate in a radically altered environment if 
the Internalist picture of mind is correct. 
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But surely, says Hurley, it is what these processes do rather than where 
they are located that makes them central in this regard. It is the function 
of the processes contained within the skin, or skull, or CNS, and not their 
location that bestows ‗centrality‘ on these processes. For example, if a 
scientist builds and trains a neural network to replace the memory of a 
patient who lost or damaged a portion of his brain in an accident and 
attaches the neural net outside of the patient‘s skull then it would still be 
a ‗central‘ process on the traditional view of what a central process is 
supposed to do. Its location is irrelevant to its ability to fulfil its function. 
Central states and processes should be specified functionally, then, and 
not according to location, says Hurley. 
 
Hurley points out that the possibility of such a device preserving 
duplication of central states depends on what we mean by ‗central‘. She 
asks us to suppose that a mad scientist has built and trained an artificial 
neural network to perform just the comparisons and alterations mentioned 
in the El Greco though experiment above. Now, if the scientist inserts this 
artificial neural network and connects it inside the membranes that 
surround Twin Dom‘s CNS then, clearly, the physical and functional 
states within this boundary have been altered and duplication of Dom‘s 
central states in Twin Dom will not be possible. Thus, for this internalist 
interpretation of ‗central‘ duplication fails. But what if, instead of 
inserting the device within the meninges, the mad scientist inserts and 
connects the artificial neural net in Twin Dom‘s elbow? In this case there 
will be no physical change to Dom‘s physical states within the CNS. 
Should the network still count as central? Doesn‘t the philosophically 
correct understanding of ‗central‘ here refer to the function performed by 




                                               
27 A la Clark and Chalmers‘ Parity Principle. 
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So the network itself constitutes an alteration in Twin Dom's central 
states. Sheer location relative to an internal bodily membrane cannot 
provide a significant criterion of centrality for philosophical purposes. 
(Ibid: 318) 
 
If, by contrast, we allow that external or extended states and processes 
can be ‗central‘ then the duplication of central states may indeed be 




If the General Duplication Assumption is correct then the duplication of 
internal states and processes should, in general, be possible. As we have 
seen this is not the case. But there is something correct in the intuition 
that lies behind the General Duplication Assumption: if all of the 
subpersonal states and processes that are doing the differentially token 
explanatory work with regard to a particular content token are identified 
then those subpersonal states and processes should, in principle, be 
duplicable in radically altered environments without a problem. That is, 
once you have identified the entire vehicle of content then that vehicle 
should be duplicable. As Hurley puts it: ―If a vehicle, then duplicable‖ 
(Ibid: 331). So, if we have identified the complete vehicle that carries a 
particular content then this vehicle should be duplicable in different 
environments. However, if the subpersonal states and processes are not 
duplicable in different environments then you have failed to identify all 
of the subpersonal states and processes doing the token-explanatory 
work. Again, as Hurley puts it: ―if not duplicable, then not the whole 
vehicle‖ (Ibid.). 
 
Hurley suggests, then, that the duplicationist has not identified all of the 
subpersonal states and processes that are doing the differentially token 
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explanatory work. Given that the internal states and processes that the 
duplicationist wishes to duplicate are not always duplicable, this suggests 
that the duplicationist is failing to identify the whole of the vehicle by 
focusing exclusively on internal states and processes. In order to identify 
all of the subpersonal states and processes that are doing the token 
explanatory work, then, we must look externally, says Hurley. We must 
look externally for the remainder of the differentially token explanatory 
subpersonal states and processes; we must look externally in order to find 
the whole vehicle in certain cases. 
 
The reason, for Hurley, that the General Duplication Assumption does 
not hold is that it is predicated on the faulty assumption of Internalism 
about vehicles. Hurley says that the reason the duplicationist runs into 
problems in the cases identified above is because he has assumed that the 
differentially token explanatory states and processes of particular content 
tokens must be internal states and processes of the organism. He will, 
therefore, fail to identify the whole vehicle in certain cases because he is 
constrained by his default starting position of Internalism. If we abandon 
the assumption of Internalism, then, and allow that the vehicles of content 
can in some cases go external then it should be possible to achieve 
duplicability of subpersonal token explanatory states and processes in all 
cases. To quote Hurley once more: ―if duplicable, then a vehicle, and if 
not the whole vehicle, then not duplicable‖ (Ibid.). Duplication of the 
states and processes that realise token mental contents is possible then but 
the General Duplication Assumption does not hold as it maintains that 
these states and processes must be internal. Duplication is possible but 
only provided that the whole vehicle is identified, if we fail to identify the 
whole vehicle because we are constrained by the assumption of 




If we return to the Twin Otto thought experiment one last time then we 
can see that there is good reason why Twin Otto cannot be a physical 
duplicate of Otto from the skin in. In this case we have a counterfactually 
altered environment—one where Twin Otto writes ‗51‘ instead of ‗53‘. 
Duplication of internal physical states in this case requires the duplication 
of information in the notebook. Clark and Chalmers failed to identify the 
whole of the vehicle in this case. If Hurley is correct then the vehicle of 
content for Otto‘s belief that the Museum of Modern Art is located on 
53
rd
 Street includes the notebook and what is written in it. Similarly, the 
vehicle for Twin Otto‘s belief that the Museum of Modern Art is located 
on 51
st
 Street includes his notebook and the mistakenly entered ‗51‘. Otto 
and Twin Otto then are not twins, they are not physical duplicates from 
the skin in and the vehicle of content for their respective beliefs about the 
Museum of Modern Art differs also. This is why Otto‘s belief about the 
Museum is true and Twin Otto‘s belief is false. 
 
Constitution vs. Enabling 
 
What I take Hurley‘s arguments to demonstrate, with great skill and an 
amazing thoroughness, of which I hope to have given just a tiny flavour 
here, is that the assumption of general duplication is a mistake; that it is 
not, in general, possible to duplicate internal physical states in 
counterfactually altered environments. In doing so she also demonstrates 
that to specify the boundary of skin and skull as a ‗magical membrane‘ 
outside of which enablers of content and cognition cannot fall is a 
mistake and that the vehicles of content can indeed extend beyond the 
boundaries of skin and skull.  
 
But we should be wary of supposing that appeal to the spread of vehicles 
between organism and environment should provide a basis for EMT. If 
Hurley‘s take on the status of vehicles, is that they are enablers of mental 
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states rather than constitutive of mental states then the extension of 
mental states required for EMT does not follow from the extension of 
vehicles. Hurley frequently interchanges ‗vehicle externalism‘ with 
‗enabling externalism‘ and refers to vehicles themselves as enablers of 
content:  
 
They explain, e.g., what processes or mechanisms enable a given 
intention to look inside the box on the left, or a given visual experience 
of a certain surface as blue. (Hurley, forthcoming) 
 
Vehicles, as enablers of particular mental states, cross back and forth 
between organism and environment. But this does not entail extension of 
the mental states themselves. Additionally, in emphasising the vehicle 
content/distinction as strongly as she does Hurley highlights that an 
enabler of a mental content or mental state may not be constitutive of that 
mental state. Thus, if the extension of mental states is required for EMT 
then Hurley‘s Vehicle Externalism is not EMT—it is EMMT. All of 
which leaves the door open for someone who wishes to reject EMT and 
remain internalist about mental states while yet endorsing vehicle 
externalism, EMMT.  
 
So, if the extension of mental states is required for a genuine EMT and if 
Hurley‘s vehicle externalism is really only a form of enabling externalism 
that secures the extension of the enablers of mental states, or the 
machinery of mind, then Hurley, like Rowlands, does not argue for a 
genuine EMT in the way that Clark and Chalmers do. But, as we saw in 
chapter one, Clark and Chalmers‘ arguments fail to definitively secure 
the extension of mental states into the world.  Part of the reason that they 
have failed in this may be that they are working without a definitive mark 
of the mental. This is an issue that we touched on briefly at the end of 
 127 
chapter 2 and I take it up further in the next chapter as we examine the 



































In this chapter I consider some of the objections that have been levelled 
at EMT, doing so will reveal that objectors typically target Clark and 
Chalmers‘ claims for the extension of cognitive processes rather than 
mental states into the world. I argue that that all of the serious objections 
considered reduce to the constitution versus enabling issue. With regard 
to cognitive processes this issue can be settled by the provision of an 
independently motivated mark of the cognitive. And with regard to 
mental states the cleanest way to settle the issue is by the provision of an 
independently motivated mark of the mental. Examination of the 
objections will involve consideration of arguments against the extension 
of cognitive processes as well as against the extension of mental states, 
but it should be borne in mind throughout that the extension of mental 
states is required for a genuine EMT. 
 
Not all cognition is extended 
 
The first objection I consider is one based on a misunderstanding of the 
claims of EMT and for this reason it is rarely found in the literature. The 
objection in its most basic form is that not every cognitive process is an 
extended cognitive process. In a slightly more sophisticated form the 
objection may be that in certain cases the use of external resources to aid 
in the completion of a cognitive task is not necessary and in fact may be a 
hindrance rather than a help, for example, and it is along these lines that 
Rupert (2004) objects to Rowlands‘ (1999) characterisation of memory. 
 
As we saw in chapter two, Rowlands (1999) argues that the type of 
memory that is most characteristic of modern literate human beings is 
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prone, in the right circumstances, to extend into the environment. He 
claims that the advent of external means of representation means that it is 
practically possible to reduce our reliance on our internal memories in 
certain circumstances, transforming the nature of the cognitive task 
facing the individual. In such cases the external information-bearing 
structures play an essential role in the completion of the cognitive task 
and, according to Rowlands, constitute a proper part of the cognitive 
process. 
 
Rupert makes a number of interesting points against this view, chief of 
which is his claim that Rowlands does not do enough to prove that his 
arguments demonstrate a fully fledged EMT, which if true would entail 
the literal extension of mental states and cognitive processes into the 
world, rather than the less radical enabling externalism, which I 
characterise in chapters one to three as EMMT: the Extended Machinery 
of Mind Hypothesis. Indeed, Rupert argues that what he calls the 
Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition (HEMC) offers a superior 
explanatory paradigm than EMT (or HEC, the Hypothesis of Extended 
Cognition as Rupert calls it). HEMC is characterised as follows: 
 
According to the hypothesis of embedded cognition…cognitive 
processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unexpected ways, on 
organismically external props and devices and on the structure of the 
external environment in which cognition takes place. (Rupert 2004: 
393) 
 
Seeing cognition as embedded rather than extended allows that the 
enablers cognitive states can extend beyond the boundaries of the 
organism and into the environment, while stopping short of the claim that 
cognition itself or cognitive states, extend into the environment. In fact, 
as we will see in the course of this chapter, many objectors take EMMT 
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to be uncontroversial and relatively unproblematic in the same way as 
Rupert does. The target for most objectors is, therefore, EMT rather than 
EMMT. And Rupert argues that Rowlands gives us no reason to endorse 
EMT (HEC) over the less radical EMMT (HEMC). 
 
Rowlands, however, does not make clear why the use of an internally 
represented code applied to the contents of an external store implies 
HEC, rather than HEMC. Although increased use of external resources 
might change the character of internal processing and the way in which 
the subject interacts with her environment, why think that the apposite 
external and internal states (or forms of processing) are thereby of the 
same causal-explanatory kind? Why infer the existence of one 
overarching kind, memory, subsuming both internal and external states 
and processes that will be of significant explanatory use in cognitive 
science? (Ibid: 408-409) 
 
This is a legitimate criticism and one that we will look at in more detail in 
later sections. For now, however, I want to focus on a different worry that 
Rupert articulates. Rowlands, following Miller (1956), highlights the 
limitations of human biological working memory and argues that we need 
to look beyond biology to the external world in order explain our 
proficiency at certain memory tasks. Rupert concedes the point regarding 
the informational limitations on biological working memory but argues 
that Rowlands‘ EMT presents a view of biological memory that is not 
consonant with the research: 
 
Although we must recognize limitations on the capacity of working 
memory, Rowlands‘ view fits poorly with much of the empirical data. 
Consider the human ability to converse effectively. Participating in a 
conversation of any significant length makes rigorous demands on 
working memory by requiring participants to build and maintain a fairly 
detailed model of the ongoing discourse. (Rupert 2004: 409-410) 
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Rupert goes on to illustrate the difficulties in explaining how we conduct a 
normal everyday conversation along what he thinks are EM theorist‘s lines. 
He asks us to imagine attempting to converse with someone while using an 
Otto-style working memory—maintaining a written running model of the 
discourse on paper—rather than biological working memory. Such a strategy 
would be, needless to say, prohibitive of a smooth conversation.  
 
In the context of a standard verbal exchange of any significant length, 
external resources are virtually useless, while internal storage appears to 
be irreplaceable. (Ibid: 410) 
 
Thus, in this case the use of external resources is not only not required, it 
may well be a hindrance in facilitating the completion of the cognitive task 
in question. The example is supposed to show that Rowlands may have been 
overly hasty pointing to the limitations of biological working memory as a 
motivation for the use of external information-bearing processes. 
 
To be clear, neither Rowlands, nor any other EM theorist, wholly dismisses 
biological working memory in favour of external information-bearing 
resources. On the EM model extended cognitive processes are hybrid and 
cannot exist without the internal portion of the process. In short, there is no 
extended working memory, of the sort that Rowlands claims is characteristic 
of modern literate human beings, without biology. 
 
But the problem for Rupert‘s objection is that it mischaracterises EMT in a 
different way. No EM theorist expects that EMT should provide a 
framework within which all cognition is partially constituted by external 
information-bearing processes. It is entirely expected, on this view, that 
many cognitive processes—and, indeed, all biologically basic ones—will be 
completely internally constituted. Thus, it is no argument against EMT to 
demonstrate that the dynamics of conversation resist explanation along 
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externalist lines since EMT only holds that some cognitive processes are 
partially externally constituted, not that all are. 
 
This point is well made by Hurley (forthcoming) in demonstrating why EMT 
has a lower burden of proof than internalism. 
 
Internalism claims to characterize all mental states, and externalism 
denies this claim must hold without itself claiming to characterize all 
mental states. Externalism thus has a lower burden of proof than 
internalism: externalism is vindicated by providing counter-examples to 
internalism, but internalism is not vindicated by providing 
counterexamples to externalism. Externalism can accommodate 
examples of internalist explanation with equanimity, since it denies that 
internalism‘s universal ambitions are justified without adopting 
comparable universal ambitions of its own. 
 
Rupert‘s strategy of providing a counterexample to EMT by highlighting 
its deficiencies with regard to explaining how we can carry out 
conversations fails because the EM theorist can simply agree that Rupert 
is correct in this case while pointing out that it was never part of EMT to 
argue that all cognitive process require externalist explanation; EMT may 




The differences objection is perhaps the most obvious one to level at 
EMT and I have already dealt with it to a certain extent in consideration 
of the integrationist perspective on the Parity Principle in chapter one. 
The objection is that external processes, or the external portion of 
extended processes, are just too unlike internal processes to count as 
mental or as cognitive. It is along these lines that Rupert makes the 
following statement: 
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I argue that the external portions of extended ‗‗memory‘‘ states 
(processes) differ so greatly from internal memories (the process of 
remembering) that they should be treated as distinct kinds; this quells 
any temptation to argue for HEC from brute analogy (viz. extended 
cognitive states are like wholly internal ones; therefore, they are of the 
same explanatory cognitive kind; therefore there are extended cognitive 
states). (2004: 407) 
 
Once more, Rupert is not arguing that external processes have no role to 
play in the enabling of certain cognitive or mental states; rather his claim 
is that these external processes are so unlike inner ones that they cannot 
legitimately be coupled with internal processes to form extended 
processes that are of the same cognitive kind as purely internal processes. 




He notes that highlighting the differences between putative extended 
cognitive processes and internal cognitive processes removes any 
temptation to argue from ‗brute analogy‘; a strategy which is, needless to 
say, not a good one. Fortunately for the EM theorist this is not a strategy 
that gets employed. Despite the key role accorded to the Parity Principle 
by the EM theorist, it is not claimed that the external aspects of putative 
extended mental states should be ‗just like‘ internal states to which we 
would accord mental status. Rather, as we saw in chapters one and two, 
the differences between internal processes and the external portion of 
extended processes are predicted and required by EMT.  
 
This is the insight that is provided by the Integrationist perspective on 
EMT (see chapters 1 & 2, and Menary 2006; 2007, Sutton 2006). The 
idea is that we offload portions of our cognitive processing into the 
environment precisely because the structures and processes that we find 
                                               
28 Although it may be a very crude version of EMT that he targets. 
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in the environment are different from the internal brain processes and so 
afford us, for example, a stability and reliability that our brain processes 
do not (See Otto). As Rowlands puts it: ‗without these differences the 
external processes would be otiose‖ (2009a: 4). 
 
Nonetheless, there is still something to the differences objection proposed 
by Rupert. Even if the Integrationist perspective on EMT requires that the 
external portion of extended cognitive processes differ in some important 
respect from purely internal processes, extended processes (comprising 
internal and external aspects) must be of the same kind as purely internal 
processes if both are to be properly called cognitive. In the absence of a 
specification of what it is in virtue of which extended processes are of the 
same kind as internal ones, the option is open for those hostile to EMT to 
reject it on the basis that the differences are too great. Thus, objectors to 
EMT can argue that even if EMT requires a difference between internal 
states and processes and the external portion of extended states and 
processes, the differences between the two are so great that they cannot 
be of the same kind, and so extended states and processes are neither 
cognitive nor mental. 
 
It is in this vein that Rupert argues that what the EM theorist refers to as 
extended memory differs too greatly from what we already know about 
memory to be considered cognitive. For example, Rupert cites a study 
that examines the idea of negative transfer with regard to memorising sets 
of pairs. Negative transfer is a particular instance of what are generally 
referred to as interference effects; effects that inhibit an individual‘s 
capacity to learn and remember new information. Suppose a subject is 
presented with a list of words that he must commit to memory, the list 
consists of paired male and female names such as John and Sally. We can 
call this list the ‗A-B‘ list. When the list has been memorised the 
experimenter presents the subject with one of the ‗A-words‘ from the list 
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and it is the subject‘s task to utter the correct ‗B-word‘, which is the word 
that it had been paired with on the list, i.e. if the experimenter says 
‗John‘, the subject should respond with ‗Sally‘. In the recall task then, the 
‗A-word‘ is the stimulus and the ‗B-word‘ is the response. Following this 
task the experimenter mixes the associations that appeared on the ‗A-B‘ 
list such that John is now paired with Mary instead of Sally, who is now 
paired with Steve. Call this new list of pairs the ‗A-C‘ list. The subject 
proceeds as before to learn the new ‗A-C‘ list of paired associations. But 
results indicate that subjects learn these new associations a lot more 
slowly than the initial ‗A-B‘ list. The reason for this is outlined by Rupert 
as follows: 
 
There is, it is said, negative transfer, an interference of the old 
associations with the learning of the new. The problem seems to be that 
if, for instance, John was married to Sally according to the A-B list, 
subjects have a hard time blocking out this association and forming a 
new association between ‗John‘ and, say, ‗Mary‘, with which ‗John‘ is 
now paired on the A-C list. (Rupert 2004: 416) 
 
Rupert next asks us to consider the case of an individual who uses a 
notebook and a pen to record the ‗A-B‘ and ‗A-C‘ lists as in Clark and 
Chalmers‘ Otto case. Rupert says that there is unlikely to be any negative 
transfer in cases such as this as all the subject needs to do is read the 
paired associations from the written lists in each case. The EM theorist 
could respond that the stability provided by the notebook is the reason 
that no negative transfer occurs in cases such as this and it is precisely for 
these sorts of reasons that external resources are recruited for the 
completion of cognitive tasks. But such a response is unlikely to cut any 
mustard with Rupert who holds that the differences between internal 
memory processes and putative extended memory processes that he has 
highlighted ―are at the very heart of cognitive scientists‘ investigations of 
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memory‖ (Ibid: 415). For Rupert, the use of notebooks and other external 
artefacts for the completion of cognitive tasks is best seen as an example 
of embedded cognition rather than as an example of extended cognition 
precisely because the use of artefacts is merely an example of the use of 
memory aids that are peripheral to the real process of remembering; a 
process that exhibits negative transfer and the generation effect for 
example. Rupert‘s specification of genuine memory as being required to 
exhibit negative transfer and the generation effect is an attempt to specify 
a mark of the cognitive for genuine memory; a criterion, or criteria, that 
distinguish(es) cases of genuine remembering from cases of the use of 
remembering aids, for example. 
 
Rupert may well be correct in his analysis of these psychological laws 
which seem to be uniquely characteristic of internal memory processes 
but it is not clear that they provide a sufficient basis for delineating the 
cognitive from the non-cognitive, which is what is required from a mark 
of the cognitive. Bartlett (2008) notes that features such as these are 
contingent features of human psychology and points out that certain 
savants have memory systems that seem to work very differently from 
those of so-called normal individuals but we do not, on that basis, deny 
that they are remembering. Similarly, the commonly referenced ‗7 units 
(plus or minus 2 units)‘ rule (see Miller 1956) for information processing 
is seen as typical of the capacity of human short-term memory and is one 
that putative extended memory systems recruiting external artefacts are 
unlikely to be limited by in the same way as basic biological memory. 
But it is not clear that we should withdraw cognitive status from internal 
processes associated with short-term memory if this rule is not adhered 
to, particularly if it is exceeded. 
 
Along the same line of objection Adams and Aizawa protest that: 
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Cognitive Processes are so different from the physical processes in the 
tools we use that a science that ignores this difference essentially 
ignores cognition. (Adams & Aizawa 2001: 47) 
 
There is a danger evident in this quote of doing a disservice to EMT by 
characterising it as the External Mind Thesis rather than the Extended 
Mind Thesis. Adams and Aizawa frequently (though not always) flirt 
with this mischaracterisation of EMT by comparing and contrasting 
internal processes with external processes instead of internal processes 
with extended processes, which are identified as hybrid entities 
comprising internal and external processes. This is not to say that the 
external portion of the process is not a legitimate target for objectors to 
EMT, just that it needs to be stressed that the EM theorist will emphasise 
that the external process is just part of the larger process that necessarily 
includes internal processes and that to ignore this fact is to be in danger 
of attacking a straw man.
29
 Bearing this is in mind I proceed to examine 
Adams and Aizawa‘s version of the differences objection. 
 
In relation to Clark and Chalmers‘ Tetris cases that we considered in 
chapter one, Adams and Aizawa note that the process of mentally rotating 
the images of blocks is very different from rotating images of blocks on a 
computer screen by pressing a button.  
 
It seems to us safe to assume that the process that physically rotates the 
image on the screen at the push of the button… is not the same as the 
cognitive process that occurs in the brain. Pushing the button closes 
some sort of electrical circuit that, at some extremely short time delay, 
changes the way electrons are fired at the phosphorescent screen of a 
cathode ray tube. This sort of causal process is surely not the same as 
                                               
29 As we will see, this strategy is crucial for the EM theorist in responding to Adams 
andd Aizawa‘s (2001) mark of the mental objection. 
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any cognitive process, or any fragment of a causal process, in the brain. 
(Ibid: 54) 
 
Adams and Aizawa contrast internal processes with external processes 
here; a strategy that, as noted above, does not do justice to the EMT 
position. Simply pointing out these obvious differences is not going to 
provide a significant challenge to the EM theorist. The EM theorist will 
argue that what matters in cases such as this is that the internal processing 
in the mental rotation case and the extended processing involving the 
rotation of the image on the computer screen both fulfil the same 
functional role by contributing in the same way to the completion of the 
cognitive task. 
 
To be fair to Adams and Aizawa they go on to highlight differences 
between the internal processing involved in a case of purely mental 
rotation and the internal processing involved in a case of on-screen 
rotation. But again here the EM theorist can simply re-emphasise the 
Integrationist element of EMT whereby precisely these differences are 
predicted and required. Thus, once more it seems that appeal to these 
sorts of differences will not do the work required by EMT‘s detractors. 
 
It is not enough to point to some difference between internal processes 
and external or extended processes and deny cognitive or mental status to 
the extended process on the basis that the whole process is not enough 
like a genuine cognitive process or mental state. Clearly, external 
processes play an important role in both the Otto case and the Tetris case 
but the challenge for both sides is to provide an account of which states 
and processes are genuinely constitutive of cognition and which states 
and processes are merely enablers of cognition. Likewise, in order to 
settle the debate over the stronger claim regarding the extension of 
mental states, the specification of a criterion that clearly delineates the 
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mental from the non-mental; what is constitutive of a mental state from 
what merely enables mental state formation is required.  
 
The differences objection, then, leads us to focus on the big issue of 
constitution versus enabling that I highlighted in chapters one to three. It 
is not enough to point out the differences between internal processes and 
external processes in order to deny cognitive status to extended 
processes. One should first account for what a cognitive process is and 
then adjudicate on boundary issues. 
 
Likewise, it is not enough for the EM theorist to point out similarities 
between internal processes and extended processes in order to confer 
cognitive status to the latter: the requirement for an account of what 
distinguishes a process as cognitive applies equally here. So, the issue 
can only be settled by the provision of an independently motivated 
account of what exactly makes a process cognitive, or what makes a state 
mental, regardless of its location. What is required from both sides of the 




If EMT requires the extension of mental states and not just the extension 
of cognitive processes then even an independently motivated mark of 
cognition will not move the debate forward with regard to the 
metaphysical extent of minds. What is needed to settle the issue here is 
the provision of a mark of the mental. 
 
The Coupling/Constitution Fallacy 
 
According to Adams and Aizawa (2001, forthcoming) many arguments 
presented in favour of EMT are fallacious because they confuse instances 
                                               
30 To give Adams and Aizawa their due once again, they do recognise this issue and 
acknowledge that their differences objection forms part of a larger argument that 
incorporates a Mark of the Cognitive. This is something I explore in a later section. 
 140 
of coupling with cases of constitution. Once again, EMMT is taken to be 
unproblematic by the objectors, which is to say that it is acknowledged 
that external factors do have a role to play in the completion of certain 
cognitive tasks. However, the point of contention is the movement from 
this innocuous EMMT to a fully fledged EMT. It is precisely this step 
that is at issue in the coupling/constitution debate. 
 
Coupling arguments are far and away the primary sort of argument 
given in support of transcranialism. What is common to these arguments 
is a tacit move from the observation that process X is in some way 
causally connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to the conclusion 
that X is part of the cognitive process Y. The pattern of reasoning here 
involves moving from the observation that process X is in some way 
causally connected (coupled) to a process Y of type Φ to the conclusion 
that X is part of a process of type Φ. In attributing this pattern of 
reasoning to advocates of transcranialism, we do not mean that they 
consciously and deliberately draw a distinction between the coupling 
claim and the constitution claim, and then explicitly assert that coupling 
is sufficient for constitution. Far from it. What typically happens is that 
writers just casually slip between one and the other. (Adams and 
Aizawa, forthcoming) 
 
The implication is that EM theorists see coupling relations between a 
cognitive process and an external process and get overexcited, positing 
constitution where there is none. But why, exactly, is the move from 
causal coupling to constitution a fallacy? To illustrate the point Adams 
and Aizawa offer us the example of a bi-metallic strip in a thermostat for 
consideration. The expansion of a bi-metallic strip in a thermostat is:  
 
…[C]ausally linked to a heater or to an air conditioner that regulates the 
temperature of the room the thermostat is in. Expansion does not, 
thereby, become a process that extends to the whole system. It is still 
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restricted to the bi-metallic strip in the thermostat. (Adams and Aizawa 
2001: 56). 
 
In this case to assume that expansion is a process that extends to the rest 
of the thermostat system simply because the rest of the thermostat is 
causally coupled to the bi-metallic strip would be a mistake. Mere causal 
coupling does not entail that the coupled object or process becomes 
partially constitutive of that to which it is coupled. Similarly, Adams and 
Aizawa argue that just because an external object or process is causally 
coupled to a cognitive process in the brain does not mean that that object 
or process now becomes constitutive of that cognitive process. In making 
arguments of this type, the EM theorist is guilty of confusing coupling 
relations and constitution according to Adams and Aizawa. 
 
It could be argued here that the example chosen by Adams and Aizawa 
does not do justice to the complexity of EMT. Of course the expansion of 
the bi-metallic strip does not extend to the rest of the thermostat—it is 
expansion of the bi-metallic strip! The claim of the EM theorist is not that 
neural firings in the brain extend into external processes and objects. It is 
that cognition extends and the opportunity to make this claim exists 
because (unless mind-brain type-identity theory is correct) cognition is 
not brain-bound by definition, unlike neural firings. 
 
Anyhow, it remains the case that causal coupling between two processes 
does not necessarily licence the claim that both processes form a single, 
cognitive kind. Thus, Adams and Aizawa legitimately criticize Wilson 
(2004) for arguing that in the strategies we employ in solving certain 
puzzles the mind: ―extends itself beyond the purely internal capacities of 
the brain by engaging with, exploiting, and manipulating parts of its 
structured environment‖ (Ibid.: 195). Consider the attempt to form as 
long a word as possible using single letters marked on a random 
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assortment of individual tiles, as in the word-game Scrabble. The typical 
way of completing this task is to arrange and re-arrange the tiles such that 
different combinations of letters present themselves. The idea is that 
manually re-arranging the tiles in this way is more fruitful and efficient 
than simply looking at the static tiles and trying to generate novel 
combinations ‗in the head‘. The more typical strategy is an example of an 
epistemic action of the sort explored by Kirsch and Maglio that we 
considered in chapter one. In cases such as these Wilson argues that 
epistemic actions are constitutive of cognition:  
 
We solve the problem by continually looking back to the board and 
trying to figure out sequences of moves that will get us closer to our 
goal, all the time exploiting the structure of the environment through 
continual interaction with it. We look, we think, we move. But the 
thinking, the cognitive part of solving the problem, is not squirreled 
away inside us, wedged between the looking and the moving, but 
developed and made possible through these interactions with the board 
(Ibid: 194).  
 
Adams and Aizawa take Wilson to be arguing for the literal extension of 
cognition, of thinking, into environment in our interactions with the 
scrabble tiles or puzzle board. They claim that if this is indeed what he 
means, the literal extension of cognition rather than of the processes 
supporting cognition, then he is guilty of the coupling/constitution 
fallacy. Note, once more, a lack of clarity here in the claims of the EM 
theorist—we can contrast the early part of the last sentence of Wilson‘s 
quote: ―the thinking, the cognitive part of solving the problem, is not 
squirreled away inside us…‖ (Ibid: 194), which is a clear expression of 
partial external location/constitution of cognition, with the latter part of 
the sentence where he describes thought as being: ―developed and made 
possible through these interactions with the board‖ (Ibid: 194), which is 
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an expression of EMMT. If EMMT is all that Wilson is arguing for then 
Adams and Aizawa emphasise that they have no problem with his claim 
as he is ―providing no argument for transcranial cognition.‖ (Adams & 
Aizawa, forthcoming). But if he is indeed arguing for EMT then he is 
guilty, they claim, of the coupling/constitution fallacy and has failed to 
provide a case for transcranial cognition. The same charge can be levelled 
at Clark and Chalmers‘ Otto case on this view. 
 
Adams and Aizawa also note a tendency of EM theorists to argue for the 
extension of cognition from a systems perspective, which is to say that 
the EM theorist points out that the individual and the external 
information-bearing structure to which he is coupled forms a cognitive 
system. It is a cognitive system because it is a system that is formed 
precisely for the purpose of completing a cognitive task (e.g. Otto and his 
notebook) and because the external portion of the system has an essential 
role to play in the completion of the cognitive task; thus cognition is said 
to include this external portion of the system.  
 
Adams and Aizawa are willing to grant that the individual in conjunction 
with the external information-bearing structure to which he is coupled 
can form a system. They are even willing to concede that this coupling 
forms a cognitive system. But they correctly point out that it is one thing 
to claim that the coupling of two objects or processes forms a cognitive 
system and quite another thing to claim that cognition extends to every 
part of that system. 
 
We can...concede that humans and their tools constitute cognitive 
systems. Still, this does not establish transcranialism. It does not 
follow from the fact that one has an “X system” that every 
component of the system does X. Obviously there are systems that 
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consist of many types of components and involve a multiplicity of 
processes. (Ibid.). 
 
To illustrate their point here Adams and Aizawa (forthcoming) ask us to 
consider a computer. Not every process that occurs in the computer will 
be a computational process, not every process that occurs as part of this 
individual computing system will be a process that computes. For 
example, a fan causes cool air to circulate, mitigating the effect of the 
heat produced by the CPU. So, say Adams and Aizawa, appeal to the 
notion of a cognitive system is not likely to help the EM theorist and the 
charge of confusing coupling relations with constitution can still be laid 
at their door.  
  
However, as Rowlands points out it is far from clear that the EM theorist 
is simply confusing coupling with constitution.  
 
Far from confusing constitution and causal coupling, the most natural 
way of understanding the arguments for EM are precisely as arguments 
for reinterpreting what had traditionally been regarded as extraneous 
causal accompaniments to cognition as, in fact, part of cognition itself. 
And, in general, to argue for the identification of X and Y, when X and 
Y had hitherto been regarded as distinct types, is not to confuse X and 
Y. (2009a: 5). 
 
This is correct, after all, not every instance of causal coupling is argued to 
be a case of extended cognitive processing and in those cases where 
coupling is argued to lead to the partial external constitution of a 
cognitive process it is not mere casual coupling that is said to occur. 
Rather, extended cognition is said to occur when external factors play a 
special enabling role in the completion of some cognitive task. EM 
theorists, as Hurley puts, make a discriminating appeal to causal spread 
(hence Clark‘s list of additional criteria that we examined in chapter one). 
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One can argue that they do not succeed in making this discriminating 
appeal, and one can highlight loose talk that slips too easily between 
EMT and EMMT. Still, to indict the EM theorist for confusing coupling 
relations with constitution is a different charge and one that isn‘t 
warranted.  
 
However, although a proper appreciation of the strategy of the EM 
theorist in this regard means rejecting charges of simply confusing causal 
coupling with constitution, it is not clear that the discriminating appeal to 
causal spread—in the form of the additional criteria offered by Clark that 
we saw in chapter one—will ease worries over the issue of constitution 
versus enabling. The cleanest way to settle this issue, as we will see is by 
providing a mark of the mental. Next, however, I examine another 





If Clark and Chalmers opt for the simplistic view that anything that is 
causally connected to a cognitive process is part of the cognitive 
process, then there is the threat of cognition bleeding into everything. 
This is sometimes called something like ―the problem of cognitive 
bloat‖ or ―cognitive ooze‖. These names do justice to the ugliness of the 
view, but not to its radical nature. The threat is pancognitivism, where 
everything is cognitive. (Adams & Aizawa 2001: 57). 
 
The Cognitive Bloat objection is a slippery-slope type objection (also 
noted by Rowlands (2009a)) that is supposed to highlight the dangers of 
allowing structures and processes that are external to the agent, such as 
the sentences in Otto‘s notebook, to count as partially constitutive of 
cognitive processes or mental states. If we allow these sorts of states and 
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processes to be partially constitutive of cognition or mentality then, the 
objection goes, what is to stop us allowing the numbers in phonebooks or 
search results from Google to count as partially constitutive of cognitive 
processes or mental states?  
 
Once more, the objection is not about whether or not external objects or 
structures such as notebooks have a role to play in the completion of 
certain cognitive tasks (EMMT), rather, the objection concerns whether 
or not the role that these objects and structures play in the completion of 
cognitive tasks warrants attributing cognitive status to these structures 
and objects as constitutive parts of the cognitive process. So, the 
objection is that allowing EMT puts one on a dangerous slippery-slope 
whereby all manner of things that are patently non-cognitive must be 
admitted to be cognitive—EMT forms, on this view, a reductio ad 
absurdum. 
 
Interestingly, Fodor (2009) claims that Clark and Chalmers‘ argument in 
favour of EMT is actually a slippery-slope argument itself and that the 
much vaunted Parity Principle is not required by EM theorists:  
 
[Clark‘s] real argument is that, barring a principled reason for 
distinguishing between what Otto keeps in his notebook and what Inga 
keeps in her head, there‘s a slippery slope from the one to the other. 
That being so, it is mere prejudice to deny that Otto‘s notebook is part 
of his mind if one grants that Inga‘s memories are part of hers. 
 
Fodor goes on to point out that slippery-slope arguments are notoriously 
invalid but states that in any case he can meet Clark and Chalmers‘ 
challenge by providing a principled difference between Otto and Inga. 
We will consider this principled difference in the next section on the 
mark of the mental. 
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For now, however, we can note that in response to the cognitive bloat 
objection Clark introduces a series of conditions that must obtain in order 
for an extended process to count as cognitive, thus attempting to provide 
a basis for distinguishing between extended cognitive and external non-
cognitive processes. So, as we saw in chapter one, Clark argues that for 
an external information-bearing resource, such as Otto‘s notebook, to 
count as part of a mental state or cognitive process it is necessary:  
 
1. That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked. 
2. That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible 
as and when required. 
3. That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the 
opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed about as 
trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory. 
4. That the information should have been previously consciously endorsed 
by the subject. 
 
These conditions limit, or at least are supposed to limit, which cases of 
the use of external information-bearing structures legitimately count as 
being partially constitutive of cognitive processes. Thus, one‘s ordinary 
use of the phonebook to locate a telephone number would not typically 
count as an extended cognitive process because it would fall foul of 
conditions one, two and possibly four. Similarly, use of search engines 
like Google would not count as a case of cognitive extension because 
search results would fall foul of conditions three and four. 
 
Kenneth Aizawa argues that these conditions are prohibitively strong in 
that they withhold cognitive status from obviously cognitive internal 
processes: 
 
I will argue here that these conditions are so restrictive that clear cases 
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of an agent‘s cognitive processing will turn out to be excluded from that 
agent‘s cognitive processing. (Aizawa, unpublished) 
 
In support of this claim Aizawa offers two cases concerning memory. In 
the first case we are asked to imagine Dotto who hits his head on a 
cabinet. Dotto suffers minor bruising but suffers no cognitive 
impairment. However, he fears that his memory may have been 
compromised by the incident and decides to reduce his dependence on it. 
Consequently, when asked for a phone number that he would previously 
have known, he replies that he does not know despite the fact that the 
number would ―flash before his mind‖ (Ibid.). Thus, Dotto no longer 
automatically endorses (condition 3) the information obtained from his 
biological memory, and no longer typically invokes it (condition 1), 
preferring to rely on phone directories etc. So, says Aizawa, on Clark‘s 
account despite the fact that the psychological processes are the same for 
Dotto before and after the accident we must withdraw cognitive status 
from Dotto‘s memories as he no longer automatically endorses and 
typically invokes them. The second case is essentially the same as the 
first except in this case Dotto withdraws automatic endorsement of his 
output from memory because he has undertaken a study of long-term 
biological memory and has found that it is unreliable. 
 
Aizawa argues that the correct interpretation of each of these cases is that 
Dotto has a cognitive resource that he no longer typically invokes or 
automatically endorses. But in each case, says Aizawa, we are prevented 
from applying this interpretation if Clark is correct. Instead, we are 
forced to say that internal psychological processes which once were 
cognitive processes are no longer cognitive processes. Now, whether or 
not this objection works depends upon what role Clark sees his additional 
criteria as playing with regard to cognitive status. Are his criteria offered 
jointly as a mark of the cognitive simpliciter, in which case they would 
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have to be adhered to by any putative cognitive process, internal or 
external? Or are these criteria offered merely as a set of additional criteria 
to be fulfilled by an external resource to form part of a putative extended 
cognitive process? 
  
If Clark‘s conditions are offered as a mark of the cognitive simpliciter 
then Aizawa may well be right in arguing that the conditions are 
prohibitively strong in ruling out obviously cognitive processes, as 
outlined above. However, it is clear that this is not what Clark has in 
mind when he offers these conditions.  
 
In response to… concerns about availability and portability, we offered 
a rough-and-ready set of additional criteria to be met by non-biological 
candidates for inclusion into an individual‘s cognitive system. (Clark, 
forthcoming, emphasis mine) 
 
The conditions offered by Clark are supposed to function as extra 
conditions on non-biological processes (presumably on top of the 
conditions on biological processes, which he has not given us) in order 
for them to be considered as part of a cognitive process. Thus, the 
conditions function more like a mark of the extended cognitive rather 
than as a mark of the cognitive. Aizawa‘s worries are misplaced then as 
the power of his objection is contingent upon Clark‘s conditions forming 
criteria for any process being cognitive. 
 
Nonetheless, Clark‘s strategy in meeting the cognitive bloat objection 
highlights once again that the constitution versus enabling issue has not 
adequately been addressed. Clark has not told us exactly what it is that 
unites internal cognitive processes and putative extended cognitive 
processes as cognitive. So, although the force of the cognitive bloat 
objection may have been neutralised, the question of why the external 
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special enablers of cognition should form a constitutive part of the 
cognitive process at all still remains. Thus, analysis of the cognitive bloat 
objection leads us, once again, to the core issue of constitution versus 
enabling. The cleanest way to deal with this issue would be to provide a 
mark of the cognitive but Clark has not been forthcoming. More 
importantly for our purposes, settling claims regarding the extent of 
mental states rest on the provision of a mark of the mental we have 
received no indication for what this might be from Clark. 
 
The Mark of the Mental 
 
With the exception of the first objection, which is based on a 
misunderstanding of EMT, all of the objections considered to this point 
reduce to the constitution versus enabling issue. The EM theorist argues 
that in certain cases, processes that involve the manipulation of external 
information-bearing structures are partially constitutive of cognitive 
processes. However, without the provision of an independently motivated 
mark of the cognitive it is not clear that these claims can be definitively 
secured. Furthermore, without the provision of an independently 
motivated mark of the mental it is not clear that Clark and Chalmers can 
definitively secure a genuine EMT, as opposed to EMMT. 
 
But the same demand falls on the objector to EMT. The EMT ‗hostile‘ 
should provide an independently motivated mark of the mental with 
which he can provide a principled difference between internal mental 
states and putative extended mental states. Otherwise he leaves himself 
open to charges of question-begging. So, in this section I examine some 
of the objections to EMT that have developed around the requirement to 
provide a mark of the mental. 
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As noted in the previous section, Adams and Aizawa (2001) adopt a 
position described as contingent intracranialism, arguing that although 
transcranialism is neither a logical nor nomological impossibility, it is a 
matter of contingent empirical fact that all human cognition takes place 
within the head. The reason that Adams and Aizawa offer us for this 
position is that putative extended cognitive processes do not bear the 
mark of the cognitive. According to Adams and Aizawa cognitive 
processes must involve non-derived, or underived, content. Thus, Adams 
and Aizawa offer non-derived content as a mark of the cognitive. But, 
since Brentano, non-derived content is typically taken to provide a mark 
of the mental. It is possible that Adams and Aizawa offer it as a 
requirement that cognition involve processing on mental states with non-
derived content. In any case, they characterise non-derived content as 
follows: 
 
Underived content arises from conditions that do not require the 
independent or prior existence of other content, representations or 
intentional agents. So, for example if minds evolved, the first mind did 
not acquire its thought content from any other mind (there were no 
others). (Adams & Aizawa 2005: 662) 
 
Fodor (2009) also emphasises the requirement for non-derived content, 
but he makes it with regard to mental states rather than cognitive 
processes. 
 
[O]nly what‘s literally and unmetaphorically mental has content, but... if 
something literally and unmetaphorically has content, then either it is 
mental (part of a mind) or the content is ‗derived‘ from something that 
is mental.  
 
So for Fodor non-derived content is the mark of the mental, which is to 
say that minds and only minds possess or exhibit non-derived content. 
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Fodor argues that Otto‘s notebook cannot literally be part of his mind 
then, as EMT claims, because Otto‘s notebook does not have non-derived 
content. The entries in the notebook can be about something, they can 
exhibit intentionality but not in the same way that Otto himself can 
exhibit intentionality because the entries in Otto‘s notebook are 
dependent on him, on his thoughts and intentions, which exhibit their 
own non-derived intentionality. The contents of Otto‘s notebook are 
derived and have meaning only in virtue of the prior existence of Otto as 
a content-bearing, intentional agent. Similarly, words, numbers, and 
traffic signals in general all have content, they all mean something, and 
they all mean something by convention. Without the logically prior 
existence of content-bearing agents these things wouldn‘t have content. 
 
Now, Adams and Aizawa claim that there is a broad-consensus in favour 
of the idea that mentality involves non-derived content, citing the work of 
Dretske (1981, 1988), Fodor (1987,1990), Searle (1980), and Millikan 
(1984) as support. But there are arguments to the contrary, such as that 
presented by Dennett in ‗The Myth of Original Intentionality‘ (1990), and 
Clark himself doubts that there is a: ―clear and distinct sense in which 
neural representations get to enjoy ‗intrinsic contents‘ of some special 
kind, quite unlike the kinds of content that figure in external 
inscriptions.‖ (Clark, forthcoming). Nonetheless, Clark is prepared to 
accept that non-derived content is the mark of the mental and that all 
mental states and cognitive processes must possess non-derived content, 
since he thinks that he can still preserve his arguments for the extension 
of mental states. I will make the same move here, and explore what 
follows for EMT if nonderived content is indeed the Mark of the Mental. 
 
We saw in a previous section how Adams and Aizawa sought to 
challenge EMT by providing a principled difference between internal 
cognition and putative extended cognition in their examination of Clark 
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and Chalmers‘ Tetris cases. To refresh; in case (1) a person attempts to 
determine the fit of the shapes by way of mental rotation alone, in case 
(2) the person does so by physically rotating the shapes on a computer 
screen, and in case (3) the person does so by way of a neural implant. 
Adams and Aizawa attempt to answer Clark and Chalmers‘ claims that 
each case is on a par in so far as cognitive status is concerned by 
providing a principled difference between the cases. This time they 
attempt to provide this difference in terms of nonderived content. 
 
Cognitive processing is, of course, involved in all three cases, but in 
different ways. (1) and (2) differ in their use of non-derived 
representations and in the sorts of processes that go on in them, hence 
(2) does not constitute a ‗real world‘ case of transcranial cognition. 
(Adams & Aizawa 2001: 54).  
 
This requires a little more fleshing out. Adams and Aizawa state that in 
case (1) the agent uses mental representations of the blocks to perform 
the task whereas in case (2) the blocks that are rotated are not 
representations at all, either derived or non-derived. ‗They do not 
represent blocks to be fit together; they are the blocks to be fit together.‘ 
(Ibid.). Fodor echoes this point stating that: ―The world can‘t be its own 
best representation because the world doesn‘t represent anything; least of 
all itself. The world doesn‘t mean anything and it isn‘t about anything; it 
just is.‖ (Fodor 2009). The bottom line according to these objectors then 
is that if cognition must involve nonderived representation then the 
manipulation of the on-screen images by pressing a button is not a case of 
genuine cognition. 
 




One obvious difference between the two cases involves non-derived 
content. Where the symbols written in Otto‘s notebook have merely 
derived content, the recollection in Inga‘s brain has non-derived 
content. Otto‘s notes do not, therefore, constitute beliefs or memories. 
(Adams and Aizawa 2001: 55) 
 
Andy Clark responds to the non-derived content objection in ‗Memento‘s 
Revenge: The Extended Mind: Extended‘ (Forthcoming), by posing the 
following question: 
 
[M]ust everything that is to count as part of an individual‘s mental 
processing be composed solely and exclusively of states of affairs of 
this latter (intrinsically content-bearing) kind? I see no reason to think 
that they must. (Clark, forthcoming).  
 
He examines what he believes to be a genuine case of cognition involving 
the visualizing of Euler Circles. Suppose that we are set some cognitive 
task that we solve by visualizing a set of Euler circles in order to reach a 
solution. It is surely the case, Clark argues, that the fact that this set of 
Euler circles means anything, regardless of whether or not they are 
visualizations, is a matter of convention. If so, then the content that the 
visualization of the set of Euler circles has is derived content and it 
clearly has a role to play in the completion of the cognitive task, it is 
clearly part of the cognitive process. So his point is that in cases like this 
we have a case of genuine cognition that involves derived content, which 
means that perhaps not everything that counts as part of an individual‘s 
mental processing must be composed solely and exclusively of states of 
affairs bearing non-derived content. 
 
Adams and Aizawa meet the challenge laid down by Clark: 
 
Evidently the problem here is supposed to be that there are some mental 
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states that have contents in virtue of a social convention. So, Clark 
implies that there are bona fide cognitive processes that involve derived 
content… Our view is that Clark‘s analysis of the Euler circles case is 
superficial and confused. (Adams & Aizawa, forthcoming). 
 
Adam and Aizawa‘s problem with Clark‘s analysis of the Euler circle 
case is that although social convention is involved in the meaning of the 
overlap of Euler circles, this is a logically separate matter from what 
makes an imagistic mental representation of intersecting Euler circles 
mean what it does. How intersecting Euler circles on paper, for example, 
get their meaning is a distinct matter from how Euler circles in mental 
images get their meaning. Intersecting Euler circles may mean set-
theoretic overlap by convention but it is by no-one‘s convention that a 
particular neural state means intersecting Euler circles.  
 
It can be a matter of convention that ―dog‖ means dog, that a stop sign 
means that you should stop, that a person raising a white flag means to 
surrender, and that a red light flashing means that something is 
overheating. But, that does nothing to show that it is not the satisfaction 
of some set of naturalistic conditions on non-derived content that get 
something in the head to have the meanings of ―dog‖, a stop sign, a 
white flag, and a warning light. (Ibid.). 
 
This may well be the case but it could still be argued that that there 
cannot be mental images in which intersecting Euler circles mean set-
theoretic overlap unless there were a social convention according to 
which intersecting Euler circles meant set-theoretic overlap. In a case like 
this doesn‘t the meaning of the mental image derive in part from the prior 
existence of the meaning of external pictures? The meaning of the mental 
image in this case could be said to depend on the existence of a prior 
meaning. Adams and Aizawa claim that an argument such as this trades 
on an ambiguity in the notions of derivation and dependency.  
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Insofar as there must be a social convention regarding the intersections 
of Euler circles in order to have a mental representation regarding the 
intersections of Euler circles, this is not a fact about the constitution of 
the content of a mental image of the intersections of Euler circles. It is, 
if anything, a kind of historical fact. (Ibid.). 
 
So what they are stating is that it is true that without prior social 
convention involving the intersection of Euler circles meaning set-
theoretic overlap one could not have a mental image involving the 
intersection of Euler circles meaning set-theoretic overlap. But this is just 
like saying that without the prior existence of cars one could not have a 
mental image of a car. This, according to Adams and Aizawa is merely a 
type of historical truth and does not show what a defender of EMT may 
want it to show; that the content of certain mental items derives, in some 
relevant manner, from a social convention. 
 
Thus, for the EMT hostile, the image of intersecting Euler circles 
although dependent on the fact of the prior existence of Euler circles is 
ultimately grounded in neural traces within the head, which are logically 
prior to the image. The image of the intersecting Euler circles gets its 
meaning from a pattern of neural firings within the head; the image must 
be triggered by neural goings-on with non-derived content, and the 
understanding must, ultimately, consist in this.  
 
But Clark hones in on a concession made by Adams and Aizawa with 
regard to the pervasiveness of non-derived content through the whole of 
the cognitive process: 
 
Having argued that, in general, there must be non-derived content in 
cognitive processes, it must be admitted that it is unclear to what extent 
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each cognitive state of each cognitive process must involve non-derived 
content (Adams & Aizawa 2001: 50). 
 
Clark takes this to mean, not unreasonably, that even if there is a 
requirement for non-derived content in the larger cognitive process, there 
can be elements of the cognitive process that exhibit derived rather than 
nonderived content. If cognitive states and processes must involve 
nonderived content in every stage, then it does, initially at least, seem 
legitimate to rule out pressing a button to manipulate images on a screen 
as a cognitive process. Similarly, it would seem legitimate to rule out the 
notes in Otto‘s notebook as beliefs and/or memories. But, as Clark points 
out, the argument is not that pressing a button on a computer screen is a 
cognitive process, the argument is that is it forms part of the cognitive 
process. Likewise the argument is not that the words in Otto‘s notebook 
in isolation count as beliefs and memories, they form part of Otto‘s 
cognitive state in the case of belief, and part of Otto‘s cognitive process 
in the case of memory. 
 
Adams and Aizawa seem to want to consider the external processes in 
isolation from what occurs within the head but this is exactly what the 
EM theorist is not claiming. EMT has it that the external components in 
combination with what happens in the head form part of an extended 
cognitive system. If you want to apply the nonderived content argument 
to these examples, then you need to consider the process over the 
extended system as a whole. Adams and Aizawa do not do this. They 
consider the external components in isolation from the internal processes 
and conclude that the external processes do not possess the necessary 
nonderived content. However, if you examine the extended system as a 
whole then the nonderived content that Adams and Aizawa require can be 
found exactly where they expect it to be, inside the head. Thus, the EM 
theorist argues, Adams and Aizawa cannot reject the examples discussed 
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above as cases of genuine cognition on the grounds that they don‘t 
contain non-derived content unless they consider the external components 
in isolation, which is a misunderstanding of the EM theorists‘ position.  
 
However, perhaps Clark was too hasty in using Adams and Aizawa‘s 
concession that not every part of every cognitive process need exhibit 
nonderived content as a licence to include derived content in the larger 
cognitive economy as a constituent part of a cognitive process that also 
involves nonderived content. After all if we examine Adams and 
Aizawa‘s statement immediately following the concession seized on by 
Clark we get a better idea of what they have in mind: 
 
[I]t is epistemically possible that cognitive processes involve 
representations that include a closed set of non-representational 
functional elements, such as punctuation marks and parentheses. Such 
items may be included in the language of thought, based on the manner 
in which they interact with items having non-derived content. (Ibid.) 
 
So Adams and Aizawa allow that things other than intrinsically content-
bearing states of affairs do have a role to play in cognition in the form of 
certain non-representational functional elements. This is not the same as 
conceding that derived content can play a role in a larger cognitive 
process that involves non-derived content. Perhaps Adams and Aizawa 
mean to rule out derived content from forming any part of a genuine 
cognitive process while admitting that certain non-content-bearing 
elements will have a role to play?  
 
In such a case it seems that they can legitimately rule out Otto‘s use of 
the notebook as a cognitive process because it will involve derived 
content in the form of the entries in the notebook. Similarly, if they are 
correct then they may be able to admit Clark‘s Euler circle example as a 
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genuine cognitive process as the meaning of the image is dependent 
(except historically) on the particular pattern of neural firings that 
instantiates the image and is not derived from any prior content. We may 
question where this leaves the Tetris example however. Since Adams and 
Aizawa and Fodor have argued that the blocks on the computer screen are 
not representations this means that they cannot be derived 
representations, which would mean, if this interpretation of the non-
derived content requirement is correct, that there is nothing to rule out the 
manipulation of the blocks on the screen as part of a larger cognitive 
process that extends from the head into the world. 
 
However, the interpretation of Adams and Aizawa‘s position whereby 
they demand that derived content cannot form part of a cognitive process 
is not the correct one it seems. Adams and Aizawa attempt to clarify: 
―Clearly, we mean that if you have a process that involves no intrinsic 
content, then the condition rules that the process is non-cognitive.‖ 
(Adams & Aizawa, forthcoming). 
 
It seems that Adams and Aizawa are offering non-derived content as a 
necessary condition on a process being cognitive. But a mark of the 
cognitive that specifies non-derived content only as a necessary condition 
on a state‘s being cognitive seems to open the door for the EM theorist 
with regard to the extension of cognitive processes. If insisting that non-
derived content is the mark of the cognitive merely provides a necessary 
condition for a state or process as a whole to count as cognitive then 
Clark and Chalmers can argue that there are other aspects (perhaps not 
representational) of a cognitive process that might extend into the world. 
This might be the case if they are specially related in some way to the 
internal non-derived content by fulfilling the additional criteria on an 
extended putative cognitive resource specified by Clark.  
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Likewise, a mark of the mental that specifies non-derived content only as 
a necessary condition for awarding mental status would also seem to 
open the door for Clark and Chalmers with regard to the extension of 
mental states into the world; and therefore with regard to the possibility 
of a genuine EMT. In the next chapter I explore this possibility in 
returning to examine the fundamental account of mental states that is 






























In this chapter I re-examine the fundamental account of mental states and 
their properties that is presupposed by EMT in order to clarify precisely 
the nature of its claims. Functionalism is taken by many to be the 
inspiration for EMT, with both sides of the debate accepting that EMT 
depends on or derives from functionalist principles. I assess, then, the 
relationship between EMT and functionalism, clarifying that it is 
analytic, or commonsense, rather than empirical functionalism that Clark 
relies on to make his case for extended mental states. I also investigate 
what it is about functionalism that makes it so important for EMT and 
take a closer look at the nature of mental states according to the 
functionalist perspective. 
 
If functionalism alone is sufficient to wholly define the propositional 
attitudes that Clark seeks to extend then EMT is a possibility. However, 
the propositional attitudes that Clark takes to be the paradigm mental 
states have two components; the attitude and the proposition or content. It 
is commonly taken that the attitudinal aspect of mental states with 
propositional content is functionally defined, i.e. it is functional profile 
that distinguishes beliefs from hopes and desires, etc. But it is content 
that individuates a belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street 
from a belief that water is wet. And nothing could count as a belief (or 
any other propositional attitude) unless it possessed content. So unless 
one buys the idea that content reduces to the functional, which is not a 
credible proposal, then functionalism tells us something about what is 
necessary but not sufficient for being a mental state such as a belief that 
the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street. If pure functionalism (i.e. a 
complete account of the properties of propositional mental states in 
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functionalist terms) were true then syntactic minds would be a real 
possibility. But if we rule out purely syntactic minds because they do not 
carry the mark of the mental then we rule out a purely functional criterion 
of mind. So, at best, the functional aspects of propositional attitudes 
might extend, but if the content doesn‘t then the defining properties of 
mental states do not extend. 
 
Thus, if non-derived content is the real mark of the mental and it is 
internal, then argument for a genuinely interesting EMT is going to be 
difficult. In presenting his argument for EMT as based on functionalism 
Clark focuses exclusively on extending the formal properties that fulfil 
the functional role of mental states, ignoring this mark of the mental. 
Despite his claims that he wants his EMT to be viewed as an 
―environmentally extended case of narrow content‖ (Clark, forthcoming), 
Clark contends he can allow that non-derived content is the mark of the 
mental and that it is internal and still argue for the extension of some 
mental states into the world. He does this by invoking the special role that 
external factors (like Otto‘s notebook) sometimes play in the generation 
of action. But this move only supports a case for the extension of the 
machinery of mind in virtue of the role that external factors play in 
enabling propositional attitudes and it is difficult to see how this EMMT 
could definitively secure a full-blown EMT. 
 
In response to these criticisms Clark could retreat from the claim 
regarding the extension of mental states (since he doesn‘t argue for the 
extension of the defining properties of mental states) to the extension of 
cognitive processes that, perhaps, need not themselves display the mark 
of the mental. But in such a case there will be no reason to think that 
EMT concerns an extension of the mental in any interesting sense. Once 
more we are faced with the conclusion that EMT is not as advertised and 
reduces to EMMT. This sets the stage for the next chapter where I will, 
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by way of conclusion, review some new movements in philosophy of 
mind that open up the possibility of taking a more radical line than Clark 
suggests with regard to extending mental states, in this way exploring 
what it would take for there to be a more interesting version of EMT. 
 
Functionalism and EMT 
 
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is typically taken to be an 
internalist position—although, as I demonstrate, this is not logically 
required. Wilson, for example, points out that functionalism has had a 
large role to play in making internalism the default view of the nature of 
mind: 
 
With the rise of functionalism, the claim that mental states are realized 
in physical states of the brain became part of the received wisdom in the 
mind-body relationship. (2004: 101) 
 
He argues that the two most prevalent ways of understanding 
functionalism within cognitive science—computationally and in terms of 
analytic decomposition—are especially amenable to internalist readings 
(or individualistic readings as Wilson puts it): 
 
Computational processes, conceived as operating solely on the syntactic 
properties of mental states, have been plausibly thought to be 
individualistic and it is natural to view analytical decomposition as 
beginning with a psychological capacity, such as memory or depth 
perception, and seeking the intrinsic properties of the organism that 
create and constitute that capacity. (Ibid: 95-96) 
 
Similarly, Jackson and Pettit point out that ―it is alleged that 
functionalism is wedded to the inner picture‖ whereby ―mental processes 
are essentially inner processes‖ (1988: 382). They cite McDowell as 
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supporting such a view and indeed he suggests that functionalism might 
be the modern day replacement for Cartesian immaterialism in fulfilling 
the demand for the autonomy of the mind from the world (McDowell 
1986). Rowlands (2003b) likewise acknowledges that functionalism is 
usually understood as a form of internalism but points out that this need 
not be the case. 
 
He argues that functionalism is only wedded to internalism if we specify 
the functional roles that characterise mental states narrowly; as beginning 
and ending at the boundary of the subject (i.e. the skin). Functionalism 
defines mental states as the states that occupy certain causal roles 
between input, output and other similar states. But, as Jackson and Pettit 
(1988) argue, it is possible to specify inputs and outputs as happenings 
that are outside the skin and, in fact, they recommend adopting just such 
a strategy in order to deal with the existence of broad content. Note that if 
functionalism alone were sufficient to account for the nature of mental 
states then this broad functionalism of Jackson and Pettit would be 
sufficient to secure the extension of mental states into the world. 
 
Now, what matters, from the functionalist perspective, is simply that the 
functional role is fulfilled, not how it is filled or what fills it. In other 
words all that matters is that the job gets done and what gets it done is 
incidental. This implies that functional states are multiply realizable and 
also that functionalism should be locationally neutral with respect to what 
fills the functional role. One may adopt the position that what in fact fills 
the functional roles characteristic of mental states are internal brain 
states, but there is nothing within the pure functionalist perspective that 
requires such a move. 
 
In any case, since the publication of ‗The Extended Mind‘ in 1998 many 
have recognised that functionalism is not necessarily an internalist 
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position and the links between functionalism and the possible extension 
of mental states and cognitive processes into the world have been the 
topic of much discussion, with Sprevak even going so far as to claim that 
―functionalism entails that cognitive processes do extend in the actual 
world‖ (2009: 503). He argues for this claim by pointing out that a 
functionalism that specifies the functional identity of mental states and 
cognitive processes at a course enough level of grain to preserve the 
‗Martian intuition‘ must include counting on your fingers as a cognitive 
process and ―Otto‘s notebook…as an extended belief‖ (Ibid: 510). The 
Martian intuition is the intuition that, for any given type of human mental 
state, having a human physical and fine-grained psychological makeup is 
not necessary in order to have that state, thus allowing Martians of 
radically different physiology to be in type-identical mental states to us. 
Sprevak goes on to recommend the rejection of functionalism on the 
basis that it entails just this sort of cognitive and mental extension but in 
this he is unique among those currently writing on EMT and, as we will 
see, most hold that functionalism at least opens up the possibility of EMT 
(although we must be careful to remember that it will only do so if 
functionalism can tell the complete story about mental states). 
 
In an interesting treatment of EMT Shapiro (2007) correctly points out 
that the possibility of extending mental states and cognitive processes 
into the world must rest on a prior theory of mind. So, for example, if one 
endorses a mind/brain identity theory then the possibility of extending 
mental states beyond the limits of the brain is a non-starter. EMT must 
rest on a theory of mind that does not rule out its very possibility. Shapiro 
goes on to suggest that the dispute over the possibility of EMT ought to 
rest on a shared agreement about which theory of mind is correct:  
 
The controversy is interesting only insofar as its participants share a 
view about what minds are but disagree over how to draw the mind‘s 
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boundaries. Fortunately, many involved in the dispute seem committed 
to a common theory of mind, viz. functionalism. (Ibid: 5) 
 
Shapiro‘s contention that both sides of the debate share intuitions 
regarding a theory of mind is borne out by what is in the literature. 
Chalmers, for instance, denies that EMT requires that all mental states be 
defined (even in part) by the causal roles they play (Clark 2008b: xv), but 
does acknowledge that some measure of adherence to a functionalist 
theory of mind is required if the possibility of EMT is to be acceptable: 
 
All one needs is the very weak functionalism captured in the Parity 
Principle: roughly, if a state plays the same causal role in the cognitive 





Chalmers‘ reluctance to accept an all embracing functionalism about the 
mind comes from his intuition that functionalism about consciousness is 
implausible. This is why you will find no argument for the extension of 
consciousness in Clark and Chalmers‘ paper: ―[I]t seems far from 
plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in these cases‖ 
(1998: 10).
32
 But although Chalmers may recoil from endorsing a fully 
fledged functionalism, he does recognise that in order for mental states to 
extend in the manner argued for by EM theorists, functionalism must be 
true of at least some mental states – i.e. propositional attitudes. This 
seems to be the general consensus among those writing on the topic and 
                                               
31 Again, we must be careful to remember that this will only be the case if functionalism 
tells the whole story about mental states. For example, anyone who rejects the 
possibility of a purely syntactic theory of belief will reject the idea that there is a 
presumption of mentality in such cases. I explore this in more detail in a later section. 
32 Clark (2008) in contrast has since professed that he is tempted by a functionalist 
account of conscious mental states. But there are good reasons for thinking that qualia, 
as definitive of conscious mental states, will not functionalise and the same may be true 
of content, as definitive of propositional attitudes. I explore this in more detail in a later 
section. In ‗Spreading the Joy?‘ (2009) Clark argues against the extension of 
consciousness. 
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this is where EMT is thought to gain its hold. Clark, certainly, is firmly 
ensconced in the functionalist camp, often referring to himself as a ‗good 
old-fashioned functionalist.‘ 
 
In response to a charge by Adams and Aizawa (2007) of being a closet 
behaviourist Clark points out that his version of EMT is: ―not 
behaviourism but (extended) common sense functionalism‖ (2008b: 96). 
And when highlighting the crucial differences between embodied and 
extended accounts of cognition he argues that: 
 
 It is the tension between an extended, situated-reason (sic) friendly
 version of good old fashioned functionalism, and something more
 fundamentally fleshy: the idea that features of the body make a special
 and in some sense non-negotiable contribution to mind and mentality.
 (Ibid: 51) 
 
The tension referred to is between what Clark calls bio-chauvinism 
(expressed in this case by the thesis of the embodied mind, which accords 
a special role to the body in realizing mental states) and the functionalist 
indifference of EMT to the physical realizers of mental states. It is in this 
indifference that the appeal of functionalism for the EM theorist lies. 
According to Clark this indifference of functionalism to the nature of the 
realizer should include an indifference to the location of the realizer, i.e. 
functionalism should be locationally neutral, and this is the key feature of 
functionalism so far as EMT is concerned. 
 
As we saw in chapter three Hurley (1998b) argues that whether or not a 
state or processes is ‗central‘ and worthy of being called a mental state or 
process should be specified functionally rather than by the location of the 
process. This is what, she claims, allows her to postulate the extension of 
vehicles into the world. And although Rowlands does not explicitly 
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invoke functionalism in presenting his version of EMT, he does rely on 
the basic functionalism that is captured by the parity principle in order to 
make his argument work. As we saw in chapter 2, Rowlands argues that 
part of the requirement for a process being a cognitive process is that it 
involves the manipulation of information-bearing structures and that the 
process is essential to the completion of the cognitive task. It is irrelevant, 
on this view, where the process takes place or what the realizer of the 
process is, what matters is that the process fulfils the functional role that 
contributes to the completion of the cognitive task in question. 
 
Adams and Aizawa also recognise the reliance that the arguments of the 
EM theorist have on functionalism and although they reject EMT as an 
empirical fact they endorse functionalism and consequently recognise 
that the characterisation of cognitive processes in terms of functional role 
leads to the extension of the realizers of those roles as a logical 
possibility: 
 
The multiple instantiability of functional categories is a familiar element 
in contemporary cognitive science. Applying this to our rather orthodox 
conception of the mark of the cognitive, one might think that non-
derived representations and the sorts of functional processes that are 
found in the brain might also be instantiated in systems that cross the 
boundaries of the brain. One might think, therefore, that for all the 
proposed conditions on the mark of the cognitive show, transcranial 
cognition is a live possibility. We agree with this line. Transcranial 
cognition is a live possibility. Our view is simply that, as a matter or 
boring contingent empirical fact, transcranial and extracranial cognition 
are not commonplace. (Adams & Aizawa 2001: 60) 
 
Adams and Aizawa‘s mark of the cognitive is, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, non-derived content. However, although it is clear that for 
propositional attitudes content is the defining feature, it is possible to 
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specify cognitive processes non-intentionally such that it is at least 
debatable as to whether or not non-derived content is also the mark of the 
cognitive. If so then a pure functionalist account of cognitive processes 
may be possible, in which case it may be correct to say that transcranial 
cognition is a live possibility. However, if non-derived content is the 
mark of the mental it is difficult to see how the same could be true for 
mental states since functionalism will only give us a partial account. 
 
Daniel Weiskopf takes a similar line to Adams and Aizawa and 
highlights the derivation of the arguments for EMT from functionalism, 
pointing out that the arguments of Clark and Chalmers in particular are 
clearly dependent on the pure functionalist principle that what makes 
something a mental state is the functional role that it plays, regardless of 
its location. Weiskopf points out that this principle is: ―no more than the 
elementary functionalist tenet that to be a belief is just to play the 
causal/functional role of belief.‖ (2008: 266) but it should be emphasised 
that there are not many who would endorse this pure functionalist 
account of propositional attitudes, recognising that the essential 
contentful aspect of propositional attitudes is not amenable to 
functionalist explanation. Nonetheless, Weiskopf argues against the 
internalist tradition, which has it that the realizers of the causal/functional 
role of a belief (or indeed of any mental state) are internal, that the 
possibility of more exotic realizers of mental states is a live one: 
 
Unusual realizers are a staple of the functionalist literature. The hybrids 
described by advocates of extended minds differ only in lying outside of 
the normal brain-body system… [I]n itself it is simply an instance of an 
unusual realization of a mental state, and thus a fixture familiar to 
functionalists. So there is a sense in which the extended mind thesis 
should not be seen as especially radical. Functionalists have all along 
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been committed to the possibility of extrabodily states playing the role 
of beliefs and desires.
33
 (Ibid: 266-267) 
 
The links between functionalism and EMT are well established in the 
literature then. But there is more than one version of functionalism and 
we can question which version of functionalism is most amenable to the 
purposes of the EM theorist. As we saw above, Clark advertises that his 
EMT is extended commonsense or analytic functionalism. 
 
Commonsense functionalism must be distinguished from empirical (or 
psycho) functionalism, a distinction that Clark (2008b) credits to 
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007). On the commonsense functionalist 
view, we attribute a particular mental state, such as the belief that the 
museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street, based on common, or folk, 
knowledge about mental states; on what causes actions, given certain 
perceptual inputs and assumptions concerning certain other of the 
individual‘s mental states. For example, Otto hears about an exhibition at 
the Museum of Modern Art (the perceptual input), forms a desire to see it 
(mental state) which relates to other mental states, i.e. beliefs, hopes, etc., 
such that he forms the intention to go to the exhibition and this causes 
him to set off in the direction of 53
rd
 street (action). On the commonsense 
view we would not hesitate under these conditions to attribute the belief 
that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street to Otto. This 
commonsense functionalism has it, then, that to believe that the Museum 
of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street is to be in a state of mind that plays the 
belief-role in this complex network of states. Since playing this sort of 
role in the theoretical network is what conceptually defines ‗belief‘ this 
view is also referred to as analytic functionalism. Analytic functionalism 
looks to the commonsense mental state ascriptions of the folk and says 
                                               
33 Once more, this last sentence is true only for someone who endorses a pure 
functionalist account of mental states and there are not many (any?) who do. 
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that mental states are those entities that fill the functional roles 
characteristic of these explanations. This is, as Clark (2008b) points out, a 
rather course-grained functionalism about mental states—we can and do 
attribute mental states in a way that abstracts away from the 
implementational details of what realizes them and being pitched at this 
level of abstraction is what makes commonsense functionalism ideal for 
the purposes of the EM theorist. 
 
In contrast, empirical functionalism claims that mental states are: ―just 
those entities with just those properties, postulated by the best scientific 
explanation of human behavior‖ (Levin 2009). This empirical 
functionalism may also make use of our commonsense folk-psychological 
mental state ascriptions but not as providing a full course-grained account 
of what is required to fill the particular functional role of a mental state. 
Instead, empirical functionalism might use commonsense mental state 
ascriptions merely as a starting point for a more fine-grained analysis of 
the functionally defined mental state. Thus, while one could use 
commonsense ascriptions initially to pick out potential candidates for 
scientific investigation the aim of this sort of functionalism is to discover, 
scientifically, what the nature of putative mental states really are. This is 
not thought to be fixed by a commonsense theory; it is not folk 
psychology that defines our understanding mental state concepts on this 
view. So, even if common sense might initially enable us to pick out 
mental states by targeting things that play such and such a role (i.e. the 
role of pain) our conceptual understanding of such mental states is 
determined wholly by the outcome of empirical investigation. Scientific 
enquiry will discover what pains are and exactly how they function in the 
mental economy of particular species according to the empirical 
functionalism. Thus, it will be an empirical matter to discover just what 
the role of pain is in humans and what plays that role (e.g. it may be that 
to be in pain to have one‘s C-fibres firing in such and such a way, for 
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example). It is the business of science to discover exactly what role pain 
plays and what exactly happens to play that role on this view. 
 
Thus, one can advocate an empirical functionalism that does not take the 
common sense mental state attributions of the folk very seriously at all. 
Such a view allows that we may discover things about mentality that are 
quite radically at odds with our everyday intuitions about the properties 
of the mind and opens the possibility that our commonsense mental state 
ascriptions do not in any way accurately describe the ontology of the 
mind, e.g. there may be no such things as beliefs and desires (cf. 
Churchland 1981). 
 
Because, prima facie, empirical functionalism takes a more fine-grained 
stance on what it is for two states to be functionally similar, than the 
more course-grained approach of analytic functionalism that abstracts 
away from the implementational details, it has been argued that the 
methodology of empirical functionalism leaves it open to the charge of 
chauvinism (i.e. it would not licence what Sprevak calls the Martian 
intuition, cf. Block 1980). Empirical functionalism may not be as liberal 
in its attributions of mentality as analytic functionalism, which would 
seem to make analytic functionalism a better candidate for the purposes 
of the EM theorists. But there is also an additional worry here that the 
empirical functionalist theories of our psychology may move away from 
the belief/desire explanation of action that characterises the mental 
attributions of the folk such that ―it will be hard to take psycho-functional 
theories as providing an account of our mental states, rather than merely 
changing the subject‖ (Levin 2009). Given that Clark is seeking an 
account that can extend propositional attitudes into the world it seems 
that an empirical functionalist account of mind, which may not even 
licence the commonsense mental state attributions of the folk, is not the 
way to go. This is not to say that a pure empirical functionalist account of 
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mind could not licence the extension of realizers into the world, rather the 
point is that we may find that the best scientific explanation of our 
psychology does not include such things as the beliefs and desires that 
Clark seeks to extend. 
 
The appeal to Clark, then, of commonsense functionalism is first of all 
that it allows him to attribute the belief that the Museum of Modern Art is 
located on 53
rd
 street to Otto. If what it means to believe that the Museum 
of Modern Art is located on 53
rd
 street is simply to go towards 53
rd
 street 
after hearing of a new exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art given a 
desire to see this exhibition, then, on this view, Otto has this belief. On 
this view the fact that Otto fulfils the necessary commonsense functional 
role is all that is required to attribute the belief to Otto: 
  
It is the course or common-sense functional role that, on this model 
(unlike that of empirical functionalism), displays what is essential to the 
mental state in question. (Clark 2008b: 89, emphasis mine). 
 
But if the EM theorist is to argue not only that Otto believes that the 
Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street but also that Otto‘s belief 
extends into the world, then he must enquire as to what in reality realizes 
this functional role. 
  
[W]e may go on to seek a much more fine-grained description of the 
actual flow of processing and representation in the (possibly extended) 
physical array that realizes the course functional role itself. (Ibid: 88-
89) 
 
It is a further question, then, as to what realizes this course functional 
role; a question that is to be answered by empirical investigation. Clark‘s 
argument is that empirical investigation will reveal that external 
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information-bearing structures such as Otto‘s notebook are often essential 
components of the realizer. If analytic functionalism is correct and mental 
states are multiply realizable then there is no reason to restrict empirical 
investigations to locations within the brain or body. Instead, we should 
also examine the external environment in order to ascertain if some 
external feature makes an essential contribution to realizing this 
particular mental state. If this turns out to be the case then functionalism 
demands that we accord it ‗fair treatment‘ (Sprevak 2009) and designate 
it as part of the realizer of that mental state. If some internal feature 
played the role we would not hesitate to label it as part of the realizer of a 
mental state. This is the message of the Parity Principle. 
 
However, it is not clear that the extension of part of the realizer of a 
mental state will be sufficient to secure the extension of the mental state 
into the world. The claim here is not that the complete realizer must be 
externally located in order for mental states to extend (this would be the 
External rather than Extended Mind), rather the claim is that if the 
realizer of the functional role of a belief can account only for the 
attitudinal aspect and not the content and if the content remains internal 
(as Clark concedes) then in what sense do we really have a case for the 
extension of a mental state into the world as opposed to a further case for 
the extension of processing into the world that Clark wants to move 
beyond?  
 
The question for Clark, then, is in what sense does he think that the 
commonsense role displays what is essential to the mental state? If he 
means that fulfilling the functional role characteristic of the mental state 
is necessary for the attribution of the mental state then he is not likely to 
meet much opposition with regard to this claim but nor will he secure the 
extension of mental states into the world. If, on the other hand, he means 
that fulfilling the functional role characteristic of the mental state is 
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sufficient for the attribution of the mental state then he is no longer 
talking about the extension of propositional attitudes and will meet 
substantial resistance. In the next section I look in more detail at the 
typical functionalist account of mental states to demonstrate why this 
should be the case. 
 
Functionalism and Mental States 
 
A good way of getting at an account of how functionalism characterises 
mental states is to approach via its historical antecedent; behaviourism. 
According to behaviourism when we say that a person is in a particular 
mental state what we mean, roughly, is that the person acts or is disposed 
to act in a certain way given a certain stimulus. In this way behaviourism 
offers a basic stimulus-response model to explain human action; defining 
mentality without ‗the inner‘ thus denying, in the process, the reality and 
so the causal efficacy of mental states (Lewis 1966). On this view the 
actions of an individual can be explained entirely by reference to various 
inputs. 
 
Behaviourism abandoned the idea that mentality is essentially linked to 
the first-person perspective, which had dominated philosophy of mind up 
to that point. Private, inner states of the sort postulated by dualism are, 
according to the behaviourist, anathema to the project of making 
psychology into a respectable science. Because non-physical mental 
states are not observable they are not measureable and so should have no 
place in a scientific psychology. So, on one behaviourist account what it 
means to be in a certain mental state is to behave or act in a certain way 
(or to be disposed to) in response to certain stimuli. Such responding 
could be highly complex and multi-tracked. Thus one way to be in pain is 
to jump or scream or wince (or all three of the above) when poked with a 
hot needle, say. On this account, understanding what it is to be in pain 
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would require an understanding of all the various ways one might react to 
various stimuli. On another, slightly different, behaviourist account; that 
a person is in pain is made contingently true or false by how that person 
responds or is disposed to respond given the ‗poked with a hot needle‘ 
stimulus. In either case the behaviourist does not require the postulation 
of internal mental states to explain what it is to be in pain, or what it is to 
believe that p. 
 
Behaviourism is criticised for ignoring the ‗intractable residue‘ of 
consciousness by failing to do justice to the reality of the inner. But, more 
significantly perhaps, behaviourism received widespread criticism 
because a complete behavioural analysis of certain mental state 
ascriptions cannot be given without appeal to some other mental state 
ascription. So, for example, a belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 
53
rd
 street cannot properly be accounted for in behaviourist terms 
because without some other mental state, such as a desire to see the 
exhibition currently on display at the Museum of Modern Art, there will 
be no action. Beliefs, on their own, are not sufficient to cause action; 
there must be some accompanying desire. The behaviourist‘s attempts to 
characterise mental state ascriptions by reference to stimuli and 
behaviour alone, without reference to other mental states is, then: ―either 
circular or radically incomplete as analyses of the mental generally‖ 
(Lycan & Prinz 2008: 4). 
 
Functionalism was proposed in part as a solution to this dilemma of 
trying to balance the scientific requirement for verifiability with the need 
to appeal to mental states in order to justify certain mental state 
ascriptions. Instead of focusing solely on the inputs and the outputs—the 
stimuli and the responses—analytic functionalism postulated that the folk 
posit the existence of a set of theoretical states between the inputs and the 
outputs. This theory assumes the reality and causal efficacy of mental 
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states and that these are investigable by science. In this way 
functionalism sought to tackle the problem of making psychology into a 
respectable scientific endeavour, not by denying the reality of mental 
states but by viewing commonsense mental state attribution as the 
postulation of theoretical entities that come between the input of 
perception and the output of behaviour. Inner mental states provide the 
meat in the sandwich between the stimulus and the response. 
 
It is commonly taken that there are two main sources of inspiration for 
this functionalist characterisation of inner mental states. The first of these 
is computer science where the distinction between the hardware and 
software was seen as a potentially useful aid for understanding the 
relationship between mind and body and the second is a view about the 
nature of theoretical terms as expressed by David Lewis, which he 
applied to commonsense mental state ascription. It is this latter 
inspiration for functionalism that I focus on since it is commonsense, 
analytic functionalism that Clark espouses. 
 
Lewis held that theoretical terms were defined implicitly by the theories 
in which they were introduced because they are definable by reference to 
the causal roles they occupy within the theory (1972). Lewis invites us to 
think of commonsense mental state ascription in just this way. On this 
view mental state predicates like belief and desire are theoretical terms 
that have been introduced within this folk-scientific theory in order to 
explain the actions of individuals. And, like theoretical terms in general, 
the theoretical terms of this folk theory are definable, says Lewis, in 
functional terms by reference to their causal roles. So, folk psychology 
associates each mental state with a typical causal role and in this way folk 
psychological explanations concern the causal efficacy of mental states 
by stating, with reference to its relations with various inputs and other 
mental states, what behaviour the state in question is likely to cause. 
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Because the folk engage in this practice of explaining actions by means 
of appeal to mental predicates such as beliefs and desires, they are said to 
be committed in some sense to the existence of beliefs and desires as 
theoretical entities. 
 
It may seem as if the attempt to explain mental states functionally in this 
way is circular, since the explanation of any mental state requires 
reference to at least one other mental state and so presupposes other 
mental states. But Lewis‘ idea is that we can simultaneously define all 
mental states at once in non-mental terms by ultimately substituting the 
theoretical, or T-terms (i.e. the mental state terms like beliefs, desires 
etc.), with terms of another, non-mental, vocabulary.  
 
In order to do this Lewis advises us to: ―Collect all the platitudes you can 
think of regarding the causal relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, 
and motor responses‖ (1972: 226), and combine them into one long 
sentence that Lewis calls the ‗postulate‘ of our folk psychological theory. 
We can give an example of what Lewis has in mind with the Otto case 
that we have been looking at. The postulate of the belief/desire pair 
regarding the Museum of Modern Art for Otto might look something like 
this: 
 
When Otto has a desire to see the Dali exhibition currently on display at 
the Museum of Modern Art and Otto has a belief that the Museum of 
Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street he will walk towards 53
rd
 street and when 
Otto has a desire to see the Dali exhibition currently on display at the 
Museum of Modern Art and Otto does not have a belief that the 
Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd





   
 
                                               
34 This sentence does not properly characterise this particular belief/desire pair in its 
entirety but it is sufficient to illustrate the idea. 
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We can see immediately that the sentence consists of several of what 
Lewis would call T-terms, like the desire to see the Dali exhibition and 
the belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street. It also consists 
of other terms that Lewis calls O-terms. An O-term is any term other than 
a T-term, a term that was already in use and understood before the advent 
of the new theory T and its T-terms. The idea is that we can replace the 
T-terms in the postulate with variables and hold onto the O-terms 
enabling us, eventually, to describe the T-terms in language that does not 
make use of mental state terms. 
 
So, we can re-write the postulate of our theory as follows with the T-
terms replaced by variables in the following manner: 
 
When Otto has x1 and has x2 he will walk towards 53
rd
 street and when 




What we have here is a two-place predicate that we can call our theory, 
T, and the T-terms of T are the desire to see the Dali exhibition and the 
belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street, represented by the 
variables x1 and x2 respectively. If the first sentence above is our theory, 
T, then we can re-write the postulate of our theory as: T(desire to see the 
Dali exhibition, belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street), 
or with the variables in place of the T-terms as: T(x1,x2). We can now 
write the Ramsey sentence for our theory T, which would look something 
like the following: 
 
 (x1)(x2) T(x1,x2) 
 
And which says that there exist two things, call them x1 and x2 
respectively, such that if Otto has x1 and Otto has x2 and Otto hears of a 




street etc. This demonstrates, says Lewis, how our theory, T, is 
committed to the existence of entities like beliefs that the Museum of 
Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street and desires to see a Dali exhibition. Lewis 
explores the modified Ramsey sentence and modified Carnap sentence of 
folk psychological theory but that need not concern us here for the point 
is made; on the commonsense or analytic functionalist view, attributing 
mental states as explanations of action commits one to the existence of 
entities such as beliefs and desires.  
 
Lewis argues that our complete folk psychological theory can be given 
the same treatment as our theory regarding Otto‘s belief/desire pair and 
so the T-terms of our folk psychological theory—the various beliefs, 
desires, feelings, and experiences—can be functionally defined in terms 
of their causal roles and the variables (standing in for the mental state 
terms) can eventually be replaced by terms from some other vocabulary, 
possibly those of neuroscience. Thus, what we have been looking at here 
is really only stage one of the project for Lewis. 
 
[I]t is possible in principle to replace the free variables (standing for 
mental state terms) with terms in some other vocabulary standing for 
non-mental phenomena. Thus the stage one work of collecting and 
analyzing folk platitudes is a prelude to determining what, if anything, 
in the natural world (e.g. as identified by neuroscience or physics) might 
play the sorts of network roles of the mental states identified by the folk 
theory. (Hutto, forthcoming) 
 
So, according to Lewis if we define a particular mental state in terms of 
its causal role and we can identify a neural state as fulfilling or realizing 
this causal role then a particular neural state will be token identical with a 
particular mental state in some instances: 
 
Mental state M = the occupant of the causal role R (by definition of M). 
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Neural state N = the occupant of the causal role R (by the physiological 
theory). 
 Mental state M = neural state N (by transitivity of =). (Lewis 1972:
 249) 
 
Though we may identify the token mental state with the neural state that 
happens to occupy the causal role R on a particular occasion we must be 
careful not to endorse the sort of bio-chauvinism that Clark argues 
commonsense functionalism is supposed to avoid. Although Lewis 
argues that any causal role R identified by the definition of any Mental 
state M may as a matter of fact be occupied by a particular neural state, 
he is not committed to identifying mental states with neural states, and 
acknowledges the multiple realizability of mental states: 
 
In general, or in the case of a given species, or in the case of a given 
person, it might turn out that the causal roles definitive of mental states 
are occupied by different neural (or other) states in different organisms. 
(Ibid: 285) 
 
Thus, functionalism affords the opportunity to token identify the mental 
state with whatever happens on some occasion to realize the causal role 
definitive of the mental state. However, to emphasise the point, what it is 
to be in a particular mental state is solely given by the causal role on 
Lewis‘ account: 
 
[T]he definitive characteristic of any experience as such is its causal 
role. The definitive causal role of an experience is expressible by a 
finite set of conditions that specify its typical effects under various 
circumstances. By analytic necessity these conditions are jointly true of 
the experience and jointly distinctive of it. (Lewis 1966: 19-20) 
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In this way Lewis sees causal role as capturing what is essential to be a 
certain kind of mental state. So long as some physical realization state 
can fulfil the conditions for occupying this causal role then it is a mental 
state and whatever it is that occupies this causal role in a given instance is 
to be identified with the mental state. Clark and Chalmers appear to 
endorse both of these sentiments. Remember Chalmers‘ statement that: 
―if a state plays the same causal role in the cognitive network as a mental 
state, then there is a presumption of mentality‖ (Clark 2008b: xv, 
emphasis mine) and Clark‘s statement that: ―It is the course or common-
sense functional role that, on this model displays what is essential to the 
mental state in question. (Ibid: 89, emphasis mine) 
 
The question here, however, that I flagged in the previous section is what 
exactly Clark (and Lewis) means by ‗essential‘. If he means that a 
complete account of propositional attitudes can be given solely in terms 
of causal role then he is ignoring content, which most would agree is the 
more important story that needs to be told with regard to propositional 
mental states. But this appears to be the strategy since, for Clark, what 
determines the attribution of a particular mental state to Otto, or anyone 
else for that matter, is that the functional role definitive of that mental 
state is occupied. This licenses, says Clark, the ascription of the same 
belief, the belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street to both 
Otto and Inga, since the ascription of this belief is said to depend on the 
role that the information plays for each of them, independently of 
however this information might be realized.  
 
Clark and Chalmers also appear to endorse Lewis‘ position on token 
identifying the mental state with whatever realizes the functional role on 
a particular occasion since they argue that should the realizer of the belief 
ascribed to Otto extend beyond the boundaries of the organism then the 
mental state ascribed to Otto also extends. This strategy is nicely captured 
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by Rupert, who gives what he thinks might be a typical argument for 
EMT that is based on functionalism:  
 
P1: A mental state of kind F is realized by whatever physical state plays
 the functional role that is characteristic (or metaphysically
 individuative) of F. 
P2: Some realizations of functional mental state kinds have physical
 components external to the organism. 
P3: A mental state extends to or includes all components of its
 realization. 
C: Therefore, some mental states extend beyond the boundaries of the
 organism. (2004: 34) 
 
This strategy is a sound one provided that P3 is true. However, as I have 
flagged in the course of this chapter and as we will see in more detail in 
the next section, there are good reasons to think that this is not the case 
since there are questions as to whether or not the functionalist account of 
mental states captures all that is definitive of the mental. In particular, if 
non-derived content is the mark of the mental (and, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, Clark seems willing to concede) then in what sense can 
the truly mental be said to extend if non-derived content is internal? The 
EM theorist also faces a related problem in that distinguishing what is 
constitutive of the realizer of a mental state from what merely enables the 
realizer by making an essential causal contribution may be problematic. It 
is to this problem that I turn next. 
 
EMT and Mental States 
 
The EMT account of extended mental states as explicated by Clark and 
Chalmers has it that the location of the realizer of the functional role that 
is characteristic of a particular mental state determines the location of that 
mental state. But anyone wishing to make such a claim faces a problem in 
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identifying the extent of the realizer of the functional role. Although 
Shapiro points out that arguments about EMT are interesting only insofar 
as both sides of the debate presuppose functionalism, he argues 
ultimately that ―functionalism is the wrong perspective from which to 
judge the merits of the extended cognition program‖ (2007: 6). The 
reason Shapiro thinks that this is the case helps to highlight a possible 
explanation as to why the EMT debate has begun to stagnate recently: 
functionalism makes arguments for or against EMT too easy. This is 
because functionalism is ―ill-equipped to answer a boundary problem that 
confronts decisions about the extent of a property‘s realization‖ (Ibid.).  
 
The boundary problem as described by Shapiro is that functional 
descriptions do not facilitate a distinction between the realizer of a 
particular functional role and mere causal contributors to, or enablers of, 
the realizer of a particular functional role. If Shapiro is correct in this then 
even if the extension of the realizer of the functional role definitive of a 
mental state were sufficient to ensure the extension of that mental state 
there would be no fact of the matter, from the functionalist perspective 
alone, that could identify the extent of the realizer. 
 
On reflection, it is not surprising that functionalism is ill-equipped to 
resolve the questions that the boundary problem raises. Functionalism 
prescribes a way to individuate kinds or properties. However, the 
functional roles that define functional kinds or properties do not provide 
direction for distinguishing those parts of a system that realize a 
particular functional role from those parts of a system that causally 
contribute to the realizer‘s capacity to fill a particular functional role. 
(Ibid: 11) 
 
We can better illustrate Shapiro‘s point with an example. We can 
distinguish the heart, as a functionally defined entity, from the heart qua 
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structural organ located in the chest—what you give/receive when you 
are involved in a heart transplant. Shapiro labels hearts as functionally 
defined entities; heartsf and hearts as structural organs; heartss – arguing 
that with regard to heartsf we can identify several different and equally 
legitimate potential realizers. 
 
The functional role that heartf defines is, according to Shapiro, something 
like: that which pumps blood through the body. Thus, one possible 
candidate, and perhaps the most obvious one, is a token of heartss. But 
although a hearts may be the most obvious realizer for a heartf it is not 
the only potential realizer. A hearts cannot perform its function without 
arteries, veins, and capillaries that carry the blood around the body. Why 
not specify the realizer of heartf as a token of hearts plus these blood 
vessels since they have an essential role to play in the fulfilling of the 
functional role definitive of a heart? Clark and Chalmers argue, in much 
the same way, that Otto‘s notebook has an essential role to play in 
fulfilling the functional role definitive of the belief that the Museum of 
Modern Art is on 53rd Street. 
 
Alternatively, one could also move in the opposite direction with respect 
to the specification of the extent of the realizer of a heartf. Oxygenated 
blood from the lungs enters the hearts at the left atrium and is 
subsequently pumped through the body from the left ventricle. De-
oxygenated blood that has already been circulated around the body re-
enters the heart at the right atrium and is pumped to the lungs for re-
oxygenation by the right ventricle. Thus, if the functional role of a heartf 
is to pump blood through the body one could specify the left ventricle as 
the realization of a heartf with the other three chambers of the heart 
providing a necessary causal contribution, or enabling role, with regard to 
the left ventricle fulfilling its function. 
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From the functionalist perspective alone, each realization of heartf seems 
equally valid. Further considerations, from medical science or our 
evolutionary history for example, may ultimately resolve the issue but 
there is nothing within the functional definition of a heart that will settle 
the matter. Shapiro argues that the same holds with regard to functional 
definitions of mental states. 
 
Clark and Chalmers‘ assurance that a sentence in Otto‘s notebook is a 
realization of one of his memories, rather than a causal contributor to 
something in Otto‘s brain that might be a better candidate for the 
memory‘s realizer, at least requires further support. For present 
purposes, the fact that functionalism does not resolve the realization 
question is enough. (Ibid: 12) 
 
Clark and Chalmers could argue that because it is Otto‘s dispositional 
belief that extends in virtue of the location of the relevant sentence in his 
notebook means that the matter may not be as straightforward as Shapiro 
argues. They point out that in order for us to attribute the dispositional 
belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street to Inga it is not 
required that she has that belief as an occurrent mental state. All that is 
required for us to attribute this dispositional belief to her is that she 
would be disposed to act in an appropriate manner with respect to 53
rd
 
Street given a desire to go the Museum of Modern Art—that the belief 
would become occurrent in the appropriate circumstance, if you will. On 
this account a dispositional belief is viewed as something like a static 
piece of encoded information that is poised in storage to guide action as 
and when required. Clark and Chalmers would argue that the sentence in 
Otto‘s notebook plays exactly this role for Otto and if we attribute the 
dispositional belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street to 
Inga, then we must also be willing to attribute the same dispositional 
belief to Otto. 
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However, it is far from clear that this argument will be sufficient to 
secure the extension of Otto‘s belief. To see why consider that for Otto, 
the proximal cause of his action is the internal representation of the 
sentence that he reads in his notebook, not the sentence in the notebook 
itself. If Otto doesn‘t read the sentence and he doesn‘t understand it then 
he won‘t act. His access to the notebook might very well be, as Clark and 
Chalmers argue, automatic and subpersonal in just the same way as 
Inga‘s access to her memories is but this does not mean that Otto doesn‘t 
represent the contents of the notebook internally. Thus, for Otto, the 
proximal cause of his action is an internal state, and we have no reason to 
attribute the dispositional belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 
Street to Otto even though we may here reasonably attribute the occurrent 
belief to Otto that the Museum of Modern Art is located on 53
rd
 street 
after he has consulted the notebook. 
 
One principled difference between the Otto and the Inga cases, then, 
seems to be that for Inga the passive, stored information on the basis of 
which we attribute the dispositional belief that the Museum of Modern 
Art is on 53
rd
 street to her is poised to be the proximal cause of her 
behaviour. For Otto this is not the case; the sentence in Otto‘s notebook 
gives rise to an internal state, a representation of the sentence in his 
notebook, which is the proximal cause of his action. Thus, we have no 
reason to regard the sentence in Otto‘s notebook as a constitutive part of 
the realizer of Otto‘s belief as distinct from the sentence making an 
essential causal contribution to the realization of Otto‘s belief, which is 
internal. 
 
We also have no reason, then, to regard Clark and Chalmers‘ argument as 
being for EMT as distinct from EMMT. The problem, from the EM 
theorists‘ perspective, as pointed out by Shapiro, is that functionalism 
alone cannot provide the means by which to rule in favour of either of the 
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two positions. Thus making arguments for or against EMT as based on 
functionalism alone, too easy. We have been given no good reason, other 
than the indifference of functionalism to both the nature and extent of the 
realizers of mental states, to regard Otto‘s belief as extended. But, as we 
have discovered, we have at least equally good reason to deny the 
dispositional belief that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street to 
Otto and to limit the extent of the realizer of his occurrent belief on just 
these same grounds. As we will see there are further points to tell in 
favour of just such a move, but for present purposes it is sufficient to note 
that there is nothing within the functionalist perspective alone that can 
adjudicate on the extent of the realizer of a mental state. As Shapiro 
argues, functionalism is the wrong perspective from which to judge the 
merits of the EM theorists‘ arguments. 
 
Even if Clark could secure the extension of the realizer of Otto‘s belief in 
manner that he requires it is not clear that even this would be sufficient to 
secure the extension of Otto‘s belief into the world. This is because 
functionalism, quite apart from being ill-equipped to settle the boundary 
problem with regard the realization of a mental state, is inadequate 
insofar as a complete characterisation of the nature of the genuinely 
mental is concerned. 
 
Although functionalism in many ways improves on behaviourism it does 
not seem clear that functionalism is necessarily better placed to make 
sense of what are commonly taken to be the special and essential 
properties of the mental. As we saw in earlier sections a pure 
commonsense functionalist account of mental states specifies that what it 
is to be a certain mental state is nothing more than to fulfil a particular 
causal role. But specifying the functional role alone is not considered 
sufficient to explain the paradigmatically mental properties, viz. 
qualitative experience, and intentionality. 
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For example, if qualia are wholly definitive of consciousness and wholly 
non-functional then there will be no extension of consciousness as based 
on the extension of whatever realizes functional role. Consider the 
possible functional definition of pain that we considered briefly earlier in 
the chapter. If what it is to be in pain is something like to believe that as a 
result of injury, there is something wrong with the body, to desire to no 
longer be in that state, to move away from the cause of the injury so as to 
minimize damage, and to moan and possibly cry, then on a purely 
functionalist account of mental states it is possible to be in the functional 
state of having pain without the usual attendant qualitative content—pain 
without the sensation of pain. It seems, then, that functionalism on its 
own is not sufficient to account for the qualitative content of mental 
states, which raises the question of in what sense functionalism is 
correctly characterising mental states at all (cf. Block 1980). 
 
It does not…seem entirely unreasonable to suggest that nothing would 
be a token of the type "pain state" unless it felt like a pain, and that this 
would be true even if it were connected to all the other psychological 
states of the organism in whatever ways pains are. (Block & Fodor 
1972: 172) 
 
But the arguments of the EM theorists that we have been looking at do 
not argue for the extension of qualitative experiences into the world. And, 
indeed, in Clark and Chalmers‘ original paper it is explicitly stated that 
this variety of mental state may not be amenable to EMT in the same way 
as propositional attitudes. Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that there 
is no qualitative content for at least some propositional attitudes, 
particularly beliefs: ―beliefs are not inner feelings whose causal links are 
available to introspection‖ (Jackson & Pettit 1988: 387, emphasis mine). 
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Thus, the problem of accounting for qualitative content may not be one 
that touches the propositional attitudes that the EM theorist seeks to 
extend. Be that as it may, qualitative content is just one of the properties 
that are paradigmatic of mental states. The other is intentional content, 
and this is also argued to be problematic for the purely functionalist 
account of mental states. 
 
Anyone who rejects the possibility of a purely syntactic theory of beliefs 
will reject the idea that there is nothing more to believing that the 
Museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 Street other than fulfilling the requisite 
causal role. If content is wholly definitive of propositional attitudes and 
will not functionalise then there will be no extension of content as based 
on the extension of whatever realizes functional role. And if propositional 
attitudes can be partly defined in terms of functional role and if part of 
the functional aspects extend then we still don‘t have extended mental 
states since what is definitive of mental states, what distinguishes them 
from the rest of the world would still be internal.  
 
Clark is happy to stick with wholly functional characterisations of mental 
states when presenting his EMT but when challenged he argues that he 
can allow that non-derived content is the mark of the mental and that it is 
internal and still have his extension of mental states into the world. This 
is, prima facie, a strange position to adopt given his claims active 
externalism should be viewed as: ―more like an environmentally 
extended case of narrow content than a case of broad content‖ (Clark, 
forthcoming). It is also strange because at no stage in his argument does 
Clark present a case for extended narrow content. The only way to 
reconcile this statement with the arguments Clark presents would be to 
say that he thinks a purely functional account of narrow content is 
possible. But he gives us no reason to think that this should be the case. 
And when challenged on the issue of content by Adams and Aizawa he 
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retreats to the claim that although non-derived content may be internal 
the functional aspects of mental states extend. 
 
The point is not that functionalism is a dead end with regard to the 
possibility of giving an account of the nature of mental states, rather, the 
point is that functionalism on its own cannot do justice to the 
paradigmatically mental properties; content and qualia. As Adams and 
Aizawa point out, there is more to mentality than passing the Turing test. 
Thus, as Block (1980) argues, specifying or seeking to account for mental 
states in terms of causal role alone, as Clark and Chalmers do, leads to 
liberalism with the attribution of mentality. If fulfilling a certain causal 
role is all that there is to being in a particular mental state then mentality 
will be attributed to things/processes/states that are undeserving of it. 
This is why functionalism is thought to require supplementation with a 
representational theory of mind.  
 
Thus, even if the EM theorist could secure the extension of the realizer 
into the world such that the sentence in Otto‘s notebook was not just an 
enabler of the realizer of his mental state but a constituent part of it, it is 
not clear that the extension of the realizer would secure an extension of 
the mental in any interesting sense unless the extension of the realizer 
entailed an extension of content. But if non-derived content is the mark of 
the mental and if formal, physical properties alone and the relations 
between them are not sufficient so far as a complete characterisation of 
mental states is concerned, since they cannot secure the contentful 
properties of mental states, then it is not clear how the extension of these 
formal, physical properties could be sufficient to secure an extension of 
the mental in any interesting sense. The EM theorist owes us a theory of 
content then, and not only that, he owes us an explanation of how this 
(narrow) content can be said to extend into the world. Without this, 
arguments for the extension of the realizer of Otto‘s belief into the world 
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are arguments for the extension of ―mere processing‖ and by Clark and 
Chalmers‘ own account, not sufficient to secure an extension of the mind 
into the world. 
 
In the previous section we noted Rupert‘s characterisation of the EM 
theorist‘s argument as based on functionalism. 
 
P1: A mental state of kind F is realized by whatever physical state plays
 the functional role that is characteristic (or metaphysically
 individuative) of F. 
P2: Some realizations of functional mental state kinds have physical
 components external to the organism. 
P3: A mental state extends to or includes all components of its
 realization. 
C: Therefore, some mental states extend beyond the boundaries of the
 organism. (2004: 34) 
 
Rupert argues that neither the commonsense characterisation of mental 
states nor a version of psychofunctionalism can be made to accord with 
premise two of this argument. He may well be correct in this but, 
nonetheless, my argument is that the EM theorist faces a real problem 
with regard to premise 3. EM theorists focus exclusively on extending the 
formal, physical properties of the realizer of mental states but this will 
not be enough to secure an extension of the mental in any interesting 
sense. 
 
Without the addition of a representational theory of mind to Clark‘s 
extended functionalism we have no reason to regard the specified 
extended realization as capturing what is essential to the mental state—its 
content—and with the representational theory of mind on board, we have 
no reason to think that the realization extends to include the notebook. At 
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best, then, the sentence in Otto‘s notebook has a special enabling role to 
play in the realization of Otto‘s occurrent belief. Without the sentence in 
the notebook there will be no (53
rd
 Street directed) action, but this is the 
same thing as saying that there would be no blood pumped throughout the 
body without the contribution of the blood vessels, this does not entail 
that the blood vessels are constitutive parts of the realizer of a heart. The 
functionalist characterisation of a heart does not provide the means by 
which to settle the extent of the heart‘s realizer. Likewise, a pure 
functionalist characterisation of a belief that the Museum of Modern Art 
is on 53
rd
 Street does not provide the means by which to settle the extent 
of the state‘s realizer. Here, other factors, such as the requirement to 
provide an account of the non-derived content that individuates the 
mental state, would seem to settle the matter in the internalists favour. 
Thus, there is a dilemma for the EM theorist; either his claim is that all 
there is to being a mental state is that it fulfils a certain functional role, in 
which case he is endorsing a form of functionalism that is overly liberal 
in awarding mentality to states that may not possess non-derived content; 
or he is endorsing non-derived content as the Mark of the Mental, in 
which case he has provided no reason to think that mental states extend. 
 
EMT and Cognitive Processes 
 
The EM theorist could retreat at this point from claims made regarding 
the extension of mental states into the world to the ones concerning the 
extension of cognitive processes only. But this strategy will only work 
provided that Adams and Aizawa are wrong in arguing that non-derived 
content is also the mark of the cognitive, in which case we will have no 
reason to regard it as moving beyond the extension of ‗mere processing‘ 
to the extension of the genuinely mental. 
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What Clark and Chalmers may well have demonstrated with their Otto 
example is a case of cognition extending, which means that it may well 
be correct to say that when Otto is accessing his notebook (automatically 
and transparently we can suppose) that he is recalling the location of the 
Museum of Modern Art. And, indeed, the notebook may have a special 
role to play in driving Otto‘s action in this case. But this is not the same 
thing as arguing that Otto‘s belief extends into the world. If we can 
distinguish between cognitive processing and mental states, as Clark and 
Chalmers claim, then a demonstration that Otto‘s cognitive processing 
extends does not equate to a demonstration that his mental state extends. 
Rowlands seems to appreciate this since his primary focus (1999, 2003, 
2009) is on the extension of cognitive processing into the world, 
admitting that these arguments work only so long as cognitive processes 




Clark seeks to extend mental states into the world and takes his paradigm 
mental states to be propositional attitudes. But since non-derived content 
is the definitive feature of propositional attitudes and Clark concedes that 
non-derived content is internal, his argument fails to conclusively prove 
that mental states extend. At best, given the strategy that he adopts, Clark 
can argue for the extension of the ‗special enablers‘ of mental states into 
the world. But this falls short of extending mental states into the world in 
any interesting sense and can be described, instead, in terms of EMMT. 
Within the EMMT framework it may be legitimate to argue for the 
extension of cognitive processes into the world provided that those 
cognitive processes are specified non-intentionally. But as we have seen, 
and as Clark admits, the extension of cognition is not the same thing as 
the extension of mental states, which is necessary for the extension of 
mind. 
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If Clark was interested in arguing for a genuinely interesting and 
challenging version of EMT then instead of accepting non-derived 
intentionality as the mark of the mental he could have challenged this 
view and attempted to provide a new mark of the mental. By not 
presenting such a challenge Clark trivialises his argument. In this regard 
Clark goes too far in arguing for the extension of mental states into the 
world because he does not go far enough in his rejection of the 
typical/traditional view of the nature of mental states that he seeks to 
challenge. A genuine challenge to this view could take the form of 
providing a new mark of the mental by rejecting the representational 


























As currently formulated, EMT fails to decisively show that mental states 
extend into the world. Relying on functionalist principles means Clark 
provides arguments to conclusively demonstrate only that the 
computational processes supporting cognition and mental state formation 
extend. The only other possible move for defenders of EMT to make 
(apart from extending representations with non-derived content) would be 
to argue that although not all aspects of mind extend it is at least possible 
that the functional aspects of non-biologically basic mental states 
sometimes extend, in certain special cases, when they are appropriately 
related to internal representations with non-derived content. 
 
In this chapter I give a brief diagnosis of what I take to be a strategic flaw 
in Clark‘s approach. Because of his willingness to accept the standard 
representational view of intentional states he has missed an opportunity to 
defend EMT on stronger grounds. As shown by the preceding chapters it 
is because Clark allows that internalists may be right about the defining 
properties of intentional states that his arguments for EMT fail to 
convince. This suggests that the strongest move in defending EMT would 
be to question standard thinking about what is definitive of intentional 
states. With this in mind I examine the anti-representationalist stance of 
the enactivist approach to cognition and mentality, demonstrating that 
such an approach may hold promise with regard to formulating a new 
mark of the mental and, consequently, of providing a more secure 






The Mark of the Mental Re-visited 
 
In chapter four we saw that the constitution versus mere enabling issue is 
crucial for the EM theorist. One cannot adjudicate on this issue—and 
therefore on whether EMT is really only EMMT—without appeal to an 
independently motivated mark of the mental. One cannot specify the 
location of a mental state without prior specification of what a mental 
state is. As Di Paolo puts it: ―Before asking where it is we must first say 
what it is‖ (2009: 10). Despite this Clark makes no mention of a mark of 
the mental in presenting his positive thesis.  
 
In comparison, Rowlands, arguing for the extension of cognitive 
processes into the world, offers the following mark of the cognitive: 
 
A process P is a cognitive process if and only if (i) P is essential to the 
accomplishing of a cognitive task T, and (ii) P involves operations on 
information bearing structures, where information carried by such 
structures is relevant to task T. (1999: 103) 
 
We can debate whether or not this mark of the cognitive is up to the job 
but at least it is recognised that specification of what cognitive processes 
are is required for specification of their location. The issue is recognised 
as being sufficiently important for Rowlands (2009a) to update his mark 
of the cognitive, attempting a more fine-grained specification of cognitive 
processes as follows: 
 
A process P is a cognitive process if and only if: 
1) P involves information processing—the manipulation and 
transformation of information-bearing structures. 
2) This information processing has the proper function of making 
available either to the subject or to subsequent processing 
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operations information that was (or would have been) prior to 
(or without) this processing, unavailable. 
3) This information is made available by way of the production, in 
the subject of P, of a representational state. 
4) P is a process that belongs to the subject of that representational 
state. 
 
Similarly, Hurley (1998b), in presenting her case for the extension of the 
vehicles of the unity of consciousness into the world, recognises that she 
requires a specification of vehicles that makes a discriminating appeal to 
causal spread. Thus, she offers a mark of the vehicle (as we saw in 
chapter three) that appeals to its duplicability in counterfactually altered 
environments. 
 
But the extension of vehicles does not necessarily entail the extension of 
mental states. Likewise, even if Rowlands‘ mark of the cognitive allows 
the extension of cognitive processes, this does not mean that it allows the 
extension of mental states. Although Rowland‘s updated mark of the 
cognitive might allow the extension of cognitive processes that might 
enable mental states, what is definitive of the mental is taken to be 
internal: ―cognitive processes always contain a non-eliminable internal 
element. It is here that we find representational states that possess non-
derived content‖ (Rowlands 2009a: 13). 
 
Clark does not offer a mark of the mental for the intentional states that he 
wishes to extend. By relying on the parity principle and appeals to 
intuition about what should count as mental in order to make his case 
Clark seems quite happy to let prevailing views dictate what the nature of 
a mental state is, seeking only to challenge the boundaries that are 
prescribed. But, as we will see, this is problematic for his stated aims. 
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The issue of the mark of the mental first raises its head in the EMT 
debate when (as per chapter four) Adams and Aizawa (2001) propose that 
non-derived content is the mark of the cognitive. But since we can 
distinguish a mental state from a cognitive process a mark of the 
cognitive is not the same thing as a mark of the mental. Adams and 
Aizawa recognise this: 
 
We assume without argument that the mental is not the same as the 
cognitive, hence that the mark of the mental is not the same thing as the 
mark of the cognitive. (2001: 48) 
 
Nonetheless, Adams and Aizawa take their argument to show that the 
sentences in Otto‘s notebook do not partially constitute Otto‘s belief, 
which is a mental state. It is more commonly taken, in line with 
Brentano‘s thesis, that intentionality, or (as it is typically taken) non-
derived content, is the mark of the mental. And given that our target here 
is the extension of mental states, I propose to take non-derived content as 
the mark of the mental rather than of the cognitive. This allows that 
cognitive processes might extend while mental states remain internal. But 
Clark thinks that he can allow non-derived content as the mark of the 
mental and still argue for the extension of mental states. 
 
Clark offers an initial challenge to the idea of non-derived content as the 
mark of the mental, arguing, in line with the parity principle, that we 
would have no problem allowing the derived content involved in 
bitmapped storage as constitutive of a mental state if it occurred in the 
head: 
 
Surely, I argued, we would have no hesitation in embracing that kind of 
bitmapped storage, even prior to an act of retrieval, as part and parcel of 
the Martian cognitive equipment … If, courtesy of our common-sense 
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psychological intuitions, we accept this aspect of Martian memory into 
the cognitive fold, surely only skin-and-skull-based prejudice stops us 
from extending the same courtesy to Otto. (Clark 2008b: 91) 
 
But if non-derived content is indeed the mark of the mental then it is not 
our common-sense intuitions that (should) award mental status. If non-
derived content is the mark of the mental and if this rules out derived 
content from forming a constitutive part of a mental state then it doesn‘t 
matter where the derived content is located, it cannot count as a 
constitutive part of a mental state. Derived content, regardless of its 
location, requires non-derived content; this is where it inherits its 
contentful properties from. And as the EM theorists argue, just because a 
process or state is internal doesn‘t accord it mental status. Parity (or ‗fair 
treatment‘ as Sprevak would put it) cuts both ways: if a process or state 
occurs within the head to which we would deny mental status had that 
process or state been in the world, then that process or state is not a 
constitutive part of a mental state (Coleman, forthcoming). If non-derived 
content is the mark of the mental then the bit-mapped aspect of Martian 
memory is not accepted as constitutive of his beliefs and we do not award 
mental status to Otto‘s notebook on precisely these same grounds. 
 
Of course the question arises here as to what we require from a mark of 
the mental. Adams and Aizawa (2001), in specifying non-derived content 
as the mark of the cognitive, are offering a necessary condition on a state 
or process being cognitive and admit that not every part of every 
cognitive process need possess non-derived content. A mark of the 
mental that specifies non-derived content only as a necessary condition 
for awarding mental status would (as we saw in chapter four) certainly 
seem to open the door for Clark with regard to the extension of mental 
states into the world. If insisting that non-derived content is the mark of 
the mental merely provides a necessary condition for a state or process as 
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a whole to count as mental then Clark can argue that, for example, the 
functional aspects of states that deal with only derived content might be 
partially constitutive of mental states after all. This would require that 
those aspects dealing only with derived content are related in the right 
way to those with non-derived representational content: 
 
One way to understand this proposal is as insisting that all that matters, 
for some conventional encoding to count as the vehicle of a 
dispositional belief, is that it be appropriately linked, at run-time, to 
representations whose content is (as Adams and Aizawa insist) intrinsic. 
Such linking can be achieved for conventionally formatted 
representations both inside and outside the head. (Clark 2005: 5) 
 
In this way Clark thinks that he can allow that non-derived content is the 
mark of the mental and still have his extension of dispositional beliefs 
into the world. This requires only that the processing dealing with derived 
content is specially related in the right way to internal representational 
states possessing non-derived content. Thus, Clark argues, if we accept 
that non-derived content offers only a necessary condition on a state 
being mental then we have no good reason to reject part of a state—that 
does not itself display this mark of the mental—as a constitutive part of a 
mental state, regardless of its location, provided that it is coupled in the 
right way to a internal representation with non-derived content. But an 
internalist is likely to respond that if non-derived content is the mark of 
the mental then Clark has given no good reason to think that the mental 
state itself has extended rather than the mere enabler of that mental state. 
 
What Clark‘s argument trades on is the idea that there may be elements 
that are characteristic of a mental state other than its non-derived content. 
He claims that accepting non-derived content as the mark of the mental 
(or at least not explicitly rejecting it) allows for the possibility of the 
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extension of these other elements even if the representational aspect, the 
non-derived content, remains internal. But, as we saw in the previous 
chapter this is to argue only for the extension of the causal/ 
computational/syntactical aspects and not the representational aspects, 
not the non-derived content that is taken to demarcate the mental from the 
non-mental.  
 
Furthermore, if these causal/computational/syntactical elements are to 
count as partially constitutive of mentality then it is difficult to see how 
we can draw a clear and non-arbitrary distinction between those that are 
internal and those that are external. It seems there is no principled way to 
settle the boundary dispute since there is nothing else to appeal to. 
Having agreed on a mark of the mental there seems nothing else to call 
on that would allow us to say which functional states are genuinely 
constitutive of mentality and which are merely causal or enabling of 
mentality. 
 
Clark does offer some extra conditions on an external resource forming 
part of a mental state or cognitive process. These are introduced in order 
to make a discriminating appeal to causal spread and avoid the problem 
of bloat. But these extra conditions apply only to external resources and 
are there to ensure that not just anything that is causally linked to a 
representational state with non-derived content counts as mental.
35
 But 
the internalist will object that causation is not the same thing as 
constitution and that a mark of the mental should apply to all putative 
mental states equally, be they internal or external. Thus, genuine mental 
states shouldn‘t need to fulfil the specified criteria in addition to the mark 
of the mental just to avoid the problem of bloat. Better to abide by the 
                                               
35 Aizawa, ms, argues that these conditions are so restrictive that if they were applied to 
internal states then they would rule clear cases of cognitive processing as non-cognitive, 
and similarly rule out clear cases of belief. 
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mark of the mental and restrict mental states to internal states they will 
argue. Although Clark‘s extra conditions might avoid the problem of 
bloat for what can count as an enabler of a mental state it does not settle 
the constitution versus enabling issue.  
 
If non-derived content is the wholly definitive mark of the mental—such 
that it alone distinguishes the mental from the non-mental—then the 
extension of states and processes that do not display this mark (regardless 
of any extra conditions placed on them) will fail to secure the extension 
of the mental in any interesting sense. For those who accept the above, 
they will argue that at best, Clark has an argument for the enablers or 
facilitators of mental states—he has an argument for EMMT as opposed 
to EMT. 
 
Clark‘s strategy provides no decisive way of adjudicating on the EMT 
debate, because it will not settle the issue of what is constitutive of a 
mental state as distinct from what merely enables a mental state. 
Agreeing that non-derived content is only a necessary condition on a 
state‘s being mental and not definitive of mentality is not enough to settle 
the important issues regard the metaphysical extent of mind. The root 
problem is that there is nothing left to appeal to that would decisively 
enable us to choose between accepting an embedded mind hypothesis, 
compatible with a non-extended mind, or EMT. To break the deadlock a 
mark of the mental that offers more than a necessary condition on a 
state‘s being mental is needed. We require of a mark of the mental that 




It is instructive to consider Clark‘s apparent unwillingness to tackle the 
issue of the mark of the mental head-on. This may be representative of 
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what Di Paolo (2009) flags as a tendency by EM theorists to simply 
accept the orthodoxy on what cognition and mentality are and seek to 
extend cognition and mental states according to this definition. And the 
orthodoxy is representationalism: 
 
While there is no agreement about the best version of the 
representational theory of mind and its vehicles, it is widely assumed 
that some version or other is non-negotiable. In this respect, an 
unquestioned commitment to representationalism frames contemporary 
debates about cognition in precisely the way that a similar commitment 
to some ‗theory of ideas‘ or other framed the debates that raged between 
empiricists and rationalists centuries ago. (Hutto 2008: 420) 
 
Clark seems willing (following the initial resistance outlined above) to 
accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being 
mental because he thinks he can preserve the extension of mental states 
into the world even while making this allowance. On this view derived 
content, like that found in a sentence in Otto‘s notebook, can form a 
constitutive part of a mental state provided that, to use Clark‘s words, is 
‗appropriately linked‘ or ‗specially related‘ to a representation with non-
derived content.  
 
But this invites the response that what is truly definitive of the mental 
remains internal, particularly if we require our mark of the mental to 
specify more than a mere necessary condition on a state‘s being mental 
such that it can settle the constitution versus enabling issue. Thus, Clark‘s 
unwillingness to challenge the representational view of mind and in 
particular non-derived content as the mark of the mental prevents him 
from developing a logically compelling argument concerning the 
metaphysical extent of minds. A possible move towards the development 
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of such an argument might be for the EM theorist to argue for the 
extension of non-derived representations into the world.  
 
Rowlands (2006) attempts to extend representations into the world in the 
form of actions. If such an endeavour can succeed then perhaps a stronger 
representationalist version of an argument for EMT might be fashioned. 
Rowlands holds that the concept of representation has suffered as a result 
of being assimilated to the category of the word and he suggests a re-
evaluation of representation; arguing that pre-intentional actions, or 
deeds, can be seen as representational. Deeds include positioning your 
fingers in order to catch a ball coming towards you at speed and the 
movement of your fingers when playing the piano, for example (Ibid.). 
Deeds are seen as being pre-intentional because they involve ―an array of 
on-line, feedback modulated adjustments that take place below the level 
of the intention, but collectively promote the satisfaction of the 
antecedent intention‖ (Ibid: 103) and also, crucially, because ―the direct 
antecedents of these deeds are not themselves representational or 
intentional states‖ (Ibid: 104). 
 
It is beyond the scope of this work to go into a detailed examination of 
Rowland‘s arguments here but it suffices for our purposes to list what 
Rowlands thinks are the characteristics of these pre-intentional deeds 
such that they are representational, they: 
 
1. Carry information about x (e.g. the trajectory of the ball). 
2. Track x or function in a way that allows the subject to accomplish 
something in virtue of tracking x. 
3. Can misrepresent. 
4. Are decoupleable from x (e.g. I can ‗practice‘ catching the ball or 
rehearse a catch in the absence of any ball) (Co-opted from 
Gallagher 2008). 
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By way of contrast, the classic concept of a representation has it that:  
 
1. Representation is internal (image, symbol, neural configuration). 
2. Representation has duration (it‘s a discrete identifiable thing). 
3. Representation bears content that is external to itself (it refers to or is 
about something other than itself). 
4. Representation requires interpretation – its meaning gets fixed in 
context. 
5. Representation is passive (it is produced enacted, called forth by some 
particular situation; or we do something with it). 
6. Representation is decoupleable from its current context. (Gallagher 
2008: 351-352). 
 
Rowlands‘ account of pre-intentional deeds as representations seeks to 
challenge conditions one to five of this classic concept of representations, 
hence Rowlands allows that not all of the most basic kind of 
representations need be internal. Given that Rowlands‘ account of 
representations as deeds rejects so much of what is commonly taken to be 
definitive of representations we can legitimately question to what extent 
Rowlands‘ deeds are genuine representations at all, although we might 
allow the weaker claim that they are representational in some sense.  
 
Gallagher (Ibid.) makes exactly this challenge, arguing that this 
minimalist conception of representations no longer conforms to the 
criteria that would make it a representation. If so, to think of deeds as 
representations requires surrendering many of the core criteria that must 
normally be satisfied for something to count as being a representation at 
all. Hence it is most likely that deeds will not be counted among the ranks 
of genuine representations. And if possession of genuine representational 
content is taken to be the mark of the mental then it doesn‘t look like 
Clark‘s version of EMT would be aided by appeal to Rowland‘s proposal. 
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Furthermore, it is difficult to see how pre-intentional deeds might stand in 
relation to the kinds of propositional attitudes that Clark makes his focus. 
Pre-intentional acts require something like the subpersonalisation of 
action that we mentioned in chapters one and three. But it is difficult to 
see how Otto‘s action of accessing his notebook could be subpersonalised 
in the same way as the access movements of a commissurotomy patient 
might. Even so, if Otto‘s accessing of his notebook only required an 
antecedent subintentional state like a deed to initiate that action, we 
would still be owed an account of how Otto‘s action could be 
representational. And even then it would still seem that explanation of 
Otto‘s subsequent action as based on the information in the notebook 
would require a subsequent believed internal representation of the 
sentence in the notebook. Attempting to salvage EMT by appeal to 
extended representations in the form of deeds is going to be problematic. 
This suggests that the cleanest move in securing a genuine EMT would 





Given the difficulties outlined above, a more promising move for 
developing an interesting version of EMT that secures the idea that 
mental states genuinely range into the world is to reject the 
representational view of mind. Enactivist approaches to mind and 
cognition do exactly this and here I explore the possibility of enactivism 
providing a different theoretical basis from which to argue for a version 
of EMT by providing an alternative mark of the mental. 
 
Much (though certainly not all) of the motivation for the enactivist view 
of mind can be said to come from the failure of classical AI to adequately 
model human intelligence. Two principle features of classical AI were: 
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1. Adherence to the rules and representation model of mind. 
2. A top-down approach to defining cognitive processes and mental states.  
 
The rules and representations model suggests ―that it is possible to 
simulate intelligence in a particular ‗world‘ by manipulating a set of 
symbols that represent that ‗world‘‖ (Lenat & Guha 1990: 147). 
Designing an artificially intelligent system on this view requires 
representing various aspects of the world and articulating appropriate 
rules to manipulate these representations such that the appropriate outputs 
will be produced. Also, Classical AI takes a very particular stance on the 
kind of processes that are definitive of intelligence. Cognition is seen as a 
high-level phenomenon that is highly abstract and disembodied. 
Implementing chess playing programs and medical diagnosis programs 
are seen as examples of the proper targets for AI on this approach. 
 
This led to the creation of expert systems that equalled and sometimes 
surpassed humans at the specific tasks they were designed to perform. 
But the problem with these expert systems is that they are too specialised; 
once removed from their own fields of expertise they are woefully inept. 
Expert systems are extremely susceptible to failure when confronted with 
novel situations outside of their area of expertise and are, consequently, 
said to be brittle. Classical AI argues that the way to deal with new 
situations is ―by finding some related case and propagating the 
differences to this new one‖ (Ibid: 3). And the way to do this is to ensure 
that there is large base of knowledge to consult. Thus: ―the mattress in the 
road to AI is lack of knowledge, and the anti-mattress is knowledge‖ 
(Ibid: 4). 
 
So the reason that the expert systems developed by the Classical AI 
approach are brittle is not, on this view, because the rules and 
representation model of intelligence is wrong but rather because the 
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expert systems are lacking in knowledge. Expert systems can achieve 
their specific tasks without ‗knowing‘ anything about the area outside 
their task, and without ‗knowing‘ very much about the task itself. To 
overcome the brittleness of the expert system Classical AI postulates that 
we need to design a system that knows lots of things about the world: to 
broaden their competence and ability to deal with novel situations expert 
systems need more propositional knowledge, more internal 
representations. 
 
It is along this line that the CYC project was undertaken by Douglas 
Lenat. The aim is to encode in the system‘s knowledge-base as much as 
possible of our consensus reality: ―the millions of things that we all know 
and that we assume everyone else knows‖ (Ibid: 4). The hope is that there 
is a threshold that this system will cross at which point it will be able to 
assist with its own programming and will, ultimately, become capable of 
learning for itself. Despite some commercial success, in the 26 years 
since its inception, the CYC project has not achieved this. 
Pronouncements that CYC has succeeded in modelling human 
intelligence have not been forthcoming. 
 
The key to success in Classical AI is seen as representing the world 
completely and explicitly and this, suggests Brooks (1991) is precisely 
the issue on which AI has foundered. He recommends an alternative 
approach to artificial intelligence whereby instead of trying to explicitly 
represent as much of the world as possible: 
 
 We must incrementally build up the capabilities of intelligent systems, 
having complete systems at each step of the way and thus automatically 
ensure that the pieces and their interfaces are valid.  
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 At each step we should build complete intelligent systems that we let 
loose in the real world with real sensing and real action. Anything less 
provides a candidate with which we can delude ourselves. (Ibid: 139) 
 
Thus, Brooks rejects the top-down approach to cognition advocated by 
Classical AI and advocates, instead, a bottom up approach whereby: 
―mobility, acute vision and the ability to carry out survival-related tasks 
in a dynamic environment provide a necessary basis for the development 
of true intelligence‖ (Ibid: 140). In adopting this alternative approach 
Brooks created a series of autonomous mobile robots and in the process 
reached what he calls an unexpected conclusion (C) and a radical 
hypothesis (H): 
 
(C) When we examine very simple level intelligence we find that explicit 
representations and models of the world simply get in the way. It turns 
out to be better to use the world as its own model. 
(H) Representation is the wrong unit of abstraction in building the bulkiest 
parts of intelligent systems. (Ibid: 139) 
 
The failure of Classical AI to effectively model human level intelligence, 
coupled with his own success in designing mobile, autonomous robots 
also leads Brooks to shun the rules and representations model of mind. In 
this way Brooks rejects the view that the sorts of states and processes that 
are definitive of human mentality are the high level, abstract, 
representational states and processes that are the focus of classical AI. 
The true character of intelligence is to be found he suggests in 
explorations of how ―whole, physically embodied agents, including 
nonhuman animals, achieve real-time sensorimotor control in dynamic, 
sometimes unforgiving environments‖ (Wheeler 1995: 1). In rejecting the 
rules and representations model of Classical AI and advocating a bottom-
up approach to explaining cognition Brooks can be seen as an important 
forerunner to the enactivist approach. 
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Enactivist approaches to mind similarly reject the representationalist view 
of mind. Representationalism begins from the positing of a fundamental 
gap between mind and world that requires the postulation of mental 
representations to explain possibility of engagement with the world: 
―There is a gap between the mind and the world, and (as far as anybody 
knows) you need to posit internal representations if you are to have a 
hope of getting across it‖ (Fodor 2009). The enactivist approach rejects 
the positing of this gap and instead takes as its starting point the organism 
in the world rather than in isolation from it. So, in rejecting the 
representationalist approach enactivism also endorses a bottom-up 
approach to cognition and mentality whereby ―Abilities are prior to 
theories ... Competence is prior to content … [and] knowing how is the 
paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that‖ (Fodor 2008: 
10). This gives us a clear picture of the explanatory programme of the 
enactivist perspective: mentality emerges from the self-organizing 




To make the distinction between the enactivist and representational 
approaches more concrete, I will very briefly contrast an enactivist 
account of visual perception with the standard representationalist 
account. Traditional accounts of perception attempt to explain our visual 
experience of the world in terms of the creation or activation of internal 
representations of that world. So, your experience of a shiny, green apple 
is to be explained, on this view, by the creation or activation of an 
internal representation, the components of which represent each of these 
features of your experience, i.e. the shininess of the apple, its greenness, 
and its roundness.
36
 And, given that our visual experience of the world is 
                                               
36 This probably goes without saying but to be clear; requiring that a representation has 
features that correspond to the different features of your experience is not to say that the 
representation must be similar in any way to the experience (although it might be). 
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rich, detailed and vivid this is to be explained in terms of a rich, detailed 
and vivid internal visual representation. 
 
But experiments carried out by Kevin O‘Regan in particular (e.g. 
O‘Regan, Rensink & Clark 1999; O‘Regan & Noë 2000, 2001) seem to 
call into doubt this rich and detailed character of our visual experience. In 
fact, O‘Regan‘s experimental work seems to reveal a certain lack of 
detail in the human visual experience that can easily become manifest 
under experimental conditions. We are, it seems, subject to a 
phenomenon called change blindness: 
 
When a few small, high contrast shapes are briefly spattered over a 
picture, like mudsplashes on a car windshield, very large changes can 
simultaneously be made in the scene without these being noticed. This 
occurs even when the mudsplashes do not in any way cover or obscure 
the changes. (O‘Regan, Rensink & Clark 1999) 
 
So, in these experiments subjects are shown a visual scene in which large 
scale changes are made repeatedly on a cyclical basis. These are changes 
that would easily be noticed by the subject under normal conditions but 
when a distracting stimulus is presented (such as mud splashes) at the 
same time as the change then subjects have great difficulty in seeing the 
change being made. This will be the case even though the changes might 
occur in full view and are not obscured by the distracting stimulus. Some 
have argued that these results cast doubt on the representational account 
of visual perception, since on this account: 
 
[A]ll that would be required to notice a change in such a scene would be 
to compare one‘s current visual impressions with the activated 
representation; when and how the discrepancies between the former and 
                                                                                                                   
There is no requirement for a representation of something green and shiny to itself be 
green and shiny, only that the representation must represent greeness and shininess. 
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the latter arose would be irrelevant. Thus, it is argued, the change 
blindness results support the claim that there is at least no complex and 
detailed internal representation. We do not notice even significant 
changes in a scene because we have no internal template against which 
to measure or compare them.
37
 (Rowlands 2006: 69-70)  
 
The results of the change blindness experiments, among other things, 
have led some to label our visual experience of the world as a ‗grand 
illusion‘ (e.g. Dennett, 1991, 1992, 1998; O'Regan, 1992; Rensink, 
O'Regan & Clark, 1997). 
 
 We believe that we see a complete, dynamic picture of a stable,
 uniformly detailed and colourful world, but [o]ur stable visual world
 may be constructed out of a brief retinal image and a very sketchy,
 higher-level representation along with a pop out mechanism to redirect
 attention. The richness of our visual world is, to this extent, an illusion.
 (Blackmore et al. 1995: 1075) 
 
On this view we are mistaken about the nature of our visual experience. 
We are mistaken in thinking that our experience of the world is rich and 
detailed, presumably because it is not supported by a sufficiently rich and 
detailed internal representation. But Noë argues, contra Blackmore, that: 
―It just is not the case that we, normal perceivers, believe we see a 
complete, dynamic picture of a stable, uniformly detailed and colourful 
world‖ (2002: 6). Instead, Noë claims that it seems to us as if we have 
perceptual access to a world that is stable, uniformly detailed and 
colourful. To think otherwise is to hold that perceivers believe what Noë 
calls the snapshot conception of visual experience. 
 
                                               
37 I do not critique the representational view here. I merely use the change blindness 
experiments as a means of contrasting the approaches of the representationalist and 
enactivist positions. 
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According to a conception of visual experience that has been widely 
held by perceptual theorists, you open your eyes and — presto! — you 
enjoy a richly detailed picture-like experience of the world, one that 
represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail and high resolution 
from the centre out to the periphery. Let us call this the snapshot 
conception of experience. (Noë 2002: 2) 
 
Noë claims that much empirical research into visual experience takes this 
snapshot conception as its starting point. When you combine this 
conception of visual experience with the reality of the limitations of our 
perceptual apparatus, i.e.:   
 
[T]here are two retinal images, not one, and they are distorted, tiny and 
upside-down … In addition, the resolving power of the eye is limited 
and nonuniform; outside the high-resolution foveal region, the retina is 
nearly colour-blind and its powers of discrimination are severely 
limited. On top of this, the eye is in nearly constant motion, saccading 
from point to point in the visual field three or four times a second. As a 
result of saccadic suppression, the data made available to the retina 
takes the form of a succession of alternating snapshots and grey-outs. 
(Ibid: 2) 
 
…then it is difficult to see how one could do anything other than posit the 
existence of rich and detailed internal representations of the world as a 
means of explaining visual perception. But, crucially, as we saw above, 
Noë argues that the snapshot conception is mistaken. It is the world that 
is rich and detailed and we have access to all of this richness and detail 
but not all at once. We perceive a rich and detailed visual world thanks to 
our capacity to move our heads and our eyes, to shift our attention, to act 
in the world. 
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Thus, the enactivist approach rejects talk of a grand illusion. We 
experience a rich and detailed visual world not because we form rich and 
detailed internal representations of the world but because we have an 
ability to instantly attend to any aspect of the scene we choose and we 
have implicit knowledge of how that scene will change depending on 
how we explore it. A tomato that is partially obscured by a pepper shaker 
is phenomenologically present to the observer, rather than experienced as 
distinct tomato parts, because:  
 
Our perceptual sense of the tomato‘s wholeness—of its volume and 
backside, and so forth—consists in our implicit understanding (our 
expectation) that the movements of our body to the left or right, say, 
will bring further bits of the tomato into view. Our relation to the 
unseen bits of the tomato is mediated by patterns of sensorimotor 
contingency. (Noë 2004: 63) 
 
Sensorimotor contingencies, or dependencies, simply refer to how the 
sensory stimulation changes, or is liable to change, given certain 
movements or environmental changes. So, for the enactivist, the 
perceptual experience of a rich and detailed visual world is the result of 
activity that goes on in the world: ―seeing is a skilful activity whereby 
one explores the world, drawing on one‘s mastery of the relevant laws of 
sensorimotor contingency‖ (O‘Regan & Noë 2001: 966).  
 
The diachronic engagement of the organism with the world is, for the 
enactivist, central to an explanation of the-what-it-is-like of token visual 
experiences. This might be compatible with (though would not 
presuppose) a representational account of vision, so long as the bodily 
movement and patterns of sensorimotor contingencies had only an 
instrumental role to play in perception. This has echoes of Kirsch and 
Maglio‘s claims regarding epistemic actions that we examined in chapter 
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one. They recognise the important causal role that epistemic actions have 
to play in the transformation of the cognitive task facing a subject, but do 
not make the stronger claim that epistemic actions can be constitutive of 
cognitive process and mental states. Similarly, a proponent of the 
representationalist account of visual perception might allow that patterns 
of sensorimotor contingencies have a causal role to play in perception by 
productively reconfiguring the tasks performed in the brain, though they 
are not constitutive of the perceptual experience itself.  
 
Some theorists move for a stronger claim than mere instrumental 
dependence of perception on action and argue that the temporally 
extended use of bodily movement and knowledge of various 
sensorimotor contingencies have more than a mere causal or explanatory, 
role to play in perception. On this view the what-it-is-like of perceptual 
experience can depend non-instrumentally, or constitutively, on bodily 
movement and implicit knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies (Noë 
2004, Rowlands 2003).  
 
But even this stronger claim is compatible with endorsement of the 
representational view of mind. And, indeed, although the principal SMC 
(sensorimotor contingency) advocates, like Noë and O‘Regan, reject the 
idea that we need ‗rich and detailed‘ representations to allow us to form a 
picture or snapshot of the world in perception, they do not surrender the 
idea that representations are required for perception or cognition more 
generally. Indeed, sometimes they are explicit about the requirement for 
representations: 
 
[F]or perceptual sensation to constitute experience – that is, for it to 
have genuine representational content – the perceiver must possess and 
make use of sensorimotor knowledge. (Noë 2004: 17, emphasis mine) 
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In addition to concerns about requirements for ‗genuine representational 
content‘ there is a worry raised by Hutto (2005) about the mediating 
knowledge appealed to in an SMC account of perception:  
 
The central idea of our new approach is that vision is a mode of 
exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge of what we call 
sensorimotor contingencies. (O‘Regan & Noë 2001: 940, emphasis 
mine) 
   
[W]e sought to explain phenomenal consciousness in terms of forms of 
cognition—for instance, knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor 
dependence. (Noë 2004: 228) 
 
If these appeals to knowledge are understood in rules and representations 
terms then this commits SMC theorists to a conservative version of 
enactivism at best. In contrast, radical enactivists reject the cognitivist 
assumptions of representationalists and conservative enactivists. They 
deny: 
  
1) That the character of experience involves or is exhausted by intentional 
content (narrow or wide); 
2) That the relevant forms of embodied activity for necessary for 
perception are based on knowledge operative at either the personal or 
subpersonal level.  
  
Radical enactivists argue that rejecting the requirement for a static inner 
representation and thinking of perception as a kind of exploratory activity 
that is extended over time means that: 
 
[T]here is no need to introduce ‗knowledge‘ as a kind of bond that holds 
together various percepts in order to explain phenomena such as 
perceptual presence. (Hutto 2005) 
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Retaining the requirements for representations of some sort and/or 
appealing to mediating knowledge in an enactivist account of perception 
or cognition is to risk run the risk of falling into conservative thinking. It 
is not clear that such an account would be properly enactivist in line with 
the enactivism first proposed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991). On 
the other hand, given its firm anti-representationalist stance, radical 
enactivism looks promising with regard to specifying an alternative mark 
of the mental that situates the metaphysical extent of mind firmly in the 
world—if it can be made to work. 
 
A new Mark of the Mental? 
 
Mind and cognition on the radical enactivist view can be seen as 
essentially and constitutively body and world-involving (e.g. Thompson 
2007). Thus, it is possible to view mentality as necessarily supervening 
on body and world as well as on the brain, making radical enactivism 
particularly amenable to the possibility of formulating an alternative and 
more interesting version of EMT. As Thompson puts it: ―the human mind 
is embodied in our entire organism and embedded in the world, and 
hence is not reducible to structures inside the head‖ (2005: 408). But 
success, in this regard will, of course, be dependent on the capacity of the 
radical enactivist approach to specify a mark of the mental that locates 
mind in the world. 
 
The prospects are promising since radical enactivism neutralises many of 
the objections that face current versions of EMT. Because the starting 
point for radical enactivism is the organism in the world, mind emerges 
from the activity of the organism in the world and there is no gap 
between mind and world that requires the postulation of internal 
representations. Objections assuming that the mark of the mental must be 
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unpacked in terms of non-derived representational contents and that, 
consequently, the genuinely mental must be internal carry no force. 
 
The paradigm mental states cannot be propositional attitudes on this 
view. The core, low-level, ontologically basic forms of cognitive activity 
that are required for higher-level cognition are the paradigm of mentality. 
And given that these core cognitive activities necessarily supervene on 
brain, body and world, mind is properly seen as extensive rather than 
extended (thanks to Dan Hutto for this). Where EMT, as currently 
formulated, allows only that hybrid cognitive states and processes that 
involve ‗add-ons‘ like Otto‘s notebook, might on occasion extend into the 
world, radical enactivism has it that the mind is essentially world-
involving and so does not require extension into the world. 
 
Thus, the distinction between cognitive processes and mental states 
dissolves, or rather, it doesn‘t arise. Because the radical enactivist 
approach does not posit the requirement for internal representations as a 
starting point and adopts a bottom-up approach to explaining mind, the 
distinction between mental states and cognitive processes that we saw in 
previous chapters does not arise. Instead, mentality consists in the active 
engagement of an organism with the world. Any other higher-level 
cognitive processes or mental states that we may wish to attribute are 
based upon and ontologically require these forms of engagement with the 
world. 
 
If the radical enactivist approach to explaining mentality can be made to 
work then it seems prima facie to offer the possibility of a more 
thoroughgoing and theoretically well-motivated proposal about the 
metaphysical extent of minds than is currently on offer. Furthermore it is 
not susceptible to many of the arguments that dog Clark‘s position since 
it does not attempt to take a notion of mind that is primarily internalist 
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and seek to extend it into the world. But all this is dependent on the 
radical enactivist approach yielding a mark of the mental. Di Paolo notes 
that enactivism is working towards a ―strong candidate for a widely 
applicable, non-species-specific, non-bio-chauvinist definition of 
cognition‖ (2009: 15) in terms of the normative engagement of an agent 
with his world. And along these lines he offers a definition of cognition 
as: ―sense-making in the interactive domain‖ (Ibid.). This requires some 
fleshing out but this is not the place for that. Instead, I note that we 
should heed Di Paolo‘s warning that there is a requirement for further 
foundational work in enactivism: 
 
In particular, several essential issues that could serve as a bridge 
between mind and life (like a proper grounding of teleology and 
agency) are given scant or null treatment in the primary literature (Ibid: 
12). 
 
While yet recognising that if such a definition of cognition is workable 
then it offers nothing less than an alternative mark of the mental that may 
form an alternative theoretical basis for a more radical but secure basis 




Rick Grush takes issue with what he sees as a growing trend in cognitive 
science to endorse the view that ―the mind is not in the head or that 
cognition does not require representation, or both‖ (2003: 53). Clark‘s 
EMT seeks to challenge the view that the mind is in the head while 
remaining wedded to a representationalist orthodoxy. Doing so means 
that developing decisive arguments for EMT is problematic. 
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An alternative approach is offered by a radical, non-representationalist 
version of enactivism. Such versions of enactivism reject the view that 
cognition requires representation and, by focusing on mind as emerging 
from the action of agents in the world, challenge the view that the mind is 
in the head. They adopt a starting point that is much more radical than 
Clark assumes for EMT. Radical enactivism argues that the mind is not 
essentially something for representing the outside world. Clark‘s EMT is 
much more modest since it: 
 
 [N]eed not deny that the mind is essentially a thinking thing or a
 representing thing. It is committed only to the much weaker claim that
 some of the thinking, and even the representing, may supervene on
 activities and encodings that criss-cross brain, body, and world. (Clark
 2008b: 149, emphasis mine) 
 
To commit to this weaker claim is to commit to the idea that the mind is 
fundamentally representational and this leads to difficulties in arguing for 
anything more than the extension of the mere enablers of mental states. 
Mind is, on this view, at its core internal and the best the EM theorist can 
hope for is the occasional extension of some mental states into the world. 
Even so, current versions of EMT do not decisively secure the truth of 
even this claim. Instead, for all that Clark says it remains possible to 
understand the metaphysics of mind in an internalist way. The cases that 
Clark cites are compatible with the possibility that minds end at the 
boundary of the individual even though certain tasks could not be 
completed without the aid of additional processes going on in the world 
that enable the having of inner mental states of various kinds. This would 
only show that, sometimes, the machinery of the mind extends as 
opposed to minds themselves extending. I do not argue here that 
defenders of EMT have no possible way of answering such critics, only 
that they have no decisive way of answering them. My analysis reveals 
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that acceptance of mental states as essentially representational will 
provide a serious hindrance to making a convincing and compelling case 
for the idea the minds are metaphysically extensive. 
 
A better move may be to reject the representational view of mind in line 
with the radical enactivist approach to mind and cognition. This is 
approach is still in its infancy but initial progress is promising. In 
particular, because of its rejection of the representational view and its 
approach to cognition from the bottom-up perspective radical enactivism 
can reject propositional attitudes as the paradigmatic mental states and 
argue that mind emerges from the activity of an agent in the world. In this 
way enactivism suggests the possibility of forming an alternative mark of 
the mental that has brain, body and environment as equal partners in 
constituting the mind. 
 
In the concluding chapter I offer a brief summing up of the principle 


















The much-needed, original analysis undertaken here highlights numerous 
problems for the Extended Mind thesis as presented by Clark and 
Chalmers and subsequently defended by Clark. Their claims for the 
literal extension of the mind into the world rest on arguments for the 
extension of mental states into the world. But these arguments must 
themselves rest upon the provision of a mark of the mental that will settle 
the issue concerning what constitutes a mental state from what merely 
enables a mental state. 
 
Clark and Chalmers are not forthcoming with the required mark of the 
mental, attempting instead to rest the argumentative burden on the much 
maligned Parity Principle. Consequently, Clark seems happy to accept 
the standard position; arguing that he can accept non-derived content as 
the mark of the mental and maintain his argument for the extension of 
mental states into the world. But it is far from obvious that he can make 
this position work. 
 
The commonsense functionalist account of mental states that is 
presupposed by EMT may yield the possibility of extending the syntactic, 
computational aspects of mental states into the world but if the 
representational aspects of mental states will not wholly functionalise 
then the possibility that their truly mental aspects might, even sometimes, 
extend is questionable. If non-derived content is the defining 
characteristic of mental states and non-derived content is internal then at 
most Clark might find the means of defending the claim that certain 
aspects of mental states might be said to extend on occasion. 
 
We can allow, perhaps, that cognitive processes that do not themselves 
display the mark of the mental but that support and relate to mentality in 
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special ways might extend into the world. But if the extension of mental 
states per se is required for the extension of mind then the extension of 
cognitive processes alone is not sufficient to secure a genuine EMT. At 
best, these cognitive processes can be described as operating in relation to 
internal representations with non-derived content, and making possible 
the formation of new ones. As such, the extension of cognitive processes 
secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states (EMMT) and 
not the constitutive parts of mental states (EMT). 
 
Clark argues that we can count these extended processes as partially 
constitutive of mental states provided they bear a special relationship to 
the internal non-derived contents. But it is difficult to see how such a 
move can be made to work without running into the dangers of bloating 
or panpsychism. What might do the job in this regard is a supplement to 
the existing mark of the mental. These additional criteria would need to 
make a discriminating appeal to causal spread by not accepting just 
anything that makes a mere causal contribution into the ranks of the 
mental. But, again, supplementing the mark of the mental in this manner 
leaves the way open for an internalist to object that since what is 
definitive of mentality remains internal, what is constitutive of the mental 
state remains internal.  
 
Alternatively, one could argue that it is possible that representations 
themselves extend into world. Rowlands (2006) undertakes such an 
argument but it is problematic for EMT in that a) it is not clear that what 
he argues for extending constitute genuine representations (as opposed to 
the weaker claim that they exhibit representationality) and b) whatever 
content such states might have cannot support the kind of propositional 
attitudes that Clark takes as paradigmatic of mental states. 
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In summary, the arguments presented for EMT, as currently formulated, 
do not definitively secure the extension of mental states into the world 
and the prospects for securing a genuine EMT by making alterations and 
additions to the original formulation look deeply problematic and 
epicylic. A stronger move, then, would be to attempt the formulation of a 
new mark of the mental. 
 
Brentano proposed intentionality as the mark of the mental and this has 
overwhelmingly been taken to mean that mental states must bear 
semantic content. On this view, the paradigm mental states are 
propositional attitudes—representational states like the belief that the 
museum of Modern Art is on 53
rd
 street. But the enactivist approach to 
mind rejects the view that mental activity necessarily consists in 
computational operations performed on internal representations of the 
world and rejects propositional attitudes as the paradigm mental states. 
 
Instead, enactivism proposes that mind constitutively depends on the 
activity of the agent in the world. It is through active engagement with 
environmental features that the mentality of an agent emerges on this 
view. Such a move may well be compatible with some kind of 
intentionality being the defining characteristic of mental states but here 
intentionality is understood in terms of intentional directedness rather 
than in terms of semantic content. In this way enactivism provides for the 
possibility of an alternative mark of the mental that allows for a genuinely 
interesting EMT, since the activity that is constitutive of mentality 
supervenes not only on what goes on in brains, but necessarily on bodily 
and environmental factors as well. Thus, if the enactivist approach can be 
made to work and if it can yield an alternative mark of the mental then it 
holds the possibility of providing an alternative theoretical basis for a 
genuinely interesting version of EMT. 
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The principal conclusion of this work, therefore, is that EMT, as currently 
formulated, cannot conclusively demonstrate the extension of mental 
states into the world. Close analysis of the claims of EM theorists and the 
assumptions on which these claims are based reveals this may be because 
EMT accepts too much from traditional representationalist views of 
mind. EMT takes mind as theorised by orthodox representational views 
and seeks to extend it into world. It‘s radical only in as much as it seeks 
to challenge the internalist location claims of traditional views of mind 
while showing it possible to accept most of their core assumptions. But, 
as I have argued, current formulations of EMT can unproblematically 
secure, at best, the extension of cognitive processing into the world and 
yields only EMMT; the Extended Machinery of Mind Hypothesis. Thus, 
EMT goes too far in arguing for the extension of mental states into the 
world because it does not go far enough in its rejection of the view of 
mind that it seeks to challenge. 
 
My analysis also paves the way and should provide good grounds and 
motivation for exploring new and more radical possibilities for a genuine 
EMT. A more radical EMT, with a new understanding of biologically 
basic cognition as extensive and not extended would help to deal with 
Rupert-style concerns that EMT does not provide an interesting basis for 
re-thinking philosophy of mind (2004). Consider, for example, whether 
there is any loss of explanatory power should we choose to interpret 
Otto‘s case in terms of EMMT rather than EMT. Although current 
formulations of EMT would, if correct, prompt a re-think of traditional 
metaphysics about mind, it is not clear that they would prompt a similar 
re-think in the methodology of cognitive science. Thinking of mental 
states as embedded rather than extended and of the enablers of certain 
mental states extending on occasion (EMMT) would seem to promote a 
similar research methodology without the metaphysical commitments of 
EMT. 
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By contrast, if the radical enactivist approach is correct then this may 
well provoke a complete re-think of the methodology of cognitive science 
as well as traditional metaphysics about mind. 
 
Issues for Enactivism 
 
But we should be wary of hopping on board the enactivism train too 
soon. As indicated in the previous chapter, the enactivist approach is still 
in its infancy. And although it holds promise with regard to the 
formulation of an alternative mark of the mental that specifies a 
metaphysically extensive mind, there are a number of challenges that 
need to be met first. 
 
Of primary concern is the Information-Processing Challenge. Because the 
principal explanatory resource availed of by enactivists is ―the theory of 
self-organizing and autonomous dynamic systems‖ (Thompson 2007: 26) 
the worry is that it is in danger of undervaluing the role played by 
information processing mechanisms in making mental activity possible 
(Ramsey 2007, Clark 2008b). Unless it can meet this Information-
Processing Challenge by providing a content-free account of how 
mentality emerges from engagement with the world then it is not clear 
that enactivism can provide a genuinely alternative approach to the 
question of the metaphysical extent of mind. 
 
Furthermore, because the enactivist approach is in its infancy there is a 
requirement for further foundational work. In particular, appeals to self-
organization in the form of autopoesis (following Varela et al. 1991) may 
entail that a living system and a cognitive system are co-extensive and 
that, therefore, the cognitive system does cannot extend beyond the 
boundaries of the organism (see Di Paolo 2009). Di Paolo admits that 
such a reading of autopoesis in the enactivist literature is possible but is 
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nevertheless adamant that ―nothing like an internalist approach to mind is 
intended by the enactive approach‖ (2009: 12). That said, Di Paolo also 
recognizes that enactivism is far from the finished article and that a 
properly enactivist account of mind will take further work, particularly 
regarding appeals to autopoesis. 
 
It is a mistake to take the theory of autopoesis as originally formulated 
as a finished theory … autopoesis leaves many questions unanswered. 
In particular, several essential issues that could serve as a bridge 
between mind and life (like a proper grounding of teleology and 
agency) are given scant or null treatment in the primary literature. (Ibid: 
12). 
 
Despite these problems the radical enactivist approach offers more 
promise of developing a genuinely interesting EMT than current 
formulations. This is precisely because it rejects the representational view 
of mind and, in particular, it rejects non-derived content as a necessary 
condition on a state‘s being mental—the issue which has seen the current 
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